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ABSTRACT 
  There are no provisions in administrative law for regulating the 
flow of information entering or leaving the system, or for ensuring 
that regulatory participants can keep up with a rising tide of issues, 
details, and technicalities. Indeed, a number of doctrinal refinements, 
originally intended to ensure that executive branch decisions are made 
in the sunlight, inadvertently create incentives for participants to 
overwhelm the administrative system with complex information, 
causing many of the decisionmaking processes to remain, for all 
practical purposes, in the dark. As these agency decisions become 
increasingly obscure to all but the most well-informed insiders, 
administrative accountability is undermined as entire sectors of 
affected parties find they can no longer afford to participate in this 
expensive system. Pluralistic oversight, productive judicial review, and 
opportunities for intelligent agency decisionmaking are all put under 
significant strain in a system that refuses to manage—and indeed 
tends to encourage—excessive information. This Article first discusses 
how parties can capture the regulatory process using information that 
allows them to control or at least dominate regulatory outcomes (the 
information capture phenomenon). It then traces the problem back to 
a series of failures by Congress and the courts to require some 
filtering of the information flowing through the system (filter failure). 
Rather than filtering information, the incentives tilt in the opposite 
direction and encourage participants to err on the side of providing 
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too much rather than too little information. Evidence is then offered 
to show how this uncontrolled and excessive information is taking a 
toll on the basic objectives of administrative governance. The Article 
closes with a series of unconventional but relatively straightforward 
reforms that offer some hope of bringing information capture under 
control. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the early 1970s, legal visionaries like Joseph Sax, Lynton 
Caldwell, and Ralph Nader pressed for a system of rules that would 
give the public greater access to administrative decisions.1 Their battle 
against smoke-filled rooms populated only by well-heeled insiders 
bore fruit, and Congress adopted important reforms aimed at letting 
the sunshine in. 
An explosion of laws followed, requiring open records,2 rigorous 
processes for advisory groups,3 access to congressional deliberations,4 
and demands that agencies go the extra mile to include all interested 
participants and to take their views into consideration.5 During this 
 
 1. See, e.g., JOSEPH SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR CITIZEN 
ACTION (1972); Lynton Caldwell, The National Environmental Policy Act: Retrospect and 
Prospect, 6 ENVTL. L. REP. 50,030 (1976); Ralph Nader, Freedom from Information: The Act 
and the Agencies, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1970). 
 2. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). 
 3. Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–16 (2006). 
 4. Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2006). 
 5. Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–70 (2006). 
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same time, the courts also stepped up their oversight of the agencies. 
Most notably, they expanded standing rules to enable public interest 
representatives to challenge agencies in court when agency rules 
diverge significantly from promises made by Congress.6 
A few commentators have expressed misgivings about the trend,7 
but the overwhelming majority views these reforms as important 
steps in the right direction. This is not surprising given that equal 
access, transparency, and judicial review are considered cornerstones 
of accountable government.8 Open government initiatives not only 
enhance oversight of agencies by affected groups, but also facilitate 
checks and balances within government itself.9 
But every successful reform movement has its unintended 
consequences. What few administrative architects anticipated from 
the new commitment to “sunlight”10 was that a dense cloud of 
detailed, technical, and voluminous information would move in to 
obscure the benefits of transparency. And because rulemaking 
processes are by their very nature blind to the risks of excessive 
 
 6. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. 
L. REV. 1669, 1723, 1748 (1975) (documenting and critiquing the liberalization of standing rules 
and the resulting greater judicial oversight of agency rulemakings through what he calls the 
“interest representation model”). 
 7. Professor Stewart in particular expressed great skepticism that broad participation 
rights would transfer naturally to the vigorous representation of all interests affected by the 
regulatory proceedings. Id. at 1763; see also id. at 1803 (“Full implementation of the formal 
participation and standing rights that are central to the interest representation model of 
administrative law would enormously increase the expense of the administrative process and 
might, in practice, increase the barriers to participation by interests that are not well-organized 
or affluent.”). 
 8. See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY 
POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 22–29 (6th ed. 2006) (describing administrative law’s 
chronological development since 1962, which highlights the importance of these principles in the 
contemporary evolution of administrative law). 
 9. Cf. 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.9, at 668 (5th ed. 
2010) (“It is simply impossible for the President even to be aware of all of the policy decisions 
agencies make. His staff assigned to this task is too small to engage in detailed scrutiny of all 
major policy decisions.”). 
 10. Justice Brandeis’ phrase, “sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants,” see Louis D. 
Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER’S WKLY., Dec. 20, 1913, reprinted in LOUIS D. 
BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92, 92 (1914), has been 
repeated almost like a mantra in some administrative law and regulatory circles. See, e.g., Steven 
Aftergood, Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 399, 
399 (2009) (quoting Brandeis and arguing that the notion of transparency is critical to the 
integrity of government); Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory 
System, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1096 (2007) (“Commentators describing the origins of the 
disclosure requirements of the securities acts frequently quote Louis Brandeis, that ‘[s]unlight 
is . . . the best of disinfectants.’”). 
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information, committed as they are to the flow of information and 
expansive participation, a new phenomenon—called “information 
capture”—is taking hold. 
In the regulatory context, information capture refers to the 
excessive use of information and related information costs as a means 
of gaining control over regulatory decisionmaking in informal 
rulemakings.11 A continuous barrage of letters, telephone calls, 
meetings, follow-up memoranda, formal comments, post-rule 
comments, petitions for reconsideration, and notices of appeal from 
knowledgeable interest groups over the life cycle of a rulemaking can 
have a “machine-gun” effect on overstretched agency staff.12 The law 
does not permit the agency to shield itself from this flood of 
information and focus on developing its own expert conception of the 
project. Instead, the agency is required by law to “consider” all of the 
input received.13 
To make matters worse, as the issues grow more numerous and 
technical, less well-financed interest groups find it hard to continue 
participating in the process. They often lack the time, the resources, 
or the expertise to continue reviewing all of the information that 
becomes part of the rulemaking record. Yet as their engagement 
wanes, so does the pluralistic engine considered so fundamental to 
the administrative process. They can no longer provide a means of 
culling out extraneous information and other chaff from the 
rulemaking through their vigorous engagement. Incentives to load as 
much information as possible into the system, combined with a 
reduction in the number and diversity of affected parties participating 
in the rulemaking process,14 set the stage for information capture. 
The root cause of information capture is not administrative law’s 
commitment to open government and transparency, but rather its 
failure to require participants to self-process the information they 
load into the system, termed “filter failure” here.15 In most social and 
legal settings, participants have meaningful incentives to process and 
hone the information they communicate. Most notably, they want to 
be sure that the desired message is communicated in an efficient and 
 
 11. It is possible that the information capture phenomenon also afflicts formal rulemakings 
in some ways, but these issues are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 12. JAMES LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 51 
(1960). 
 13. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006). 
 14. See infra Part III.A. 
 15. See infra notes 21–23 and accompanying text. 
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effective way. Administrative law, by contrast, imposes almost no 
filtering requirements or incentives on any of the participants who 
engage in the rulemaking and instead produces strong incentives for 
precisely the opposite behavior at key points in the process. 
Unlike the older conceptions of capture that depend 
fundamentally on the vulnerability of the hearts, minds, and stamina 
of agency staff to special interests, information capture flourishes 
even when agency officials are determined to resist this pressure.16 
Even more insidious, under the right circumstances capture will take 
place even if the dominant participants are not trying to manipulate 
the system. It is as if the logic of the administrative process creates a 
gravitational field that attracts more and more information. Even if 
the consequences are unintended, the parties with the resources to 
feed the information monster will benefit, to the detriment of actors 
with fewer resources and the administrative system as a whole. 
Moreover, once excessive information begins to gum up the works, 
simple fixes are no longer possible. Radical institutional overhaul 
becomes the only viable remedy.17 
Information capture thrives in regulatory arenas in which 
technical issues dominate the rulemaking. In these settings, diffuse 
beneficiaries, typically represented by public interest groups, face 
substantial impediments to participating in costly rulemakings when 
the rules are detailed, complex, technical, and involve issues that are 
difficult to translate into salient risks for donors, the public, and the 
media. Without pressure from a diverse group of affected interests 
and absent a central arbiter with incentives to find balance in spite of 
incomplete representation, regulatory outcomes risk becoming 
skewed in favor of the dominant interest group. 
A number of important social policies may be adversely affected 
by administrative law’s naïve presupposition that more information is 
better.18 Although this affinity for unbounded information may have 
 
 16. See infra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra Part IV. 
 18. For example, there have been rumblings of information capture and excessive 
information in the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC’s) telecommunications 
regulations, see Pete Tridish & Danielle Redden, Radio Controlled: A Media Activist’s Guide to 
the FCC!, PROMETHEUS RADIO PROJECT, Feb. 12, 2006, http://prometheusradio.org/low_ 
power_radio/organizational_guides/radio_controlled.html (trying to break open the “obscure” 
FCC rulemakings, which appear to have been mired in information capture, for radio activists); 
in the disclosure required by securities regulation, see, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the 
Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 
417, 449 (2003) (arguing that security disclosure requirements are not sensitive to the need to 
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originated in the middle of the last century when information was 
more scarce,19 in the electronic age, this undiscriminating approach to 
information is clearly outdated. Indeed, other institutions recognize 
that effective processing of information is a prerequisite to effective 
decisionmaking.20 This Article begins by examining pollution and 
toxics regulations by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
but it is part of a larger project that examines a broad range of issue 
areas that may be adversely affected by the administrative state’s 
obliviousness to the effects of excessive information in a variety of 
regulatory settings. 
The argument that administrative law’s utter inability to 
recognize and address information excess—its filter failure—
significantly undermines its ability to ensure administrative 
accountability in certain areas of regulation unfolds in four Parts. The 
first Part provides an orientation to the basic concepts of information 
capture and filter failure and sets them against the larger literature of 
law, political science, and information theory. The second Part 
discusses how current administrative laws and processes exacerbate, 
rather than counteract, excessive information costs and information 
capture. The third Part highlights some of the adverse consequences 
that flow from a legal system that remains indifferent to information 
excess. 
Despite the apparent entrenchment of information capture 
within existing administrative process, this Article closes on an 
optimistic note by identifying a number of relatively straightforward 
reforms in the fourth Part that are likely to go some distance toward 
redressing the adverse consequences of information capture in the 
administrative state. One antidote presented in this final Part is to 
reform the standard for judicial review in a way that recalibrates 
judicial deference to the level of vigorous and balanced engagement 
by interest groups, rather than to the reasonableness of the agency’s 
result. A variety of panels—like citizen advisory and science advisory 
 
filter or limit information and that this leads to a series of regulatory-related problems); and in 
utilities regulation, see Frank N. Laird, Learning Contested Lessons: Participation Equity and 
Electric Utility Regulation, 25 REV. POL’Y RES. 429, 434 (2008) (discussing how public utilities 
commission public hearings are still stacked in favor of utilities in ways that resonate with the 
information capture theory). 
 19. See, e.g., HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-
MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS 242 (4th ed. 1997) (criticizing 
organizations’ information systems as generally not being designed “to conserve the critical 
scarce resource—the attention of managers”). 
 20. See infra notes 24–27 and accompanying text. 
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panels—could also be deployed to counteract information capture’s 
tendency to focus an agency too narrowly on the concerns of one set 
of interests. Administrative process should also be revamped to 
provide agencies with greater freedom to develop rules free from 
interest group influence, such as providing an early, litigation-free 
opportunity for regulatory innovation by policy wonks who are 
insulated from stakeholder pressure. Finally, the dominant 
stakeholders can be pitted against one another in a competitive sense 
to cut through the information excess and identify regulatory 
solutions that otherwise might lie buried beneath piles of information. 
I.  THE BASICS OF INFORMATION CAPTURE AND FILTER FAILURE 
In administrative law, the absence of limits on the quality, 
quantity, or content of information submitted to the agency makes 
the temptation to inundate the agency with reams of technical details 
and multiple arguments all but irresistible. Indeed, a variety of 
doctrinal and statutory incentives unwittingly encourage regulatory 
participants to load the administrative system with more and more 
information in ways that ultimately undermine pluralistic oversight by 
creating unfair advantages for those advocates who have the 
resources to engage in these excessive processes. At the root of the 
problem is filter failure—a refusal of administrative law to make an 
effort to optimize the amount or nature of information entering or 
leaving the system. The needed filters or screens would not blot out 
communications, but rather would make them more efficient and 
streamlined by requiring regulatory participants, including the 
agency, to rigorously process communications before inflicting them 
on other regulatory participants. The absence of filters to encourage 
more efficient communications, when combined with strong 
incentives for parties to overload the system, puts the regulatory 
system at risk of information capture, which allows some parties to 
control or at least dominate regulatory outcomes using information. 
This Part sets out the mechanics of this filter failure and resulting 
information capture. After providing a more complete explanation of 
these phenomena, the Part discusses how information capture fits into 
the theoretical literature more generally. The Part closes by exploring 
some features of EPA rulemakings that cause them to be particularly 
vulnerable to information capture. 
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A. The Basics of Information Capture 
Information capture involves either the inadvertent or the 
strategic use of costly communications—well beyond what is 
necessary to convey the message—to gain control over regulatory 
outcomes. Information capture can be undertaken by stakeholders or 
even the agency itself. Because the prize is control over the regulatory 
outcome, information capture can be waged by different parties (that 
is, a stakeholder and the agency) simultaneously, often using multiple 
strategies. To be a serious player in this game, a participant must 
enjoy convenient access to relevant information, a significant reserve 
of resources (mostly technical and legal), and high stakes and 
motivation. To win, a player need not convince his opponents of the 
merits of his case; he need only wear them down enough to cause 
them to throw in their towels and give in. 
The root cause of information capture is filter failure, a basic 
failure of the administrative process to force participants to ensure 
that the information they provide meets the needs of the audience 
and situation.21 Ideally, participants will provide the right level of 
information—both in content and volume—for their intended 
audience. In many social settings, in fact, the problem of information 
excess is not a serious one.22 Most speakers and writers voluntarily 
bear the costs of processing and filtering information before they 
communicate it to ensure it will reach their intended audience.23 In an 
academic setting, simple rewards like book sales, article citations, and 
 
 21. Clay Shirky coined the term “filter failure” in his speech at the Web 2.0 Expo NY, “It’s 
Not Information Overload. It’s Filter Failure” in September of 2008, which is available at 
http://web2expo.blip.tv/file/1277460/. The need for filters or limits on information that are 
mindful of the capabilities and limitations of the audience is relatively well accepted, see, e.g., 
PAUL GRICE, Logic and Conversation, in STUDIES IN THE WAYS OF WORDS 22, 26 (1989) 
(offering as a cooperative principle that conversation be based on the needs and purposes of the 
situation), though the concept may not be totally worked out, even in linguistics, see, e.g., Henry 
E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1133 
(2003) (observing how linguistics have focused traditionally on the costs of information from the 
perspective of the speaker, rather than the audience). Shirky’s most valuable contribution is to 
focus attention on these filters and away from more abstract worries about information 
overload, which often do not consider the unique features of the receiving institutional or social 
setting. 
 22. In Professor Smith’s model of information, “the aim is to maximize the net benefits of 
communication, that is the excess of the benefits of communication over the costs of production 
and process. ‘Processing costs’ . . . include the costs incurred by a cognitive agent in receiving 
information from a message.” Smith, supra note 21, at 1108. 
 23. See id. at 1136 (noting how most information theory assumes that the communications 
are cooperative in nature). 
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instructor evaluations encourage speakers to internalize the costs of 
processing information, even when their audience is large and 
anonymous. 
Many areas of law are sensitive to the problem of information 
excess and even consciously require actors to filter information 
before the legal system will recognize it. Professor Henry Smith writes 
with great admiration about property rules that tend to encourage the 
approximate optimization of information through simple rules that 
other owners can respect.24 Contract rules may be even more 
exemplary in calibrating the level of detail and volume that is 
reasonable for a given contract to the capabilities of the parties.25 
Many court battles, at least at the appellate level, involve explicit 
limits on the pages, margins, and even font size of briefs; the time 
allocated for oral argument; and the number of pages of 
attachments.26 And trials before juries—however indirectly—require 
counsel to distill and abbreviate the key message for a group of lay 
persons with average attention spans and educational levels. Trial 
courts also impose a number of important filters on evidence to 
ensure that counsel, rather than the judicial system, bear the cost of 
processing this information prior to introducing the evidence at trial.27 
But administrative law is different. A commitment to open 
government and full participation is understood to preclude limits or 
filters on information, and the administrative system operates on the 
working assumption that all information is welcome and will be fairly 
 
 24. See id. at 1114, 1155–56 (arguing that property law does a relatively good job of 
minimizing third-party processing costs). 
 25. See id. at 1177–90 (discussing the ways that contract law develops to take into account 
information costs). 
 26. Virtually every article providing tips for appellate brief writing emphasizes the need for 
being as succinct as possible and for sharpening arguments to make them accessible to the busy 
judicial panel. See, e.g., Shari M. Oberg & Daniel C. Brubaker, Supreme Review, 87 MICH. B.J. 
30, 33 (2008) (“Given the workload of the Supreme Court, effective applications are as concise 
as possible.”); Michael J. Traft, Special Considerations in Appellate Briefs, in 1 APPELLATE 
PRACTICE IN MASSACHUSETTS ch. 14, § 14.1 (2008). 
 27. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence.”); see also Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 
IOWA L. REV. 227, 229 (1988) (noting the argument in recent historical scholarship that “the 
modern rules of evidence were instituted primarily for the control of lawyers rather than for the 
control of juries”). 
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considered.28 Indeed, the historic myth of agencies as experts may 
have locked the courts into a kind of unrealistic expectation with 
regard to the unlimited capacity of agencies to resolve any question 
put to them.29 In their high hopes for the administrative state, the 
courts and even Congress and the president seem to have designed 
the system with “the fallacy of thinking that ‘more information is 
better.’”30 
Yet without filters, parties have little reason to economize on the 
information they submit to agencies.31 Participants are not held to any 
limits on the information they file, nor must they assume any of the 
costs the agency incurs in processing their voluminous filings.32 
Indeed, a variety of court rulings actually encourage regulatory 
participants to err on the side of providing far too much information, 
rather than too little.33 But as information costs rise, so do the costs of 
 
 28. See, e.g., Sheila Jasanoff, Transparency in Public Science: Purposes, Reasons, Limits, 69 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 21, 21–22 (2006) (discussing the commitment to and gradual 
expansion of the public’s right to access information underlying agency decisions); see also infra 
Part II.A. 
 29. See, e.g., Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence 
of New Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399, 417 (2007) (describing how in the 
early to mid-1900s, agency experts were viewed as neutral specialists able to successfully 
implement Congress’s more general policy solutions and identify the “objectively correct 
solution[s] to the country’s problems”). 
 30. SIMON, supra note 19, at 242–43 (emphasis added). 
 31. Participants might be naturally inclined to filter communications occurring in individual 
meetings, hearings, or phone calls with an agency staff member. See, e.g., Andrea Bear Field & 
Kathy E.B. Robb, EPA Rulemakings: Views from Inside and Outside, 5 NAT. RESOURCES & 
ENV’T, Summer 1990, at 5, 5 (advocating this type of control over short-term communications). 
Over the long term and across the life cycle of a rule’s development, however, the incentives 
tend in just the opposite direction. 
 32. The Freedom of Information Act is an exception to this general rule; it allows the 
agency to ask the requester to reimburse it for reasonable expenses incurred in responding to 
the information request. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) (2006) (authorizing federal agencies to set 
fees for search and duplication that are “limited to reasonable standard charges for document 
search and duplication” and providing for recovery of only the direct costs of such search and 
duplication). 
 33. For a discussion of these legal incentives, see infra Part II.A–B. In theory, the point at 
which information costs are higher than necessary depends on the intended audience. See, e.g., 
Smith, supra note 21, at 1157 (taking care to avoid the goal of “optimizing” information and 
instead attempting to highlight how the law sometimes is attentive to trading off the costs of 
communication shouldered by the communicator and those imposed on the audience). 
Determining this precise point will be both difficult and quite contestable. Conveniently, 
however, because the focus of this Article is on filter failure and the nearly complete absence of 
any restrictions on the flow of information through the system, the argument is simply that some 
types of filters or restrictions are required. Other commentators may wish to debate how to 
determine the right level of or approach to filtering in different administrative settings. 
Although I dodge this bullet, I strongly suspect that ultimately the resolution will come from 
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participation, and this can affect the ability of some groups to 
continue to participate in the process and ultimately may cause thinly 
financed groups to exit for lack of resources. 
In a participatory system already struggling against the odds to 
generate balanced engagement from a broad range of affected 
parties, filter failure is likely to be the last straw. Pluralistic processes 
integral to administrative governance threaten to break down and 
cease to function when an entire, critical sector of affected interests 
drops out due to the escalating costs of participation. Instead of 
presiding over vigorous conflicts between interest groups that draw 
out the most important issues and test the reliability of key facts, the 
agency may stand alone, bracing itself against a continuous barrage of 
information from an unopposed, highly engaged interest group. The 
agency will do its best to stay abreast of the information, but without 
pluralistic engagement by the opposition, which helps filter the issues, 
and without the support of procedural filters that impose some 
discipline on the filings of dominant participants, the agency may find 
itself fighting a losing battle. A system that puts the decisionmaker at 
the mercy of an unlimited flood of information from an unopposed 
group, which in turn can reinforce its filings by a credible threat of 
litigation, is captured by information. Figure 1 illustrates the 
dynamics of filter failure and information capture. 
 
pragmatic experimentation with various types of information filters and incentives, until a 
relatively acceptable balance has been struck. 
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Figure 1.  A Flowchart of Filter Failure and Information Capture 
From the standpoint of a resourceful party, the ability to gain 
control of the rulemaking process through the use of excessive 
information may even be turned into a strategic advantage.34 Using 
technical terms and frames of reference that require a high level of 
background information and technical expertise, and relying heavily 
on “particularized knowledge and specialized conventions,”35 these 
fully engaged stakeholders can deliberately hijack the proceedings. 
Aggressively gaming the system to raise the costs of participation ever 
higher will, in many cases, ensure the exclusion of public interest 
groups that lack the resources to continue to participate in the 
process. Doing so all but assures that the aggressor will enjoy an 
unrestricted playing field and the ability to control the public input 
through all phases of the rulemaking life cycle. 
Even when agency staff can withstand the technical minutia 
coming at them at high speed and under tight time constraints, they 
face an administrative record that is badly lopsided, and threats of 
 
 34. For a more detailed description, see infra Part III.B.2. 
 35. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 21, at 1167 (describing all of these features as negative 
aspects of information). 
WAGNER IN FINAL.DOC 3/4/2010  2:04:17 AM 
1334 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:1321 
lawsuits against the substance of their regulation that come 
predominantly from only one sector (industry).36 This skewed 
pressure may not cause them to cave in to each and every unopposed 
comment and technical addendum, but it likely affects at least some 
of the choices incorporated into the final rule.37 And when time is 
short, information capture becomes even more severe. Agency staff, 
even those who began their careers as true believers in their agency’s 
mission, may find themselves relieved to have regulations written by 
industry because this ensures a quicker path toward a final, binding 
rule.38  
B. Information Capture’s Fit with Existing Theories 
Collective action theory already highlights the grim plight of 
public interest groups saddled with multiple handicaps in organizing 
and participating.39 The resultant underrepresentation of the diffuse 
public—at least relative to its actual stake in the issue—is a constant 
worry for political processes.40 
Information capture, however, adds a new worry to the collective 
action story: it reveals that the costs of organizing are not the only 
impediment that public interest representatives need to overcome.41 
 
 36. See infra notes 266–69 and accompanying text. 
 37. See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa Peters, Air Toxics in the 
Boardroom: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Hazardous Air Pollutants Rules 19–22 (Nov. 13, 
2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 38. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 39. See generally STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE 
POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 29–52 (2008) (providing a thorough 
overview of public choice concerns about collective action barriers). 
 40. See, e.g., RONALD J. HREBENAR, INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN AMERICA 329–30 (3d 
ed. 1997) (discussing the impediments faced by representatives of the diffuse public in relation 
to more concentrated interests, as well as their struggles to keep up in recent times); NEIL K. 
KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 69–72 (1994) (describing collective action problems with particular reference to 
how they impede smooth functioning of the political process); Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. 
Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1285–90 (2006) 
(same); see also Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 
99 (1983) (“[W]idely dispersed costs or benefits are less effectively represented in policymaking 
than concentrated costs or benefits. Thus we would expect error-correction to favor interests 
championed by enforcers and regulated firms and to undervalue interests of unorganized 
beneficiaries of government programs.” (footnote omitted)). 
 41. Much of the commentary on public engagement in administrative rulemaking focuses 
primarily on the costs to nonprofits of organizing, and neglects the equally important costs 
associated with accessing and processing the relevant information, which can vary significantly 
between rules. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and 
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Instead, inflated information costs, beyond what is justified or 
necessary, further drive up the cost of participation and 
simultaneously lower the payoff, at least to public interest groups that 
will find it increasingly difficult to translate the issues into tangible 
public benefits.42 In economic terms, as the costs go up and the payoff 
goes down, these thinly financed and salience-dependent groups that 
represent the public will drop out of the process.43 Indeed, they may 
even drop out midway through the rulemaking after realizing that 
they can no longer justify their involvement to donors and other 
funders. 
These rising information costs can take a variety of forms in the 
regulatory system.44 Communications bulging with undigested facts 
are the most common type of information excess and include 
redundancies and peripheral issues that must be culled out; 
discussions pitched at too specialized a level or demanding an 
unreasonable level of background information from the reader; and 
discussions delving into very intricate details, many of which are of 
trivial significance. All of these information excesses serve to inflate 
 
Future, 55 DUKE L.J. 943, 966 (2006) (surmising that the lack of public participation in e-
rulemaking is due in large part to the “opportunity costs,” including more recreational 
opportunities and the concern that one comment will not make a difference in any event; but 
missing the arguably more important impediment posed by highly voluminous and technical 
information that must be processed before a party can determine whether it has a stake in the 
issue or can identify meaningful ways to engage); Stewart, supra note 6, at 1760–90 (focusing on 
stakes-related features that tend to disadvantage public interest groups, but neglecting to 
consider the added barriers arising from the high costs of processing relevant information that 
further disadvantage these groups). 
 42. See, e.g., Constance A. Nathanson, Social Movements as Catalysts for Policy Change: 
The Case of Smoking and Guns, 24 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 421, 442 (1999) (discussing the 
importance of a “credible risk” to environmental and public health campaigns; without this risk, 
the effort is severely handicapped). Information externalities, then, may be particularly costly 
for public interest representatives because it not only increases the costs of their participation 
but also decreases their ability to sell their involvement to donors, thus further shrinking the 
payoff. 
 43. Professor Neil Komesar observes that an individual’s participation is based upon the 
relative costs and benefits of that participation, a calculation that varies not only by issue but by 
institution. When the costs of information are lowered and information becomes more 
accessible, participation increases. Similarly, when the benefits to participation rise—for 
example, through damage awards in tort claims—claimants’ participation increases. See 
KOMESAR, supra note 40, at 8. It is the combination of lower costs and higher benefits that 
explains the comparative advantages of the tort system relative to the regulatory system in 
providing improved access to needed information regarding health and environmental 
protection. 
 44. See Smith, supra note 21, at 1153–55 (roughly defining information externalities as 
those costs that “are most likely not to be internalized by a sender of a message,” which 
Professor Smith then illustrates graphically). 
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the participants’ costs in processing the information.45 Secrecy and 
deception also impose unjustified information costs on other 
participants if they are not able to access the information cheaply or 
at all.46 Even thinly supported litigation threats and marginally 
meritorious lawsuits can increase information-related costs for 
recipients (that is, defendants) to unreasonable levels.47 Familiar 
concepts like nuisance litigation and extortive settlements refer at 
base to the concept that the audience—or defendant—incurs 
excessive information costs as a result of plaintiffs’ abuse of process.48 
The results of this information capture resemble the outcomes 
expected from more traditional forms of capture, but the mechanisms 
through which information capture occurs are actually quite different 
from and at odds with these early public choice models. Most versions 
of old-fashioned agency capture depend on wooing malleable agency 
staff and officials with contributions or promises of future 
employment.49 If the soul of the regulatory official is not for sale, then 
 
 45. For examples, see infra notes 92, 94–112 and accompanying text. Information costs 
include costs associated with accessing and processing information. Information processing costs 
can arise from information that requires specialized training or extensive background expertise, 
information that is voluminous, information that is dense and complex, and information that is 
poorly organized and not explained in clear ways. Access costs arise primarily when one or 
more of the participants has asymmetric information and, at its extreme, involves a party’s 
refusal to share the information. The importance of these different types of information costs to 
rational behavior is still being worked out, but their basic features—of raising the costs for 
audiences to understand a message—seems well accepted. For some of the ongoing work that 
attempts to better understand how these species of information costs affect behavior, see, for 
example, Haruo Horaguchi, The Role of Information Processing Cost as the Foundation of 
Bounded Rationality in Game Theory, 51 ECON. LETTERS 287 (1996); Stephen Morris & Hyun 
Song Shin, Optimal Communication, 5 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 594 (2007). 
 46. See supra note 45. 
 47. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Challenging the Rules: Litigation and Bargaining in the 
Administrative Process 104 n.25 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Michigan) 
(on file with the Duke Law Journal) (recounting an anecdote in which the industry petitioned in 
the hope of getting rule adjustments, but the agency held firm and the industry ultimately 
voluntarily dismissed its petition). 
 48. See, e.g., In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 236 F. Supp. 2d 445, 453–60 (E.D. Pa. 
2002) (criticizing attorneys for medically unreasonable assembly-line diagnoses in the fen-phen 
settlement); see also Lester Brickman, On the Theory Class’s Theories of Asbestos Litigation: 
The Disconnect Between Scholarship and Reality, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 33, 62–103 (2003) 
(hypothesizing a high false-positive rate of asbestosis diagnoses in mass asbestos litigation due 
to plaintiffs’ attorneys’ assembly-line practices). 
 49. See, e.g., Bagley & Revesz, supra note 40, at 1284 (observing how capture theory is 
based on the premise that well-organized groups gain an advantage by contributing votes and 
resources); Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and 
the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 178 (1990) (“‘Capture’ is the 
adoption by the regulator for self-regarding (private) reasons, such as enhancing electoral 
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this traditional form of agency capture is ineffectual. Information 
capture, by contrast, thrives even in cases in which officials are 
principally opposed to the skewed outcomes that may result. The end 
result, however, is the same. In information capture, just as in old-
fashioned capture, the stakeholders with relatively greater resources 
are able to dominate the outcomes and often do so free of oversight 
by onlookers—not because the deals have been struck through 
financial inducements, but because they are so technical and 
complicated that in practice they take place at an altitude that is out 
of the range of vision of the full set of normally engaged and affected 
parties. 
Information capture also fits neatly within existing political 
science models of interest group participation, though again the 
phenomenon seems to be missing from existing theory. In his classic 
four-quadrant typology of regulation, for example, Professor James 
Q. Wilson predicts that when the benefits of a policy are diffused 
across the population and the costs are concentrated on a small group 
of regulated parties, the agency is more at risk of capture unless a 
charismatic entrepreneur emerges who acts as the “vicarious 
representative” of the public beneficiaries.50 On its face, Professor 
Wilson’s model fits well with information capture, which simply adds 
in the variable of information costs to predict particularly high risks 
of capture for complex and technical rules. In applying his model to 
the subset of technical environmental regulations, however, Professor 
Wilson is surprisingly optimistic that dominance by regulated parties 
will generally be avoided due to the low costs of accessing the process 
and the growing prevalence of policy entrepreneurs, such as 
environmental nonprofits.51 Through these assumptions, Professor 
Wilson betrays a possible blind spot with regard to filter failure and 
 
support or postregulatory compensation, of a policy which would not be ratified by an informed 
polity free of organization costs.”). 
 50. See JAMES Q. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 367–70 (1980). Professor 
Wilson’s four quadrants of politics categorize regulation according to the distribution of benefits 
(concentrated or diffuse) on the one hand, and the distribution of costs (concentrated or 
diffuse) on the other. The specific categories include not only “entrepreneurial politics,” in 
which benefits are broad but the costs of a policy are concentrated, but also “majoritarian 
politics,” in which society in general incurs both the benefits and the cost of the policy; “interest-
group politics,” in which both the costs and benefits of a policy are concentrated on a narrow set 
of interests; and “client politics,” in which the benefits of a policy accrue to a narrow set of 
interests and the costs are spread over the entire population. Id. 
 51. See, e.g., id. at 385 (suggesting that environmental groups can hold industry accountable 
and participate equally in regulation). 
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resulting information capture. Professor William Gormley’s 
quadrants of regulatory participation come much closer to 
recognizing the existence of information capture because he qualifies 
as subject to one-sided interest-group dominance (what he calls 
“board room politics”) those rules for which the information is highly 
complex.52 But these must also be nonsalient rules, by which he means 
rules that do not interest the public,53 and which he assumes, like 
Professor Wilson, generally do not include health or environmental 
rules.54 Professor Gormley’s neglect of filter failure and corresponding 
information excesses also seem to cause him to miss potentially 
important interactions between his own two variables, complexity and 
salience.55 
More specific references to an information capture–like 
phenomenon did arise during the early period of social regulation, 
but these accounts mysteriously seemed to fizzle out before they 
developed into more robust explanatory models.56 James Landis, for 
example, observed in 1960 that regulated industry—in large part 
through the never-ending stream of information—has a “daily 
machine-gun like impact” on the agency that leads to an industry 
 
 52. See William T. Gormley, Jr., Regulatory Issue Networks in a Federal System, 18 POLITY 
595, 607–08 (1986). 
 53. See id. at 598 (“A highly salient issue is one that affects a large number of people in a 
significant way. Expressed a bit differently, salience is low unless the scope of conflict is broad 
and the intensity of conflict is high.”). 
 54. See id. at 600 tbl.1 (including among the high-complexity, low-salience rules: “Cable 
Television Regulation,” “Antitrust Regulation,” “Securities Regulation,” “Insurance 
Regulation,” “Banking Regulation,” “Telephone Regulation,” “Transportation Regulation,” 
“Hospital Regulation,” and “Patent Regulation”; and including in the high-complexity, high-
salience rules: “Hazardous Waste Regulation,” “Air Quality Regulation,” “Water Quality 
Regulation,” “Occupational Safety,” and “Health Regulation”). 
 55. The strategic ability to move rules that have the capability of being “salient” into the 
“nonsalient” pile through information capture seems to escape Professor Gormley’s model. In 
retrospect, Professor Gormley’s classification system easily could be amended to include 
practical inaccessibility to the public as part of the salience variable. This friendly amendment 
acknowledges the multiple reasons why interest groups (particularly public interest groups) may 
or may not engage in a rule, and also notices how complexity makes engagement increasingly 
unlikely for public interest groups, thus creating a feedback effect between the variables. 
 56. The possibility of information capture seemed to be largely dismissed by the late 1970s, 
based in part on a renewed faith in pluralistic processes made possible by the courts’ expanded 
scope of preenforcement judicial review. Professor Croley, for example, argues that agencies 
typically account for information biases introduced by regulated parties, in part because 
adversaries will be quick to counteract this type of informational pressure. See, e.g., CROLEY, 
supra note 39, at 294 (“If one group supplies an agency with incomplete or biased information, 
another group with adverse interests will have opportunities to challenge or rebut it.”); see also 
infra Part III.A. 
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bias.57 And Professor Louis Jaffe suggested as early as 1954 that by 
virtue of their continuing presence, regulated parties capture agencies 
through the constant stream of information they provide to agencies.58 
Later, in 1978, Professors Owen and Braeutigam noticed how 
stakeholders could use information games—filing voluminous and 
technical comments, for example—to gain control over the agency.59 
In any case, these prescient sightings of information overload still 
miss the important intersection between information theory and 
administrative law that information capture helps bring into focus. 
The problem is not just that interested parties can strategically 
bombard the agency with information in order to overwhelm them. It 
is that the administrative system is so completely oblivious to 
information costs that it not only neglects requiring some information 
filtering, but also collectively creates strong incentives for this 
information excess. Although much of the resulting information 
overload may result from inadvertence—a blind but rational response 
to rules of administrative process—the system’s obliviousness to 
information costs also creates space for strategic gamesmanship. 
Information excess can then be a conscious strategy deployed by 
resourceful participants to exhaust their adversaries, reduce the 
accountability of the rulemakings outside of the immediate circle of 
those in the know, and browbeat the agency into capitulating to many 
of their demands by reinforcing each technical complaint and 
criticism with a credible threat of litigation. 
Information capture and the accompanying notion of filter 
failure not only highlight the perverse role that information can play 
in administrative law, but also fill some gaps in existing theories of 
interest group participation and agency accountability. For example, 
 
 57. LANDIS, supra note 12, at 71. But see CROLEY, supra note 39, at 293–95 (recounting the 
theory of information capture, but concluding that support for the hypothesis is limited to 
nonexistent). 
 58. See, e.g., Louis L. Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A 
Reevaluation, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1113–19 (1954); Louis L. Jaffe, Federal Regulatory 
Agencies in Perspective: Administrative Limitations in a Political Setting, 11 BOSTON C. INDUS. 
& COM. L. REV. 565, 566 (1970); see also 2 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF 
REGULATION 11–14 (1971); Roger Noll, The Economics and Politics of Regulation, 57 VA. L. 
REV. 1016, 1028–30 (1971) (observing that “most of the information flowing to the agency will 
come from the regulated”). 
 59. See BRUCE M. OWEN & RONALD BRAEUTIGAM, THE REGULATION GAME: 
STRATEGIC USE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 4–5 (1978) (advocating that special 
interests should make strategic use of information and litigation to gain control over the 
administrative process). 
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information capture embellishes in important ways on familiar 
concepts such as agency costs, monitoring costs, and slack—terms that 
generally refer to the costs or capacity for stakeholder oversight of 
agency decisions.60 When information capture is taken into account, it 
becomes important not only to think of whether the average agency 
monitoring costs are high or low, but also to assess the difference in 
monitoring costs between the most and least informationally 
advantaged participants in the rulemaking process (assuming that 
their stakes are roughly equivalent).61 References to monitoring costs 
or slack that aggregate all interest groups as an undistinguished unit 
may miss a critical variable in the accountability equation. 
Information capture, in contrast to older versions of capture, is 
also more apolitical and value neutral than the iron triangles of 
political theory that seem to depend on the prospect of campaign 
contributions and similar financial inducements between regulated 
parties and congresspersons (two points of the triangle) and on the 
predisposition of agency personnel to capitulate to congressional 
pressure (the third point of the triangle).62 A sharp disparity in 
resources is one factor in predicting the onset of information capture 
in administrative law, but it is not decisive. Poorly financed groups 
can succeed in information capture if the issue is salient and the 
stakes are high enough for them.63 Additionally, in situations in which 
a group holds information advantages, it can engage more 
inexpensively than other groups, even when it lacks other types of 
resources. 
Information capture could even catalyze rethinking of the basic 
model for agency accountability.64 Information capture and filter 
 
 60. See, e.g., Levine & Forrence, supra note 49, at 180 (discussing these terms and 
explaining that the term “slack” refers to the discretion a regulatory agency enjoys that is free 
from accountability). 
 61. An agency official may have extraordinary slack from the vantage point of an attentive 
but informationally exhausted public interest group that cannot keep up with the information, 
but very little slack with regard to the careful, information-intensive positions, arguments, and 
documentation that a common set of regulated parties produce over the life cycle of regulation. 
Cf. Levine & Forrence, supra note 49, at 185, 187, 190 (discussing the average amount of slack 
for a given rule or policy and noting that it is often very high when information costs are high, 
but not discussing how different interest groups may provide a regulator with very different 
amounts of slack in a single rulemaking). 
 62. See, e.g., HREBENAR, supra note 40, at 263 (describing Iron Triangles formed in part by 
contributions to officials that create cozy relationships). 
 63. Cf. id. at 331–39 (focusing on the important role that resources play in political power). 
 64. For a more detailed discussion of these adverse consequences, see infra Part III. 
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failure underscore how requiring agencies to open their rules to 
comments, without limits or penalties, runs the risk of inviting kitchen 
sink, scattershot comments that can occupy shelves of docket space 
and exhaust attentive participants. Information capture highlights 
how enlarging access to the courts can inadvertently provide a 
strategic tool for advantaged stakeholders to extort the agency and 
threaten it into submission. And even the dedication to transparency 
contributes to information capture because it flags for onlookers just 
how complex the rule is without providing any incentive or 
mechanism for them to engage in participating. At the same time, for 
engaged and resourceful onlookers, a transparent rulemaking 
provides more opportunity to trawl the record for weak assumptions 
and concessions of uncertainty, and ultimately to increase the issues 
in dispute. 
Finally, information capture may begin to bridge legal analysis to 
other areas of study, like information theory.65 Information theory has 
been a robust discipline for more than half a century; indeed, when 
administrative law is viewed from the perspective of information 
theorists, its design appears curiously primitive. Nobel Prize–winning 
thinkers like Herbert Simon have long stressed that the “major 
problem” with organizations is their failure to realize that attention, 
not information, is the limiting ingredient.66 These limitations are 
most pressing when an organization faces time constraints in 
decisionmaking.67 The desperate need for information-management 
systems in large organizations, like regulatory agencies, is an 
inescapable conclusion of this pioneering body of work. An entire 
discipline—the mathematical theory of information—is dedicated to 
studying ways to streamline communications and limit information 
externalities.68 Within this theory, one of the central criteria for good 
 
 65. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 21, at 1125 (“Because the stakes can be quite high in the 
law, the costs involved in the informational tradeoff sometimes require intervention, so that 
they may be more fully internalized by those sending messages about legal relations.”). 
 66. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 19, at 241–43. Dr. Simon observes that: 
The major problems of organization today are not problems of departmentalization 
and coordination of operating units. Instead, they are problems of organizing 
information storage and information processing—not division of labor, but 
factorization of decision-making. These organizational problems are best attacked, at 
least to a first approximation, by examining the information system and the system of 
decisions it supports in abstraction from agency and department structure. 
Id. at 248–49. 
 67. See, e.g., id. 
 68. See, e.g., ROBERT ASH, INFORMATION THEORY (1965); CLAUDE E. SHANNON & 
WARREN WEAVER, THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF COMMUNICATION (1949). 
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communication is minimizing information costs; for example, keeping 
bits of information at the lowest level possible, much like Bell’s 
invention of the alphabet for the telegraph, which used the shortest 
symbols for the most frequently used letters. This work similarly 
underscores the importance of processes that control information 
costs as part of basic institutional design. The economic theory of 
information, which studies inefficiencies and related defects created 
by various types of information costs, is now a burgeoning field.69 
Even within law and economics, a number of scholars have developed 
a robust literature examining how certain types of information 
costs—most notably those resulting from asymmetrical information—
impair the effectiveness of legal rules.70 This work also suggests that 
the law should pay closer attention to the need to filter information, 
although legal analysts have their work cut out for them in 
considering how to do so given the rather mature state of 
administrative law. 
At the same time, information capture also highlights blind spots 
in both legal theory and information theory. Traditionally, 
information theory has not engaged deeply in the study of deception 
or abuse of information; instead, the primary focus is on streamlining 
and making communications still more efficient.71 The mutual blind 
spots between these respective fields make the challenge of linking 
them together more difficult, but hopefully even more worthwhile. 
C. Environmental Rulemakings and Their Susceptibility to 
Information Capture 
So far, this discussion of information capture has been largely 
abstract. To make the concept at least a little more concrete, it may 
be helpful to consider the concept of information capture in the 
context of a typical EPA rulemaking. 
 
 69. See, e.g., JACK HIRSHLEIFER & JOHN G. RILEY, THE ANALYTICS OF UNCERTAINTY 
AND INFORMATION (1992); INÉS MACHO-STADLER & J. DAVID PÉREZ-CASTRILLO, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION: INCENTIVES AND CONTRACTS (2d ed. 
2001); LOUIS PHLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION (1988); Joseph E. Stiglitz, 
The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics, 115 Q.J. 
ECON. 1441 (2000). 
 70. For a sample of this body of scholarship, see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps 
in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989); 
Smith, supra note 21, at 1111. 
 71. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 21, at 1136. 
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In the vast majority of EPA rulemakings, the agency is tasked by 
Congress with setting industry- or product-specific rules that limit 
pollution or restrict the availability of chemicals or pesticides.72 In 
most cases, the agency must also calculate the cost burden on industry 
and factor it into the rule to ensure that the technologies, methods of 
inspection, and so on are practically available to all affected 
industries.73 These types of health-related regulations comprise not 
only a large portion of the EPA’s workload but also a large share of 
rules promulgated by the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) for the workplace,74 by the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission (CPSC) for a variety of consumer 
products,75 and by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for 
some food products, cosmetic products, food additives, and drugs.76 
Indeed, most public health and environmental protection occurs 
through these product-, industry-, or site-specific rulemakings that 
target particular risks and attempt to restrict them to reasonable 
levels.77 
 
 72. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136a 
(2006) (requiring manufacturers of new pesticides to conduct specific tests on the pesticide and 
obtain registration from the EPA before marketing it); Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 
15 U.S.C. § 2604 (2006) (requiring manufacturers of new chemicals to submit a premanufacture 
notification); Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2006) (prohibiting the point source 
discharge of pollution without a permit that, in turn, is based on the capabilities of the best 
available technology); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6923–
25 (2006) (requiring transporters and treatment, storage, and disposal units handling hazardous 
wastes to self-identify and follow regulatory requirements); Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 
7412(i) (2006) (prohibiting the emissions of air toxins in major amounts without a permit that 
specifies emissions limits for the source). 
 73. For example, in setting technology-based standards under the Clean Water Act, the 
EPA must consider the cost to industry, but in doing so, it generally considers features such as 
the age of equipment and facilities involved, the process employed, potential process changes, 
nonwater quality, environmental impacts including energy requirements, economic 
achievability, and other such factors as the EPA Administrator deems appropriate. See, e.g., 
Effluent Limitations Guidelines and New Source Performance Standards for the Concentrated 
Aquatic Animal Production Point Source Category, 69 Fed. Reg. 51,891, 51,896 (Aug. 23, 2004) 
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 451); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2) (2006). 
 74. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 655(a)–(b) (2006) (requiring the Secretary of Labor to establish 
mandatory nationwide standards governing health and safety in the workplace). 
 75. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2056 (2006) (allowing the Consumer Product Safety Commission 
to set consumer safety standards for products). 
 76. See, e.g., Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 341 (2006) (requiring the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services to promulgate nationwide standards for food identity 
and quality). 
 77. See generally JOHN APPLEGATE, JAN G. LAITOS & CELIA CAMPBELL-MOHN, THE 
REGULATION OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND HAZARDOUS WASTES ch. 6 (2000) (setting out 
these different standard-setting programs in greater detail). 
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Even though establishing pollution and product standards tends 
to dominate the EPA’s rulemaking agenda, most of these standards 
are rarely covered in the news.78 The agency rules that do gain the 
most attention—setting air standards for the country and allowing 
coal plants to trade mercury emissions—are atypical. These 
newsworthy rules are almost always national in scope, their health 
and environmental consequences are obvious and hence salient, and 
they have a robust mix of affected parties engaged in a fight over 
them.79 
But the EPA appears to issue only a few such very visible rules 
each year. The other three hundred or more bread-and-butter rules 
that the EPA promulgates annually get far less attention.80 And 
indeed, their relative obscurity is central to understanding why they 
may be uniquely susceptible to information capture. Although many 
of these rules have significant implications for public health and 
environmental protection,81 the EPA rulemaking process does not 
 
 78. See, e.g., Wagner et al., supra note 37, at 30–32 (charting the frequency of news reports 
on hazardous air pollutant regulation from 1990 to 2009). 
 79. See, e.g., CROLEY, supra note 39, at 160 (characterizing each of these rules as being 
“enormously important to regulatory decisions that sparked intense national debates and 
implicated billions of dollars. . . . [and noting these same rules] would all unquestionably make a 
short list of some of the most significant regulatory activity in more than a decade”). 
 80. Professor Coglianese estimated that the EPA promulgated 334 rules per year from 
1986 to 1990. See Coglianese, supra note 47, at 1 n.2, app.1. In an ongoing empirical project to 
gauge the “newsworthy” features of at least some of these rules, a Lexis search of major 
newspapers was conducted for media coverage of the EPA’s promulgation of air toxic emissions 
standards over a twenty-year period. See Wagner et al., supra note 37, at 31. The search found 
that only about 15 percent of ninety emissions standards were referenced in a major newspaper, 
despite their significance to public health protection. Id. Readers can gauge the newsworthy 
quality of EPA rules for themselves by running random searches for examples of typical EPA 
rulemakings in the Office of Management and Budget’s new Unified Agenda database. See 
RegInfo.gov, Advanced Search – Select Publication(s), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/ 
eAgendaAdvancedSearch (last visited Feb. 15, 2010). This spontaneous, limited sampling 
should provide further support for the general assertion that most EPA rulemakings remain 
obscure and out of public view. 
 81. In the Clean Air Act, for example, Congress directs the EPA to reduce the incidence of 
cancer attributable to the emission of air toxins from select sources in urban areas by at least 75 
percent. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(k)(1) (2006). Indeed, almost all pollution control 
standards under the statutes cited at note 72, supra, impose some restrictions on industrial 
operations that were initially unregulated with regard to pollution. A much more difficult 
question arises with respect to what the public health consequences are for the range of 
plausible alternative standards for each of these pollution control rules. In other words, how 
many more lives does the most rigorous version of the pollution control standard save as 
compared to the weakest plausible standard under consideration? Because these standards 
involve multiple subissues that directly affect the timing and enforceability of the rule as well as 
its coverage and stringency, there are likely to be potentially significant differences for many of 
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require that actual public health benefits be calculated or 
considered.82 In fact, because the agency is generally regulating the 
pollution source, rather than the environment itself, the direct 
implications for public health and the environment are not considered 
germane to the rule.83 If an interest group—for or against the rule—is 
interested in such information, it must model the health implications 
of different source standards on its own.84 This seems rare, but in 
cases in which it has been done, the public consequences can prove 
quite significant.85  
 
the rules. See infra notes 94–111 and accompanying text; see also Wendy Wagner & Lynn Blais, 
Children’s Health and Environmental Exposure Risks: Information Gaps, Scientific Uncertainty, 
and Regulatory Reform, 17 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 249, 256–58 (2007) (describing some of 
the enforceability and related problems with these rules, which significantly undermine their 
protective qualities). Indeed, the fact that environmental groups participate in nearly half of 
these rules, despite the barriers discussed in Part III.A, infra, suggests that the EPA’s 
development of these standards do matter, potentially very much, to public health. 
 82. This type of modeling is done only for “significant” rulemakings as determined by their 
costs to industry. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 
U.S.C. § 601 (2006). Bread-and-butter rules rise to this level only occasionally, see, e.g., Wagner 
et al., supra note 37, at 18, but even in these cases, public health benefits are often characterized 
incompletely and almost as an aside. See, e.g., Winston Harrington, Lisa Heinzerling & Richard 
D. Morgenstern, What We Learned, in REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 215, 224 
(Winston Harrington, Lisa Heinzerling & Richard D. Morgenstern eds., 2009) (advocating as a 
reform of regulatory analysis greater attention to the specification of the public health benefits 
of regulatory alternatives, and basing this proposal on infirmities detailed in preceding 
chapters). 
 83. See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 83, 88–89, 96–97 (discussing this feature of technology-based standards when emissions 
limits are based on the capabilities of existing pollution control technologies rather than on the 
needs of the receiving environment). 
 84. See Nathanson, supra note 42, at 445 (arguing that a “credible risk” is needed to engage 
the public). In discussing his difficulty in making worker-safety issues salient for the news and 
foundations, a prominent epidemiologist confided to the Author off the record that, after laying 
out all of the worrisome risks for a reporter, the reporter asked, “but where are the dying 
orphans?” 
 85. See, e.g., Occupational Exposure to Benzene, 52 Fed. Reg. 34,460, 34,461 (Sept. 11, 
1987) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910) (“OSHA estimates that the new standard [for benzene 
exposure in the workplace] will prevent a minimum of 326 deaths from leukemia and diseases of 
the blood and blood-forming organs over a working lifetime of 45 years.”). Interestingly, the 
public visibility of analogous pollution control standards may be even lower, as discussed in note 
80, supra. Recently, however, there has been increased interest in the cumulative health risks 
associated with these standards. See, e.g., Dina Cappiello & Lise Olsen, In Harm’s Way, 
HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 16, 2005, at A1, available at http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/ 
archive.mpl?id=2005_3836663 (reporting on a prize-winning investigative study of inexplicably 
high concentrations of air toxins in local communities, some of which may be in compliance with 
existing standards); see also Brad Heath & Blake Morrison, Health Risks Stack Up for Students 
Near Industrial Plants, USA TODAY, Dec. 10, 2008, at A2 (documenting uncontrolled hazardous 
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At the same time that the public benefits of pollutant standards 
are unspecified, the consequences for industry are clear, immediate, 
and direct. A worried regulated party can identify countless issues 
relating to the imposition of a pollution control standard that may 
affect its operations and ultimate profitability. For example, in a 
decision about how to set technology-based controls for industry, the 
following questions might be raised: What are the best technologies 
available in the market? How good are they, or do they vary 
according to the plant in which they are installed? Are most industry 
participants the same, or do they break into subgroups that should be 
treated differently? How easy are the various technologies to install 
and operate in most industries? How should the new pollution control 
technology be monitored and reported? The answers to these 
questions, and many more like them, determine the rigor of the 
standards the EPA promulgates.86 
In a proposed rule, the agency will offer a proposal for 
addressing these many technical questions. Because the agency’s 
proposal depends on mastering many of the issues of concern to 
industry, these plans are typically developed with heavy industry 
involvement years before the proposed rule is actually published and 
formally shared with the public.87 And as might be expected, 
regulatory energies tend to focus like a laser on the alternative 
compliance options and their costs for industry, with the possible 
differences in public benefits completely ignored or quickly drowned 
out by the hubbub relating to the technical details.88 After the 
 
air pollutants in potentially dangerous concentrations near a large number of schools 
throughout the United States). 
 86. See D. Bruce La Pierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental Protection 
Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REV. 771, 810–11 (1977) (specifying three steps in setting technology-based 
standards: (1) categorizing industries; (2) identifying the contents of their respective 
wastewaters; and (3) identifying the range of control technologies available); see also Sanford E. 
Gaines, Decisionmaking Procedures at the Environmental Protection Agency, 62 IOWA L. REV. 
839, 853 (1977) (discussing questions regarding the effectiveness of pollution control 
technologies under various plant ages, sizes, and manufacturing conditions). 
 87. See, e.g., NEIL GUNNINGHAM, PETER GRABOSKY & DARREN SINCLAIR, SMART 
REGULATION: DESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 44 (1998) (noting the “clear imbalance of 
knowledge between regulators and industry” with regard to setting technology-based 
standards). 
 88. There are very powerful, public-benefitting reasons to bracket a consideration of these 
health and environmental benefits in setting pollution control standards (whether technology-
based or simply source- or waste-specific). Because the actual health and environmental 
benefits are difficult to identify with quantitative precision, requiring an industry to “do its best” 
given available technologies allows for less litigation (from industry) and, as a result, more 
expeditious standard setting. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 83, at 83. The discussion here should 
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resulting proposed rule is published, the agency must solicit 
comments on the rule from all interested parties.89 Based on those 
comments and any other information presented to it, the agency will 
revise the rule and publish it in the Federal Register. 
Both because the issues are so important to stakeholders and 
because there is no limit on communications, it is not surprising that 
most EPA rulemakings involve a large amount of documentation, 
much of which is highly technical. (Although this technical 
information is quite important to industry, it is largely obscure to the 
public.) The index of the rulemaking record for a single pollution 
control standard often runs into the hundreds of pages.90 The final 
rule and supporting preamble published in the Federal Register is 
generally at least several dozen pages and can reach over two 
hundred pages in length.91 Virtually every page, moreover, is filled 
with technical discussions that assume a high level of specialized 
knowledge.92 Yet, in the hundreds of pages of documentation, it is 
 
not be read as an argument that this approach to standard setting in many media is a mistake or 
needs to be revised. As a matter of process, however, it does seem problematic for public health 
consequences to be ignored for many and likely most EPA rulemakings, particularly because 
these consequences highlight the public’s stake in the issue and thus generate greater public 
oversight. This oversight, discussed later, should be redressed by a requirement—perhaps 
imposed in place of the RIA process—that agencies always characterize the public and 
environmental benefits of varying control options to provide the public and their 
representatives a better basis for understanding the implications of the rule and gauging their 
involvement in its design. See infra Part IV.A.3. If this cannot be done quantitatively for some 
or all benefits, then qualitative estimates and descriptions are sufficient as well as discussions of 
why the uncertainty remains. As is later suggested, if the analysis here is correct, then the RIA 
process completely misses the true analytical needs of regulators—these low-salience rules—and 
concentrates energies on issues (compliance costs) and rules (high salience) in which the 
rulemaking process is least likely to fail. See infra Part III.A.4.c. 
 89. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006) (requiring that “the agency shall give interested persons an 
opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or 
arguments”). 
 90. See, e.g., Wagner et al., supra note 37, at 13. 
 91. Id. at 18–19. 
 92. The detailed, technical features of the rules should not be underestimated. The 
following excerpt is from the EPA’s explanation of how it responded to significant comments on 
its pollutant standards for the emissions of hazardous air pollutants from acrylic and modacrylic 
fiber production. This excerpt is not a random selection, but it is a relatively representative 
sample of the level of specialized knowledge and background information that the EPA 
demands from its readers: 
ii. Can the pollution prevention control techniques being used by several of the plants 
with suspension spinning operations be used for the solution process in existing 
facilities? Although the air emission and source characteristics for all other emission 
point types (i.e., tanks, equipment components, wastewater treatment units) are 
similar throughout the source category, the solution and suspension processes 
associated with the spinning operations differ from each other in the processing steps 
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rare for even one sentence to discuss the implications of the rule for 
public health or the environment. The final rule, with all of its 
accompanying documentation, then forms the backdrop or record 
against which the agency is tested to determine whether its final rule 
is reasonable, or at least not arbitrary.93 
A closer look at a single, bread-and-butter rule illustrates at least 
a few of the problems that can arise in these unwieldy rulemakings, 
particularly when the agency is engaged in a time-sensitive project. 
Consider, as an example, the rule promulgated in the mid-1990s 
regulating the emissions of toxic air pollutants from chemical storage 
tanks in tank farms at large petrochemical plants.94 In this rule, the 
emissions standards were unusually straightforward—for most tanks, 
the EPA required lids with tight seals to keep them from emitting 
significant quantities of toxic pollutants into the air.95 But this 
emissions standard did not resolve all critical regulatory issues; chief 
among them was how to make sure that these tanks would not leak 
hazardous air pollutants if the seal became loose or worn. On this 
issue, the EPA could have required the industry to install continuous 
emissions monitors at the rim of the tanks that would trigger an alert 
if a worrisome level of toxins was detected at the edge or over the 
 
and the acrylonitrile concentrations in the process materials and associated emissions. 
Solution polymerization spin dope for fiber production contains, by product and 
process design, a significantly higher concentration of residual AN monomer than 
does suspension polymerization. The public comments [filed by industry] argued that 
the application of the pollution prevention techniques being used for suspension 
processes (e.g., steam stripping of excess monomer, scavenger solvents) to existing 
solution processes is not viable because of the physical nature of the solution 
polymerization process. Specifically, application of high efficiency residual AN 
polymer steam stripping (incorporated to reduce downstream emissions) is 
technically feasible to incorporate into the suspension process and is not feasible for a 
solution polymerization process because the latter does not produce a solid polymer 
product that can be introduced to direct steam contact without contamination. At 
solution polymerization facilities, other pollution prevention or source reduction 
measures which formed the initial technical basis for determining the 100 ppmw 
action level for all spinning lines may not be capable of achieving the higher AN 
removal rates of the higher residual monomer concentration present in solution 
polymerization fiber spinning operations. We agree with the public comments that 
incorporating the pollution prevention techniques to an existing solution process 
spinning line is not viable. 
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Generic Maximum Achievable 
Control Technology (Generic MACT), 64 Fed. Reg. 34,853, 34,862 (June 29, 1999) (codified at 
40 C.F.R. pt. 63). 
 93. See, e.g., Edison Elec. Inst. v. OSHA, 849 F.2d 611, 617–18 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding 
that more than the administrative record can be considered in judicial review). 
 94. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Categories, 
40 C.F.R. §§ 63.100–.183 (2009). 
 95. See id. § 63.119(a) (providing extremely detailed requirements that amount to requiring 
a seal and floating lid for most tanks). 
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surface of a tank. Or the EPA could have required regular inspections 
of the tanks with a sniffer, much like what natural gas companies use 
to detect gas leaks. Instead, in the final rule, the EPA simply requires 
visual inspections by a company employee to ensure the seal is 
intact.96 With regard to the frequency of this self-monitoring, the EPA 
could have required weekly or even monthly examinations given the 
seemingly low expense of the visual self-inspection; instead, the EPA 
set the inspection interval at one year.97 Indeed, under the rule, if a 
leak is discovered in the course of this annual check-up, the company 
is given another forty-five days to correct the problem, as well as the 
opportunity to self-administer up to two additional, thirty-day 
extensions.98 And to complete the picture, records of the industry’s 
compliance with these self-inspection requirements are stored onsite 
and are not filed with state agencies or the federal EPA.99 
How could these strikingly permissive enforcement requirements 
survive the fierce adversarial pressures of administrative 
rulemakings? The docket index, documents in the record, and 
proposed rule itself provide a clue. The proposed rule, which included 
three other subparts, was over 187 pages long.100 Just on the storage 
tank rule alone, the EPA met with industry groups at least three 
times before publishing the proposed rule, communicated with them 
through letters, and prepared at least fifteen background 
documents.101 After publication of the proposed rule, twenty-two 
industries and industry associations—nearly all of them household 
names—and a smattering of public interest advocates—more 
precisely, two public interest groups and four states or state 
regulatory associations—engaged first in formal notice and comment 
just on the storage tank portion of the rule and then presented their 
concerns at a public hearing.102 The EPA’s response to these and 
other significant comments in the larger, four-part final rule identifies 
 
 96. See id. § 63.120(a)(1). 
 97. See id. § 63.120(a)(2). 
 98. See id. § 63.120(a)(4). 
 99. See id. § 63.123(c). 
 100. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Categories, 
57 Fed. Reg. 62,607 (proposed Dec. 31, 1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63). 
 101. See Hazardous Organic NESHAP Storage, Docket No. A-90-21, Document Nos. II-A-
1 to -6, II-B-1 to -7, II-E-4 (Oct. 29, 1992), available at http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/ 
home.html# documentDetail?R=09000064800c084a. 
 102. See id. Document Nos. IV-D-1 to -28, IV-F-1 to -12. 
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more than one hundred issues in contention.103 Not surprisingly, 
moreover, this final rule and preamble gained still more girth—this 
time reaching 223 pages and over 195,000 words in the Federal 
Register.104 With a statutory deadline looming, the agency pushed the 
rulemaking through in three-and-a-half years from start to finish.105 
Because of a vocal constituency of unhappy interest groups, however, 
the EPA reopened public comment on one of the rulemaking’s key 
issues eighteen days after publishing the final rule, and received 
another sixty formal communications.106 Before it could issue a 
revised rule, one of the regulated industries petitioned for 
reconsideration of the entire rulemaking.107 The agency ultimately 
issued a proposed clarification to the original rule two years later, 
received another twenty comments on its proposed clarification,108 
and issued a final revised rule at the end of 1996.109 
Despite all this activity, the final rule offers no explanation as to 
why the regulation of storage tank emissions is so lenient and 
provides no indication that any stakeholders were unhappy with the 
approach. One can surmise that there were simply too many battles—
each of them intricate and time-consuming—for the two public 
interest representatives and four state regulatory groups to keep up 
with all of the moving parts. One can also surmise that in slogging 
through the more than one hundred significant contested issues 
addressed under a tight schedule, the agency itself had to tread lightly 
on issues for which the industry might have claimed superior 
 
 103. This number is based on counting each of the (significant) issues discussed by the EPA 
in Sections V and VI of the Final Rule. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air 
Pollutants for Source Categories, 59 Fed. Reg. 19,401, 19,411–48 (Apr. 22, 1994) (codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 63) (describing the comments and significant changes to the rule based on those 
comments). 
 104. See id. 
 105. The period of three-and-a-half years is based on comparing the date of the first 
document listed in the docket index authored after 1990, which is the year the EPA’s mandate 
was passed by Congress, and the date of the first final rule. For the first document in the docket, 
dated August 10, 1990, see Hazardous Organic NESHAP Storage, Docket No. A-90-21, 
Document No. II-B-1, available at http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/home.html# 
documentDetail?R=09000064800c084a. 
 106. See Hazardous Organic NESHAP Process Vents, Docket No. A-90-19, Section VI 
(Sept. 14, 1992), available at http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/home.html#document 
Detail? R=09000064800c07be. 
 107. See id. Document No. VI-B-63. 
 108. See id. Section VIII. 
 109. See id. Section IX. 
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knowledge.110 Alternatively, perhaps the agency threw bones to 
industry representatives as a way to get their buy-in on other issues—
particularly when it suspected that those concessions would not be 
caught or litigated by public interest groups reluctant to delay the rule 
with litigation unless the litigation involved a crucial issue cutting to 
the very heart of the EPA’s air toxic program. 
Ironically, demands by public interest groups that the EPA 
promulgate the rule on time and in keeping with Congress’s 
deadline111 may actually make the information capture phenomenon 
worse. As lawyers know well, deadline suits are almost impossible to 
lose and serve a vital public purpose; without the suits, industry has 
no restrictions on their polluting activities, and the environment and 
public health are unprotected. In the context of information capture, 
however, these deadline suits put the agency between a rock 
(information battering by the industry) and a hard place (a deadline 
suit by environmental groups). When faced with lawsuits from all 
sides, the natural path of least resistance is to promulgate a final rule 
quickly and, if there is not time to respond to all of industry’s 
complaints, to give in to many of them just to get the rule out the 
door. As the nation’s top environmental lawyers, most of whom 
worked first for the EPA before advising industry, observe: “The 
reason that the Agency is generally receptive to well-reasoned 
technical comments [from industry] . . . . [is to] withstand judicial 
review. The heart of a regulatory program is thus more likely to 
survive over the long term.”112 
II.  HOW ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ENABLES INFORMATION CAPTURE 
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)113 and related open 
government statutes create the perfect substrate for the growth and 
nourishment of information capture. Through a variety of judicially 
created requirements, the APA lays the groundwork for information 
gluts that can estrange marginally financed interest groups, 
 
 110. See supra note 103. 
 111. In fact, the EPA promulgated the air toxic emission standards just discussed under 
deadline litigation presumably brought by public interest groups that demanded that the EPA 
promulgate the standards in accordance with the congressional timeline. See National Emission 
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Categories, 62 Fed. Reg. 2722, 2722 (Jan. 17, 
1997) (amending the final rule). 
 112. Field & Robb, supra note 31, at 50. 
 113. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59 (2006). 
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undermine the hope of pluralistic engagement that could help the 
agency sift through at least some of the incoming information, and 
ultimately put the agency at the mercy of the party in control of most 
of the relevant information. 
Administrative law instructs interest groups that if they plan to 
file comments that can be backed by legal challenge, then the 
comments need to cover the waterfront of their concerns and ideally 
do so in detail. At the same time, administrative law places no 
restrictions on the size, number, detail, or technicality of the issues 
that can be raised—the sky is the limit. As a result, parties can 
inadvertently or deliberately exert substantial control over the 
agency’s agenda in the number, diversity, detail, and even the framing 
of the multiple comments they lodge, as well as with the information 
they share earlier in the process. As long as the court reviews the 
agency’s action based on an unlimited record that commenters have a 
hand in creating, information becomes almost akin to a choke collar 
that can be used at the whim of interest groups to control the agency’s 
factual record and even its policymaking agenda. 
Even worse, agencies themselves develop coping strategies that 
can aggravate the information capture problem. If the agency receives 
reams of unprocessed material from interest groups and is held 
responsible for synthesizing it, then the agency’s own process is likely 
to mirror these information pathologies, if not exacerbate them. An 
enormous record of highly technical and somewhat extraneous 
comments that delve into tedious and often unnecessary detail will 
tend to be reflected in the agency’s own rule in order to avoid 
accusations of insufficient attention to detail. Such an opaque rule 
may have the added benefit of being more likely to escape rigorous 
judicial scrutiny and may even discourage thinly financed parties from 
taking on the rule as a litigation project. Along these same lines, if the 
agency must respond to all comments yet cannot change the rule 
substantially without starting over, then the agency will engage 
interested parties much earlier in the process of developing the rule, 
even though this might defeat the idea of ensuring balanced and 
vigorous participation by a diverse set of interest groups. Even 
litigation threats at the conclusion of a rule may cause the agency to 
develop nontransparent coping mechanisms for adjusting rules after 
the fact, an exercise made easier when the rule generally escapes 
understanding by most onlookers. 
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This Part isolates the various incentives caused by the 
“rulemaking review game”114 that not only tolerate excessive 
information but also produce incentives for players, including the 
agency itself, to overload the system with information or otherwise 
gain an edge through their superior access to key information. These 
rules of the game arise in part from the APA itself, but are both 
clarified and made more perverse through a series of judicial opinions 
that generally attempt, ironically, to make the process fairer. After 
this Part explores the ways that the law creates perverse conditions 
for information capture, Part III then surveys the current landscape 
for signs of damage. 
A. Filter Failure in the Administrative Procedure Act 
The APA displays great faith in the capacity of agencies in 
particular and the administrative state more generally to process 
information, no matter how overwhelming. This confidence is 
evidenced in nearly every nook and cranny of the APA. The APA’s 
command that “the agency shall give interested persons an 
opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of 
written data, views, or arguments” is an inviolate principle for 
rulemaking.115 The Senate Report supporting the original APA 
aspired to ensure that an agency’s “notice must . . . fairly apprise 
interested parties of the issues involved, so that they may present 
responsive data or argument.”116 The Attorney General’s Manual on 
the APA, issued one year later, similarly recommends that “each 
agency should schedule its rule making in such fashion that there will 
be sufficient time for affording interested persons an opportunity to 
participate in the rule making.”117 Courts have taken these aspirations 
seriously. “If an agency does neglect to provide this 
information . . . and that neglect adversely affects a party’s ability to 
 
 114. This is Professor Mashaw’s term. JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND 
GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 166 (1999) (modeling out the 
“rulemaking review game,” which is governed by the basic idea that “to the extent that an 
opponent of rulemaking (regulatory or deregulatory) perceives the use of an external obstacle 
to rulemaking to have a higher expected value than failing to use it, that external constraint will 
be activated”). 
 115. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). 
 116. 1 PIERCE, supra note 9, § 7.3, at 571 (citing S. DOC. NO. 79-248, at 200 (1946)). 
 117. Id. (citing TOM C. CLARK, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL 
ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 29 (1947), available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/ 
library/admin/1947cover.html). 
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provide meaningful comments, a reviewing court will hold the rule 
invalid.”118 
Accordingly, notice and comment—the period explicitly 
designed to open the doors to any and all information that any party 
wishes to provide—not only discourages agencies from placing any 
limits on the content, technicality, or volume of this information but 
also requires agencies to keep the period open long enough to ensure 
that anyone with information to share can participate.119 A rule can 
also be remanded if the agency has neglected—however 
inadvertently—to make a complete library of relevant documents 
available for commenters to use in formulating their arguments.120 
Agencies are further required by law to “consider,”121 which 
generally means to process and then respond to, all significant 
comments.122 If the agency does not do this, it again runs the risk that 
a court will reject its rule.123 A court, for example, may remand a rule 
if the agency too quickly dismisses a comment as unduly vague or 
nonspecific and refuses to address the commenter’s concerns in the 
final rule.124 As the Second Circuit held in reversing one of the FDA’s 
 
 118. Id. at 572 (citing Global Van Lines, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 714 F.2d 
1290 (5th Cir. 1983)). 
 119. See, e.g., Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act 
Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 114 (2003) (“Once the notice is given, anyone may 
send the agency a comment, and agencies always accept these comments (indeed, how could 
they not, unless they returned the envelope for insufficient postage?).”). 
 120. See, e.g., Gerber v. Norton, 294 F.3d 173, 181 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that the Fish 
and Wildlife Service’s failure to make the map of an offsite mitigation area available for public 
viewing in the issuance of an incidental take permit deprived plaintiff of the meaningful 
opportunity to comment and required that the case be remanded back to the agency). 
 121. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006). 
 122. See generally MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL 
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 44–49 (1988) (discussing the history of administrative law since 
1946 and how the goal of expanding access to government led to the rule whereby interested 
groups could provide comments to rulemaking agencies that these agencies must consider); 
Stewart, supra note 6, at 1717–60 (discussing the importance of responding to comments in 
surviving judicial review). 
 123. See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 245 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(reversing an FDA regulation governing good practices for whitefish in part because the FDA 
failed to respond to an important technical comment in its final rule); see also Motor Vehicle 
Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (holding that an “agency 
must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action”). 
 124. See, e.g., Adams v. U.S. EPA, 38 F.3d 43, 51–53 (1st Cir. 1994) (concluding that the 
EPA had erred in ignoring comments for vagueness and holding that the EPA had sufficient 
notice from the comments for materiality purposes, which imposed a requirement on the EPA 
to respond; because it had ignored the comments, the EPA’s resulting action was arbitrary and 
capricious). 
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good practices rules, “[i]t is not in keeping with the rational process to 
leave vital questions, raised by comments which are of cogent 
materiality, completely unanswered.”125 
As a result, agencies comply, perhaps too conscientiously, with 
the letter of the law. Even for the minor rules, the EPA typically 
prepares a one-hundred-plus-page report on its response to 
comments,126 as well as anywhere from a few to dozens of pages of 
“significant changes” in the small, three-column type of the Federal 
Register.127 “[I]n one major rulemaking, EPA wrote thousands of 
pages explaining how it resolved hundreds of issues based on its 
consideration of over one hundred studies and over one hundred 
thousand comments it received in response to its notice of proposed 
rulemaking.”128 
B. Courts Encourage Information Excess 
In the abstract, courts would seem ideally suited to provide a 
reality check on Congress’s unrealistic faith in the agency’s ability to 
stay abreast of the avalanche of information that must be processed 
when developing a rule. But as lawyers fully appreciate, the courts’ 
substantive rules rarely succeed in simplifying processes and instead 
tend to make complex systems worse.129 The courts’ interpretation of 
administrative law is no exception. In APA case law, the courts have 
generally reinforced, and even expanded, the incentives for 
information excess and filter failure.130 They do this first by providing 
unintended rewards for agencies to develop rules that are more 
complex, detailed, and lengthy than needed to lower the risk of an 
 
 125. Nova Scotia, 568 F.2d at 252. 
 126. See BRUCE C. JORDAN, EPA, NATIONAL EMISSION STANDARDS FOR HAZARDOUS 
AIR POLLUTANTS (NESHAP) FOR PRIMARY ALUMINUM REDUCTION PLANTS—
BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR PROMULGATED STANDARDS, SUMMARY OF PUBLIC 
COMMENTS AND RESPONSES (1997), as an example of the type of document the EPA prepares 
for all rules, including smaller rules like this one, that explains the agency’s response to 
significant comments. 
 127. See infra notes 155–58 and accompanying text. 
 128. 1 PIERCE, supra note 9, § 7.4, at 595. 
 129. Cf. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 578–79 
(1988) (noting that courts can play a perverse role in “muddying” rules and that 
“straightforward common law crystalline rules have been muddied repeatedly by exceptions and 
equitable second-guessing, to the point that the various claimants . . . don’t know quite what 
their rights and obligations really are”). 
 130. Cf. MASHAW, supra note 114, at 126 (“It seems virtually undeniable that the major 
procedural developments in American administrative law from the Administrative Procedure 
Act to the present have been the work largely of the courts or of the chief executive.”). 
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adverse outcome in judicial review, and second by encouraging 
parties to inundate the agency with excessive information in order to 
make a record and protect all possible claims. 
1. Incentives for the Agencies to Conduct Informationally 
Excessive Rulemakings.  The courts’ first unhelpful contribution to 
administrative process is to relegate to obscurity the one provision 
Congress did make for requiring agencies to filter information. In the 
APA, the agency is required to provide a “concise general statement 
of [its] basis and purpose [for the rule].”131 Congress intended this 
provision to force the agencies to ensure that their rules are accessible 
to the general public, as well as amenable to review by courts and the 
legislature. “The rationale of this requirement is to enable the public 
to determine the actual basis and objectives of the rule and to 
facilitate meaningful judicial review.”132 With respect to its meaning, 
the provision was initially understood, even by the courts, to require 
agencies to explain in basic terms “what major issues of policy were 
ventilated by the informal proceedings and why the agency reacted to 
them as it did.”133 
Despite the intent of the provision, courts hold an agency in 
violation of the “concise general statement” requirement only when 
the agency fails to provide enough information, not when it provides 
too much.134 There appear to be no cases in which a court has rejected 
a rule because an agency’s lengthy and highly technical preamble was 
not concise or comprehensible enough. By contrast, and although the 
agency need not discuss every minor facet of its proposal,135 the courts 
 
 131. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 132. 3 JACOB A. STEIN, GLENN A. MITCHELL & BASIL J. MEZINES, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
§ 15.09, at 15-164 (1992) (citing, inter alia, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, H.R. REP. NO. 
79-1980 (1946), Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981), and various lower 
court decisions). 
 133. Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
 134. See, e.g., Indep. U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Dole, 809 F.2d 847, 854–55 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (holding that the Secretary of Transportation’s statement of basis and purpose failed to 
provide an adequate account of how the rule served the Merchant Marine Act’s objectives, and 
thus vacating the rule). 
 135. See, e.g., MCI Worldcom, Inc. v. FCC, 209 F.3d 760, 765 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“An agency 
is not obliged to respond to every comment, only those that can be thought to challenge a 
fundamental premise.” (citation omitted)); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 850 
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (upholding the EPA’s general statement in setting air quality standards because 
the “regulation contains sufficient exposition of the purpose and basis of the regulation as a 
whole to satisfy this legislative minimum”); Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass’n, 407 F.2d at 332 
(rejecting a claim that the statement was insufficient because certain details were lacking). 
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will remand rules for insufficiency when major issues are left 
unaddressed.136 From this case law, Professor Richard Pierce 
concludes that “[t]he courts have replaced the statutory adjectives, 
‘concise’ and ‘general’ with the judicial adjectives ‘detailed’ and 
‘encyclopedic.’”137 
The demise of the concise general statement is just the beginning 
of the trouble, however. Not only do the courts reject the need for 
filters on the agencies’ communications (despite some congressional 
intent otherwise) but also their opinions greatly exacerbate the risk of 
information excess and inaccessible rulemakings. By far the strongest 
incentive for agencies to actively load their rule and record with 
details and defensive statements is the hard look doctrine.138 This test 
emerged in the early 1970s as a way to increase oversight over what 
was then viewed as unbridled agency discretion and a serious risk of 
agencies being captured by the interests they were charged with 
regulating.139 In hard look review, the court closely scrutinizes the 
agency’s rule to ensure that it has adequately considered all 
comments and supported its contested assumptions.140 As the D.C. 
Circuit reminded the agencies: “What we are entitled to at all events 
is a careful identification by the Secretary, when his proposed 
 
 136. See, e.g., Lloyd Noland Hosp. & Clinic v. Heckler, 762 F.2d 1561, 1567 (11th Cir. 1985) 
(holding that the agency’s statement was inadequate because it “failed to give the facts 
underlying the conclusion”); Nat’l Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 701 (2d 
Cir. 1975) (holding that the FDA has failed to provide an adequate statement supporting a rule 
because it lacked a “detailed record” or “thorough and comprehensible statement of the 
reasons for its decision” that establish the basis for the agency’s rule). 
 137. 1 PIERCE, supra note 9, § 7.4, at 596. 
 138. Professor Pierce argues that: 
To have any reasonable prospect of obtaining judicial affirmance of a major rule, an 
agency must set forth the basis and purpose of the rule in a detailed statement, often 
several hundred pages long, in which the agency refers to the evidentiary basis for all 
factual predicates, explains its method of reasoning from factual predicates to the 
expected effects of the rule, relates the factual predicates and expected effects of the 
rule to each of the statutory goals or purposes the agency is required to further or to 
consider, responds to all major criticisms contained in the comments on its proposed 
rule, and explains why it has rejected at least some of the most plausible alternatives 
to the rule it has adopted. 
Id. at 593. 
 139. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 1039, 1043 (1997) (“[T]he courts’ assertiveness during the period from roughly 1967 to 
1983 can be explained by judicial disenchantment with the idea of policymaking by expert and 
nonpolitical elites. . . . The principal pathology emphasized during these years was “capture,” 
meaning that agencies were regarded as being uniquely susceptible to domination by the 
industry they were charged with regulating.”). 
 140. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J., concurring) 
(arguing for hard look review). 
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standards are challenged, of the reasons why he chooses to follow one 
course rather than another.”141 But when a rulemaking has dozens or 
even hundreds of moving parts, this puts agencies in a no-win 
situation. For substantial rules, the “reviewing court, assisted by able 
counsel for petitioners, almost always can identify one or more issues 
the agency addressed poorly in its statement of basis, and purpose.”142 
Adding to the litigation worries created by hard look review is 
the occasional demand by courts that the agency develop substantial 
evidence in support of its protective regulation.143 The Supreme Court 
set the bar quite high for this substantial evidence requirement in 
Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute (the 
Benzene case).144 In rejecting OSHA’s argument that the science was 
too uncertain to determine the precise level at which the carcinogen 
benzene became unsafe, the Court demanded that the agency 
assemble “substantial evidence” in support of its standards to survive 
judicial challenge.145 In response to the Supreme Court’s Benzene 
decision, commentators observed that OSHA found itself forced to 
engage “in this exceedingly precise analysis with full knowledge that 
the estimates provided by existing risk assessment models could vary 
millionfold, depending upon the model selected.”146 Other federal 
agencies also felt compelled to provide detailed technical 
 
 141. Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
 142. 1 PIERCE, supra note 9, § 7.4, at 614. 
 143. Benzene immediately produced ripples in the case law. In Gulf South Insulation v. 
United States Consumer Product Safety Commission, 701 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1983), the Fifth 
Circuit overturned the Consumer Product Safety Commission’s ban on the use of urea-
formaldehyde insulation in residences and schools and held that the agency’s supporting record 
was complete: “To make precise estimates, precise data are required.” Id. at 1146. Somewhat 
similarly, in Leather Industries of America, Inc. v. EPA, 40 F.3d 392 (D.C. Cir. 1994), the D.C. 
Circuit not only invalidated the EPA’s model because of the agency’s failure to refine the model 
to address specific activities, but also invalidated the EPA’s working assumption regarding the 
phytotoxicity of selenium, an assumption made necessary by limitations in available evidence: 
“While the EPA ‘may ‘err’ on the side of overprotection,’ it ‘may not engage in sheer 
guesswork.’” Id. at 408 (quoting Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1186–87 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981)). The court did not suggest, however, that the agency had ignored relevant 
information, nor did it explain how the EPA could go about gathering additional information. 
 144. Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene), 448 U.S. 607, 614 
(1980). 
 145. See, e.g., ELIZABETH FISHER, RISK REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 107–12 (2007) (describing the more tolerant view of OSHA standard 
setting because of rampant uncertainties). 
 146. Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1403 (1992). 
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explanations for their standard-setting decisions to avoid the outcome 
reached in Benzene.147 
The agency’s only responsible course of action when faced with 
these doctrinal demands is to engage in defensive overkill when 
developing rules.148 In the rulemaking environment created by the 
case law, every comment that raises a credible-sounding issue, even a 
peripheral one, must receive a complete and detailed response. In 
preparing its rule for challenge, the agency will also work hard to 
support, or at least give the appearance of supporting, every 
assumption incorporated into the rule with information from the 
technical and scientific literature. Moreover, because the agency is 
not expected to be concise in its use of information, and because 
there is no requirement that this information be even moderately 
accessible to a general audience, there are no downsides for the 
agency to include pages of technical verbiage designed to fend off 
litigation. Indeed, it is rational for the agency to do so. 
In practice, at least in contemporary judicial review, hard look 
review and Benzene’s demand for a substantial scientific record are 
the exception rather than the rule; most courts reviewing EPA 
technical rulemakings grant the agency considerable deference.149 But 
 
 147. See, e.g., JOHN D. GRAHAM ET AL., IN SEARCH OF SAFETY: CHEMICALS AND CANCER 
RISK 151 (1988) (“Since the Supreme Court's 1980 benzene decision, federal agencies have felt 
compelled to use such numerical risk estimates to support both priority-setting and standard-
setting decisions.”); Frank B. Cross, Beyond Benzene: Establishing Principles for a Significance 
Threshold on Regulatable Risks of Cancer, 35 EMORY L.J. 1, 12–43 (1986) (arguing that judicial 
review forces agencies to provide detailed technical explanations for standards); Howard Latin, 
Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 89, 132 (1988) 
(“[T]he Court’s benzene decision has . . . induced federal agencies to conclude that they must 
provide quantitative risk estimates even if they lack confidence in the resulting judgments.” 
(citation omitted)); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political 
Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 
DUKE L.J. 300, 311 (arguing that courts often require “that agencies ‘find’ unfindable facts and 
support those findings with unattainable evidence”). 
 148. Professor Pierce describes what the agencies must do to avoid the risk that courts will 
remand their rules as arbitrary and capricious, which includes a demand that they 
respond to all major points made in comments, state the factual predicates for its rule, 
support the factual predicates by linking them to something in the record of the 
rulemaking, explain its reasons for resolving issues as it did, relate its findings and its 
reasoning to decisional factors made relevant by its statute, and give reasons for 
rejecting plausible alternatives to the rule it adopted. 
1 PIERCE, supra note 9, § 7.1, at 559. 
 149. SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN 
AMERICA 91 (1995) (“Judicial withdrawal from the supervision of technical decisions in the 
1980s avoided the pitfalls of overzealous review but only by reinstating an unrealistic and 
anachronistic vision of agency expertise.”); R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: 
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there remains a distinct risk that the agency will get unlucky and draw 
a hard look panel, and it is nearly impossible for an agency to know in 
advance what the panel’s predilection will be.150 Professor Jerry 
Mashaw observes that because of this significant unpredictability in 
the applicable standard of review, the courts essentially function “as 
robed roulette wheels churning out results—either ‘case dismissed’ or 
‘remanded to the agency for further development’—in a fashion that 
approximate[s] chance.”151 
It is this risk that the judicial roulette wheel will settle on a hard 
look standard that leads agencies to assume the worst.152 Professor R. 
Shep Melnick observes: “Since agencies do not like losing big court 
cases, they reacted defensively [to the courts’ requirements], 
accumulating more and more information, responding to all 
comments, and covering their bets. The rulemaking record grew 
enormously, far beyond any judge’s ability to review it.”153 And 
“[t]hus began a vicious cycle: the more effort agencies put into 
rulemaking, the more they feared losing, and the more defensive 
rulemaking became.”154 Indeed, not only is there no filter to limit the 
information agencies need to support their rulemakings, but also, 
from their perspective, providing excessive information is a winning 
strategy. 
Although filter failure and information costs have not been 
factored directly into the scholarly complaints about the current state 
of judicial review, many critics do identify the adverse consequences 
associated with the unnecessary expansion of the rulemaking and 
accompanying record. Professor Pierce, a longtime critic of hard look 
review, argues that this unrestricted form of judicial scrutiny has 
 
THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 356 (1983) (concluding that judges have wisely realized 
their own limitations and overturned only those standards that are based on “glaring error”). 
 150. See ROBERT KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 223, 
225 (2003) (underscoring how uncertainty in judicial review, coupled with adversarialism, leads 
to counterproductive delays and skews in the resulting influence and power of different groups 
affected by a rulemaking); MASHAW, supra note 114, at 165 (underscoring that “most seem to 
argue that the real impediment created by judicial review is uncertainty” in how courts will 
analyze the rule). 
 151. MASHAW, supra note 114, at 181. 
 152. See, e.g., 1 PIERCE, supra note 9, § 7.4, at 600–01 (discussing how Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), 
requires an agency to respond to all comments and criticisms and noting the resultant adverse 
effects that this has on the agency). 
 153. R. Shep Melnick, Administrative Law and Bureaucratic Reality, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 245, 
247 (1992). 
 154. Id. 
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forced agencies to engage in excessive data analysis and explanation, 
filling hundreds of pages of the Federal Register that courts ultimately 
“may, or may not, consider an adequate response to the 10,000–
1,000,000 pages of comments” received.155 In her study of the effects 
of judicial review on the EPA, Professor Rosemary O’Leary similarly 
concludes that “the proliferation of court decisions has forced what 
one EPA staff member called ‘non-user-friendly’ regulations. 
According to EPA technical staff, the Office of General Counsel 
often rewrites regulations, notices, and proposals in anticipation that 
a lawsuit is imminent. Lawyers have the last word in most EPA 
actions.”156 And in an article on Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,157 Professor Richard 
Stewart also takes note of the informational consequences of hard 
look review: 
In response to these [hard look] rulings, agency lawyers sought to 
bolster the agency’s position by elaborate documentation, while 
respondents and intervenors submitted contrary documentation 
which they themselves developed or obtained from agency files 
through Freedom of Information Act litigation. These various 
documents provided an elaborate record for judicial review . . . .158 
Yet even if the courts were consistently deferential, agencies 
might still perceive some benefits to producing records and rules that 
provide communications that are far more technical, lengthy, and 
detailed than needed or justified under the circumstances. An overly 
complex rulemaking offers an agency the benefit of exhausting its 
adversaries. The enormous size and breathtaking detail and 
technicality may even help discourage some courts that might 
otherwise be inclined to review the agency’s decision with some care. 
Professor Melnick speculates about “judicial exhaustion” that 
characterizes some courts’ reviews of agency actions.159 In these cases, 
 
 155. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Waiting for Vermont Yankee III, IV, and V? A Response to 
Beermann and Lawson, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 902, 920 (2007). 
 156. Rosemary O’Leary, The Impact of Federal Court Decisions on the Policies and 
Administration of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 549, 566 (1989) 
(citation omitted). 
 157. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 
(1978). 
 158. Richard B. Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure, 
91 HARV. L. REV. 1805, 1812 (1978). 
 159. R. Shep Melnick, Courts and Agencies 14 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.bc.edu/schools/cas/polisci/meta-elements/pdf/melnick/courts-and-agencies.pdf. 
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the courts may resort to a deferential approach simply because they 
lack the stamina to do anything else. 
Thus, what began in 1947 as a hopeful, concise general statement 
rule has been transformed through sixty years of litigation into a 
lengthy, technical, and often incomprehensible jumble. The goal of 
hard look review may have been noble in theory, but in practice this 
form of judicial review appears to have led to precisely the opposite 
of what its proponents imagined.160 Instead of providing a means for 
increasing meaningful oversight of agency rulemakings, hard look 
review causes the agency to prepare a defensive rulemaking that will 
tend to alienate some key interest groups (not to mention the general 
public) and all but the most energetic (or ideologically bent) judges.161 
2. Parallel Incentives for Interest Groups to Engage in 
Information Capture.  The incentives for information excess arising 
from judicial review affect not only the agencies but also the interest 
groups that participate in the rulemaking process. Case law sends a 
signal to these parties that is quite similar to that transmitted to the 
agencies; namely, to include in their comments highly specific, very 
detailed, extensively documented comments on every conceivable 
point of contention, and to back up their comments with the threat of 
 
 160. In advocating for hard look review, William Pedersen itemized the types of 
requirements that should be imposed on agencies. Note that, with the benefit of hindsight, it 
becomes clear how each of these requirements ultimately imposes cumulative information 
burdens on agencies that are likely to lead to excess from either the interest groups or the 
agency itself: 
First, both the essential factual data on which the rule is based and the methodology 
used in reasoning from the data to the proposed standard must be disclosed for 
comment at the time a rule is proposed. To the extent they are not available at that 
time, they must be disclosed when they become available. Second, the agency's 
discussion of the basis and purpose of its rule—generally contained in the 
“preambles” to the notices of proposed and final rulemaking and in the 
accompanying technical support documents—must detail the steps of the agency's 
reasoning and its factual basis. Third, significant comments received during the public 
comment period must be answered at the time of final promulgation. However, 
comments must meet a standard of detail equal to that required of the agency in 
promulgating its rule before they will be considered significant. Fourth, only 
objections to the regulations which were raised with some specificity during the public 
comment period, and to which the agency thus had an opportunity to respond, may 
be raised during judicial review. 
William F. Pedersen, Formal Records and Information Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 75–76 
(1975) (footnotes omitted). 
 161. See, e.g., id. at 66–70 (describing how EPA attorneys play a large role in forming the 
administrative record and tend to include a great deal of material to protect the agency from 
suit); Melnick, supra note 153, at 256 (citing studies and concluding that because of aggressive 
judicial review, agency lawyers are the biggest “winners” as “[f]requently—especially on 
remand—they end up writing substantial portions of the regulations”). 
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litigation. Attorneys working primarily for industry stress that the 
most important task for their clients is to “build the best record” they 
can, observing that “[w]ritten comments are the single most effective 
technique” for doing so: “[m]ake sure that you submit to the Agency 
all relevant information supporting your concerns in the rulemaking. 
This is the best way to convince the Agency to respond favorably to 
your concerns.”162 Because there are no limits to the information that 
agencies are expected to process, there is no need for these 
commenters to provide succinct statements of their complaints. 
Instead, they can leave the task of processing the information to the 
agencies. 
Several unrelated doctrines further reinforce the incentives for 
stakeholders to use information as an offensive weapon in their 
dealings with agencies. First, the courts generally require that only 
parties that file comments during the notice-and-comment period can 
later be involved in litigation against the agency.163 This requirement 
originates from the notion that before seeking judicial redress, a party 
must exhaust its administrative remedies.164 Some operative statutes 
also impose this requirement on rulemakings.165 
The courts’ demand that parties exhaust their administrative 
remedies was originally conceived of as a way to save agency 
resources, both by avoiding “premature interruption” of the 
rulemaking process and by bringing the courts into the picture only as 
a last resort.166 But when viewed from the perspective of information, 
this requirement actually increases the burden on agencies. In order 
to preserve their claims, rational parties will react by erring on the 
side of providing too much rather than too little information. Indeed, 
the rule suggests not only that a party must file a comment before it 
can litigate but also that it must file that same, specific comment 
 
 162. Field & Robb, supra note 31, at 9–10 (collecting the most important advice from the 
top attorneys interviewed for their report). 
 163. See generally McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969) (setting out the reasons for 
exhausting remedies first within the agency before raising the issue with the court). 
 164. See generally Marcia R. Gelpe, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Lessons from 
Environmental Cases, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1985) (outlining the rationale behind the 
exhaustion requirement and arguing for the abolition of exceptions to the exhaustion 
requirement). 
 165. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B) (2006) (noting that “[o]nly an 
objection to a rule or procedure which was raised with reasonable specificity during the period 
for public comment (including any public hearing) may be raised during judicial review,” with 
limited exceptions). 
 166. McKart, 395 U.S. at 193–95. 
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before raising it in court. If a party neglects to raise an argument 
during the comment period, however preliminarily, it is generally 
foreclosed from raising the issue later.167 Because the threat of 
litigation may be the only, or at least the best, way for stakeholders to 
get the agency’s attention during the rulemaking process, they have 
strong incentives to lay the groundwork for future legal action by 
including every plausible argument in their comments. 
Additionally, and more worrisome from the standpoint of 
information excess, the courts have held that more general comments 
from affected parties—even if lodged in writing and on time—are 
usually not material enough to matter legally.168 To preserve issues for 
litigation, affected parties are thus best-advised to provide comments 
that are specific, detailed, and well documented.169 This seemingly 
reasonable requirement for specificity again encourages interested 
parties to provide too much documentation, too many specifics, and 
too much detail, rather than too little.170 
Finally, the courts have signaled that the agency ignores these 
material comments at its peril.171 This, however, creates a situation in 
which interested parties can overwhelm the rulemaking process when 
it is in their interest to do so. With no limits on the extent or nature of 
the information they can file, the temptation to drown the agency in 
criticisms and accompanying documentation is likely irresistible, at 
least for some resourceful interested parties. As the D.C. Circuit 
remarked in a case with a record that spanned more than ten 
thousand pages: 
 
 167. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410, 419 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(holding that arguments not raised during the comment period may be foreclosed in later 
proceedings). 
 168. See, e.g., Gordon C. Young, Judicial Review of Informal Agency Action on the Fiftieth 
Anniversary of the APA: The Alleged Demise and Actual Status of Overton Park’s Requirement 
of Judicial Review “On the Record,” 10 ADMIN L.J. AM. U. 179, 207 (1996) (“[T]he largely 
unenforceable requirement that agencies consider comments was translated into the real 
requirement that an agency, in explaining its decision, respond to any significant comment 
which challenged its rationality.”). 
 169. See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973) 
(holding that a commenter cannot merely assert that a general mistake was made, but must 
provide specific evidence and argumentation as to the nature of that mistake and its 
implications). 
 170. See supra notes 160, 164 and accompanying text. 
 171. See, e.g., 1 PIERCE, supra note 9, § 7.4, at 594 (“If a comment criticizes in detail some 
characteristic of the agency’s proposed rule . . . and the agency retains that characteristic in the 
final rule without including in its statement of basis and purpose a relatively detailed response 
to that criticism, a reviewing court is likely to hold the rule unlawful . . . .”). 
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The record presented to us on appeal or petition for review is a 
sump in which the parties have deposited a sundry mass of materials 
that have neither passed through the filter of rules of evidence nor 
undergone the refining fire of adversarial presentation. The lack of 
discipline in such a record, coupled with its sheer mass . . . makes the 
record of informal rulemaking a less than fertile ground for judicial 
review.172 
In his case study of an OSHA rulemaking, Professor Patrick 
Schmidt traces how the successful parties carefully laced the record 
with multiple grounds for suit and then used these issues to hold the 
agency hostage to their viewpoints.173 On the other hand, when a 
participant fails to lodge comments and preserve its right to judicial 
review, the agency discounts and in some cases completely ignores 
their concerns.174 
In sum, the case law recommends that an interested party raise 
every possible issue and criticism in writing, in detail, and ideally with 
full documentation before the comment period closes. If this does not 
occur, the party effectively waives its opportunity to raise the issues in 
future litigation. Rational interest groups will respond to these legal 
incentives by raising every imaginable point of difference so as to 
preserve their right to judicial review. If an interest group thinks 
strategically, it will also consider the added bonus that its excessive 
communications and filings might even wear the agency down.175 
C. Administrative Processes in the Shadows 
Because information is central to rulemakings, participants that 
enjoy privileged access to information may find that they also enjoy 
special advantages in the process. The agency becomes dependant on 
their counsel. Yet rather than correct for these information 
imbalances, the administrative process allows these groups to enjoy a 
 
 172. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (citation 
omitted); see also Aqua Slide ‘N’ Dive Corp. v. CPSC, 569 F.2d 831, 837 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(observing that judicial review was complicated by the record, which consisted of a “jumble of 
letters, advertisements, comments, drafts, reports and publications . . . run[ning] for almost 2,000 
pages . . . [with] no index”); Fla. Peach Growers Ass’n v. Dep’t of Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 129 (5th 
Cir. 1974) (lamenting that the record is “some 238 documents occupying approximately two and 
one half feet of shelf space” that contains a mix of technical information).  
 173. See Patrick Schmidt, Pursuing Regulatory Relief: Strategic Participation and Litigation 
in U.S. OSHA Rulemaking, 4 BUS. & POL. 71 passim (2002). 
 174. Id. at 77. 
 175. See infra note 267. 
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further edge on their opponents by creating opportunities and 
incentives for agencies to meet with these particularly knowledgeable 
groups outside of the formal process. The APA does require 
communications between agencies and stakeholders to take place in 
the sunlight, but such communications are practically limited to the 
period between publication of the proposed and final rules. Both 
before and after this transparent process, informationally endowed 
stakeholders and agency staff can negotiate regulatory policies in the 
shadows, where they are typically free of mandatory docket and 
recordkeeping requirements. In these darkened settings, 
unnecessarily high information costs arise more from information 
inaccessibility than from information excess, and these costs fall 
exclusively on those groups that are not included in the ex parte 
communications. An analysis of the high information costs arising 
from the case law is thus not complete without a discussion of how 
some participants gain information-related advantages over others 
during these other stages of the rulemaking process. 
1. Participating in the Development of the Proposed Rule.  
Despite the considerable attention devoted to open government as 
memorialized through notice and comment and judicial review, these 
events are only part of the larger rulemaking life cycle. Based on his 
experience as general counsel of the EPA, Professor E. Donald 
Elliott observes that “[n]otice-and-comment rulemaking is to public 
participation as Japanese Kabuki theatre is to human passions—a 
highly stylized process for displaying in a formal way the essence of 
something which in real life takes place in other venues.”176 These 
venues range from “informal meetings with trade associations and 
other constituency groups, to roundtables, to floating ‘trial balloons’ 
in speeches or leaks to the trade press.”177 Although proposed rules, 
on the surface, appear to be drafted by agency staff based on internal 
technical analyses, most of them are likely the result of extensive 
negotiations with interested parties that remain unrecorded and 
perhaps even unacknowledged. The only residual signs of this early 
dealmaking may arise in vague, post hoc rationalizations scattered 
throughout a proposed rule preamble.178 
 
 176. E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492 (1992). 
 177. Id. at 1493. 
 178. William Pedersen, then an attorney with the EPA, described how the “real” 
decisionmaking process for rules often occurred. See Pedersen, supra note 160, at 55–57. Most, if 
not all, of this information is considered “deliberative process” and thus is hidden from view. 
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There are several strands of judicial doctrine that inadvertently 
encourage agencies to work with affected parties in the shadows 
rather than in the sunlight as anticipated by the APA. First, and 
perhaps most importantly, the courts have made it painfully clear that 
if a rule is to survive judicial review, it must be in essentially final 
form at the proposed rule stage.179 Material changes made after this 
point require a new notice-and-comment process and may even 
require the agency to start over.180 To avoid the need to make 
“material” changes, the agency is eager to get it right the first time.181 
In fact, the basic incentive for agencies to produce nearly complete 
proposed rules arises from the commitment to due process embedded 
by the courts into informal rulemakings, which in theory demands 
that parties have an opportunity to comment on all significant aspects 
of the rule.182 
The prospect of a seemingly endless cycle of notice and comment 
provides a powerful incentive for the agency to publish a proposed 
rule that has been heavily vetted before it is publicly aired as an 
informal proposal.183 In doing so, the agency will find it in its interest 
to reach out to the most knowledgeable and litigious stakeholders. At 
 
 179. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 757–63 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that the 
agency failed to provide meaningful notice-and-comment opportunities on issues in the final 
rule; the issues were raised by commenters during the notice-and-comment process); Chocolate 
Mfrs. Ass’n v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1099–100 (4th Cir. 1985) (same); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. 
Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (same); see also Envtl. Integrity Project v. EPA, 425 
F.3d 992, 995–98 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (vacating an EPA rule setting forth monitoring requirements 
because the agency “flip flopped” after notice and comment and the final rule was not a logical 
outgrowth of the proposed rule, thus violating the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements). 
 180. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 856, 893–900 (2007) (criticizing courts for adding the requirement that agencies 
go through a second notice-and-comment process when the final rule is not the “logical 
outgrowth” of the proposed rule and discussing how this requirement impedes agency 
adaptability to new information during the notice-and-comment period). See generally 1 
PIERCE, supra note 9, § 7.3 (discussing the extensive case law on whether an agency’s notice was 
adequate based on subsequent developments occurring after the proposed rule in the course of 
the rulemaking). 
 181. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 176, at 1495 (“Because of the need to create a record, real 
public participation—the kind of back and forth dialogue in which minds (and rules) are really 
changed—primarily takes place in various fora well in advance of a notice of proposed 
rulemaking appearing in the Federal Register.”). 
 182. Cf. Rubin, supra note 119, at 111 (arguing that this type of procedural requirement is 
modeled after “due process” protections in adjudication). 
 183. See generally William F. West, Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, Accountability 
and Responsiveness in Bureaucratic Policy Making: An Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 PUB. 
ADMIN. REV. 66 (2004) (arguing that the pre-NPRM period provides rich opportunities for 
informal contacts and engagement by agencies with stakeholders). 
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the very least, these pre–Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (pre-
NPRM) discussions will educate the agency about difficult technical 
issues and provide it with a means of anticipating and addressing 
these issues in the proposed rule without being caught off-guard. At 
most, engaging stakeholders in the development of a proposed rule 
may get their buy-in, making them less inclined to undo the proposed 
rule by filing material comments later in the process. 
The agency is also well-advised to dump all it has learned from 
extensive pre-NPRM discussions directly into the preamble of the 
proposed rule.184 Because there are effectively no filtering 
requirements on the agency’s proposal, and because including all of 
this detail helps protect against the risk of material comments (which 
can set the process back), the incentives for information excess in 
proposed rulemakings are again unequivocal. The agency’s rational 
response to these incentives, however, raises the risk that the 
proposed rule and the final rule will be much less accessible, 
particularly to those who were not involved in pre-NPRM 
negotiations.185 If affected parties have been left out of pre–proposed-
rule discussions and are faced with the prospect of processing and 
critiquing a one-hundred-page, opaque explanation and discussion 
during a short notice-and-comment period, it is at least possible that 
they will choose to forgo this rather time-intensive exercise.186 
Creating a voluminous record may thus ultimately benefit the agency 
by lowering the risk of material comments and limiting the total 
number of comments in need of response. 
Ideally, the courts would foreclose substantive communications 
between stakeholders and the agency that do not occur in the 
sunlight. Instead, they allow the agency to freely negotiate its rules 
during the pre–proposed-rule process without the significant 
encumbrance of transparency requirements. The agency must log its 
ex parte contacts in the public record only after publishing the 
proposed rule and generally not before.187 
 
 184. See infra notes 237–42 and accompanying text. 
 185. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 176, at 1492 (“What was once (perhaps) a means for 
securing public input into agency decisions has become today primarily a method for compiling 
a record for judicial review. No administrator in Washington turns to full-scale notice-and-
comment rulemaking when she is genuinely interested in obtaining input from interested 
parties.”). 
 186. See infra Part III.A. 
 187. See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that 
“communications which are received prior to issuance of a formal notice of rulemaking do not, 
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In these darkened settings, unnecessarily high information costs 
can arise, not only from excessive detail in the agency’s proposal, but 
also from the fact that some of this detail may be unexplained and 
effectively unintelligible to those who did not take part in pre-NPRM 
deliberations. Still more problematic, the added costs generally fall on 
only one sector—in environmental rulemakings, this is often the same 
sector of affected parties that is already strapped for resources to 
participate. Somewhat ironically, processes intended by the courts to 
help ensure that rulemakings are accessible and accountable to the 
public are responsible for causing this inequitable access. 
2. Renegotiating the Final Rule After Publication.  Rulemaking in 
the shadows occurs again after the rule is finalized, but this time the 
agency’s interest in continuing to work on the rule arises only in cases 
in which a party has filed, or perhaps threatens to file, a petition for 
judicial review. During this post-rule litigation, court processes 
impose some structure on the parties. These court processes, 
however, require only very limited transparency for negotiations that 
take place between the litigants.188 
Litigation thus opens the doors to a second round of negotiations 
that, even more than the pre-NPRM period, can involve secret deals 
over details, interpretations, and related features of a rule with only a 
narrow slice of the affected interests.189 In his study of the EPA’s 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) rulemakings, for 
example, Professor Cary Coglianese concludes that post-rule 
“litigation offers interest groups and the agency an opportunity to do 
 
in general, have to be put in a public file. . . . [but] [o]nce a notice of proposed rulemaking has 
been issued . . . any agency official or employee who is or may reasonably be expected to be 
involved in the decisional process of the rulemaking proceeding, should [avoid ex parte contacts 
and place any such contacts in the public file]”). 
 188. Even after a court opinion is issued, negotiations often continue and can lead to 
mutually accommodating resolutions. See, e.g., Coglianese, supra note 47, at 118–20. But it 
seems more likely that in these post-opinion negotiations, accountability is slightly higher not 
only because the results are more visible but because the options have been potentially limited 
by the court’s ruling and by the litigation process itself, which tends to tee up and simplify the 
issues under dispute. 
 189. As one regulator insider summarized in an interview with Professor Coglianese: 
I see this litigation as just a continuation and a narrowing of the regulatory process, 
and I think most of the players do too. . . . Once it’s all over at the official stage, you 
start the second stage and you start it by filing litigation so that you can be at the table 
and work it out with only those people who are really interested. You’ve narrowed 
the universe from the general public down to those who really care, and you can get 
down to business. Litigation just happens to be the way you do it. 
Id. at 108. 
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something they were not permitted to do in the notice-and-comment 
period: negotiate in secret.”190 A trade association’s general counsel 
elaborated: “[Litigation] is often a vehicle to kind of lead to a revision 
of regulations. . . . There are a number of cases that are filed and 
automatically stayed because we are filing them just so we go back to 
the agency and basically kind of renegotiate the regs.”191 Another 
corporate counsel remarked: “It is almost like having another 
rulemaking with those people who care enough about the issues to 
spend the time, being the ones who get to play.”192 These negotiations 
also “hold an added degree of secrecy given their privileged status”193 
and can help “immunize agency officials from oversight by third 
parties such as the Office of Management and Budget.”194 Information 
costs rise as accountability mechanisms decline at this late stage in the 
rulemaking. 
In most cases, there is also a fair amount of room remaining in 
the post-rule stage to negotiate with respect to the substance of a rule. 
Although any direct changes to the rule’s text must go through a new 
notice-and-comment period, other changes, including official 
interpretations, policy guidances, and enforcement priorities, escape 
this fate.195 As Professor Schmidt found in his case study, these 
interpretive guidances can be sufficiently meaningful to lead a litigant 
to voluntarily dismiss its case.196 
The significance of post-rule negotiations is spotlighted in 
Professor Coglianese’s study but is surprisingly unexplored elsewhere 
in the literature. To the extent that post-litigation settlements occur—
and Professor Coglianese’s findings suggest that they occur 
frequently197—they provide yet another vehicle for driving up 
 
 190. Id. at 107. 
 191. Id. at 88. 
 192. Id. at 91. 
 193. Id. at 107. 
 194. Id. at 131. 
 195. See, e.g., Richard Stoll, Coping with the RCRA Hazardous Waste System: A Few 
Practical Points for Fun and Profit, 1 ENVTL. HAZARDS 6, 6 (1989), reprinted in PERCIVAL ET 
AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 257 (2d ed. 1996) 
(describing how the EPA’s private letters, obscure guidance documents, and hidden statements 
in unrelated final rule preambles have given industry participants considerable wiggle room in 
satisfying compliance requirements in hazardous waste rules). 
 196. See Schmidt, supra note 173, at 74 (highlighting the significance of interpretive 
guidance). 
 197. Professor Coglianese found that at least one petition for judicial review was filed for 35 
percent of significant RCRA and Clean Air Act rules. Coglianese, supra note 47, at 66 tbl.3-2. 
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information costs for outsiders who are not included in the 
negotiations. It is particularly problematic that these secret 
negotiations with a small group of affected parties occur in response 
to the liberalized judicial review process, a legal intervention that was 
intended specifically to heighten rather than reduce agency 
accountability. 
D. Administrative Law and Information: A Conceptual Summary 
Administrative law is not simply passive in its tolerance of 
unlimited information; it exacerbates the problem of information 
excess by creating multiple incentives for rulemaking participants to 
overload the system with a variety of information costs. The 
rulemaking review game, for example, produces incentives for 
stakeholders to fill the record with intricate details, raise every 
conceivable argument, err on the side of including attachments that 
may not be terribly helpful, engage in negotiations outside of formal 
notice-and-comment parameters, and raise every litigation threat 
within their grasp. For their part, agencies are foreclosed from trying 
to limit the information presented to them. They must respond to all 
material comments, no matter how many, how technical, or how 
poorly framed. They must solicit input and keep comment periods 
open until everyone has the chance to submit volumes of information. 
They, too, face incentives to present their analysis in undigested, 
often incomprehensible form to the larger public and, perhaps worse, 
to work closely with at least some affected parties in the shadow of 
the APA, before proposing a rule and after publishing the final rule. 
The resulting process treats information as an undiminishing 
good that not only welcomes excessive information but also 
encourages it at all stages of the process. In a system that rewards 
interest groups for creating elaborate records for review and agencies 
for delving into minute details to insulate their rules from attack, 
regulatory participants come to understand that “the more 
information, the better.” In fact, a related empirical study of EPA air 
toxic rules found exactly this relationship between information input 
and output, at least during notice and comment: as comments 
increase, so do changes made to the rules.198 
 
Nearly half of those challenges were voluntairly dismissed, id. at 97 n.17, suggesting that many 
of those cases involved settlement. 
 198. See, e.g., Wagner et al., supra note 37, at 21 tbl.8. 
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Yet common sense, contemporary scholarship, and basic 
economic models all predict that there is a point of diminishing 
returns on information, at least if there is some limit on the time and 
resources available to the agency to process the input.199 One way the 
resulting quality of decisions could drop, for example, is when the 
information becomes so excessive and detailed that it must be 
processed by agency contractors who, in turn, suggest cumulative 
addenda to the rule in rote fashion that further mire the rule down in 
unnecessary complexity and detail. Problems arise not only because 
parties naturally load excess information into the system, but also 
because the system’s inattention to information excess provides 
opportunities for strategic action. Clever participants can use 
excessive filings to deliberately move the rulemaking into more 
hopeless areas of information overload so that they may gain control 
over outcomes or throw the regulatory process into dysfunction. 
Adversarial or more balanced contests between interest groups, when 
they do occur, may spotlight the main issues and overcome judicial 
and administrative incentives for information overload by forcing the 
rule into the information sweet spot of political and administrative 
oversight. But for complex rules, this jump down the information 
incline is likely to be the exception rather than the rule. 
III.  CONSEQUENCES 
“The ‘rules of the game’ powerfully affect who wins, who loses, 
or who even is allowed to play.”200 The rules of the game discussed in 
the previous Part tolerate unlimited and unnecessarily excessive 
information; create positive incentives for participants to control the 
agency agenda with excessive and nitpicking filings; and ultimately 
encourage the agency to work more closely with these participants, 
largely out of the reach of the APA, which in turn allows them to gain 
an information-based edge over their opponents. 
This Part considers consequences that logically flow from this 
game. If all participants and agencies behave rationally in response to 
these rules, what are the consequences for policymaking and 
 
 199. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. 
 200. CHRISTOPHER J. BOSSO, PESTICIDES AND POLITICS: THE LIFE CYCLE OF A PUBLIC 
ISSUE 13 (1987); see also CROLEY, supra note 39, at 69 (arguing that “focusing only on 
decisionmakers’ incentives, motives, and goals without consideration of how they are shaped, 
reinforced, and altered by the decisionmaking procedures will yield incomplete understandings 
of regulatory outcomes”). 
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accountable government? The analysis makes a best-case assumption 
that the agency is generally operating in good faith and—all things 
being equal—would prefer to make its rules accessible and its results 
democratically responsive. The analysis does not, in other words, 
assume that the agency acts secretly or on behalf of politically 
preferred constituencies or is subject to capture in the more 
traditional sense. The reason for this optimistic assumption is that it 
catches the more pessimistic view of agencies as well. If agencies 
unintentionally produce rules that are inaccessible and lead to 
imbalanced participation, it is easy to see how they could do so 
deliberately by making the discussions unintelligible. 
In this discussion, however, it is important to put the problem of 
information capture and filter failure within the larger administrative 
context. Administrative law scholars have long worried about a 
variety of maladies that impair the agencies’ ability to do their job of 
producing high-quality and democratic-resembling rules. Scarce and 
diminishing resources of agencies with an increasing workload, 
assaults on the integrity of agency staff that take a toll on morale and 
on the recruitment and retention of the best and brightest, and 
gradual White House takeover and reversals of agency decisions that 
reduce agency independence and motivation all are understood to 
impair the quality of regulatory decisionmaking.201 Information 
capture does not overwhelm these other, simultaneous problems, but 
rather moves in the same direction. The extent to which the 
consequences or outcomes discussed here are specifically linked to 
information capture as opposed to agency impotence or malaise is 
impossible to determine. Nevertheless, because the forces operate 
simultaneously and generally in complementary ways, it seems likely 
that at least some of the consequences can be attributable to 
information capture. 
This Part highlights four main consequences that emerge from 
information capture, the first of which—the loss of pluralistic 
oversight—is the most significant and thus is discussed in the most 
detail. This Part’s three remaining Sections explore other adverse 
consequences of filter failure and information capture for agency 
 
 201. For a comprehensive discussion of these problems, see generally RENA STEINZOR & 
SIDNEY SHAPIRO, THE PEOPLE’S AGENT: EXECUTIVE BRANCH ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
SECRECY IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (forthcoming 2010), and Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy 
of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal Environmental Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
311 (1991). 
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governance, which include the inhibition of creative policymaking, 
the limitations of transparency and open government as means for 
ensuring agency accountability, and the difficulties of reversing 
information excesses once they have entered the system. Figure 2 
diagrams these consequences, a schematic that not only forms the 
organization for this Part but also becomes the template for reforms 
discussed in the final Part. 
 
Figure 2.  A Schematic of the Adverse Consequences of Information  
Capture 
             
A. Implications for Pluralistic Oversight 
The administrative state is built on an assumption that pluralistic 
processes will provide the primary means for keeping agencies 
accountable. Rigorous engagement by a diverse and balanced 
assortment of affected interests, reinforced by an ability to challenge 
regulations in court, equates roughly with a form of democratic 
oversight. Professor Edward Rubin argues that this pluralistic 
engagement is so important to current conceptions of administrative 
process that the APA is essentially a “one-trick pony”: “[a]ll of its 
basic provisions rely on a single method for controlling the actions of 
administrative agencies, namely, participation by private parties.”202 
Indeed, even in the Attorney General’s Report that helped make the 
case for the APA’s passage, the need for pluralistic oversight of 
 
 202. Rubin, supra note 119, at 101. 
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agencies was considered pivotal to the success of the administrative 
state: “[p]articipation by these groups [economic and community-
based] in the rule-making process is essential to permit administrative 
agencies to inform themselves and to afford adequate safeguards to 
private interests.”203 
Scholars writing in administrative law echo this faith in pluralistic 
processes and observe its success over the decades, with particular 
emphasis on environmental regulation.204 Professor James Q. Wilson, 
for example, observes: “EPA has had to deal with as many complaints 
and lawsuits from environmentalists as from industry, despite the 
economic and political advantages industry presumably enjoys.”205 In 
their study of interest group politics, Professors Burdett Loomis and 
Allan Cigler conclude that by the early 1980s, a “participation 
revolution” had arisen comprising citizens and special interest groups 
seeking collective material benefits for the public at large: “[t]he free-
rider problem has proven not to be an insurmountable barrier to 
group formation, and many new interest groups do not use selective 
material benefits to gain support.”206 Professor Christopher Bosso 
adds to this positive characterization in his study of pesticide politics: 
“[b]y the mid-1980s, however, we find a diversity in representation 
that, on the surface at least, gives pluralists some vindication.”207 More 
recently, in his book on public interest regulation, Professor Steven 
Croley argues that “[w]hile one can still distinguish among regulatory 
decisions according to the amount of public attention they generate 
or the number of outside participants they involve, few agency 
decisions with significant stakes escape public attention or 
participation completely. Regulatory decisionmaking is seldom done 
in the dark anymore.”208 
The conventional wisdom that environmental rulemakings are 
subject to input from a diverse and wide range of affected parties is 
 
 203. ATT’Y GEN.’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT 103 (1941). 
 204. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 6, at 1683 (“Today, the exercise of agency discretion is 
inevitably seen as the essentially legislative process of adjusting the competing claims of various 
private interests affected by agency policy.” (footnote omitted)). 
 205. WILSON, supra note 50, at 385. 
 206. Burdett A. Loomis & Allan J. Cigler, The Changing Nature of Interest Group Politics, 
in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 1, 11 (Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis eds., 1983). 
 207. BOSSO, supra note 200, at 245. This is in part because “[e]nvironmental policies, by 
their nature, prompt acrid disputes among equally determined and almost permanently 
mobilized sets of claimants because they exhibit structures of incentives more contagious to 
conflict than do agricultural subsidies or water projects.” Id. at 252. 
 208. CROLEY, supra note 39, at 291–92. 
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further reinforced by the work of Professors Cass Sunstein and then-
Judge Stephen Breyer. They both write about a regulatory system 
that they worry is too easily influenced by misinformed public opinion 
and even hysteria that derails sensible regulation and leads to 
inefficient pollution standards.209 Their reforms attempt to circumvent 
these public passions and biases through the use of more rational 
regulatory tools and expert bodies.210 
The existence of filter failure and the possibility of information 
capture, however, cast doubt on these optimistic portrayals of the 
regulatory process, at least for a potentially important area of 
regulatory activity in which information costs are particularly high.211 
This is because information costs not only substantially increase the 
costs of participation, particularly for groups that lack inside 
information, but also—through the resulting clouding of the issues—
work simultaneously to reduce the payoff or benefits of participation 
for these same groups.212 The escalating information costs, in turn, 
may tilt the playing field so significantly against those with the least 
resources that the natural pluralistic processes that underlie 
rulemaking systems cease to function. 
This Section collects evidence of possible imbalance in interest 
group engagement in EPA rulemakings in which information costs 
are likely to be very high and uncontrolled by adversarial 
counterpressure. Preexisting sources of imbalances in participatory 
capabilities among sectors of affected interests are considered first. 
Layered on top of this asymmetry are additional information 
 
 209. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE 
RISK REGULATION 33 (1993) (describing how public perceptions trigger a “vicious circle” of 
legislation and regulation of trivial risks that impose unjustified costs on regulated parties); 
Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 
683, 741 (1999) (discussing how salient and accessible claims about environmental risks, often 
promoted by public interest groups, can cascade through the public to lead to unsupported 
urgent calls for regulation of trivial risks, and offering recommendations for insulating civil 
servants from these mass demands). 
 210. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 209, at 68–72 (recommending that an elite group of 
“super regulators” make regulatory decisions rather than basing regulations on public 
preferences, as is currently the case); Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 
J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 1060 (2000) (recommending the use of cost-benefit analysis to correct for 
numerous cognitive deficits in public assessment of risk); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE 
COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION passim (1996) 
(recommending the use of cost-benefit analysis to correct for various undesirable effects of 
public governance). 
 211. See supra Part I.B. 
 212. See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text. 
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advantages arising from the administrative process that accrue 
primarily to regulated parties. These additional advantages are 
discussed in the second Section. As regulatory proposals become 
more detailed and costly to penetrate, due in part to the heavy 
engagement of a narrow slice of affected parties earlier in the process, 
public interest groups continue to drop out during the public notice-
and-comment process, a problem discussed in the third Section. The 
final Section then considers countervailing institutional mechanisms 
for representation of less well-financed interests and finds them 
lacking. The cumulative result is a badly skewed participatory 
process. Information capture is not the only explanation for a 
breakdown in pluralistic oversight mechanisms, but it is the primary 
contender and, at the very least, should be taken seriously. 
Before continuing, it is important to underscore that information 
capture will not afflict all rules. Some rulemakings are very much in 
the public eye, despite their complexity, and thus manage to rise 
above the battles over details in ways that highlight their implications 
for a broader audience. In these settings, a balanced array of interest 
groups compete for the short attention span of political officials and 
the public, dedicating considerable time to determining how to make 
their case persuasively. The resulting, self-imposed filtering of 
information and more balanced engagement evidenced in these rules 
occur because natural pluralistic processes are working. In his book, 
Professor Croley provides compelling case studies of such high-
visibility rules promulgated by several agencies, including the EPA.213 
His case studies focus on examples that not only involved vigorous 
engagement by the public interest community but were actually 
triggered by petitions filed by these very groups.214 These rulemakings, 
however, may well be the exception rather than the rule, at least at 
the EPA.215 
The exploration of the information capture phenomenon in this 
Part considers only those rules that generally do not make it into the 
newspaper and are largely obscure to the public, even though they 
make an important contribution to the protection of public health and 
 
 213. These are the case studies that Professor Croley considers in his book. See CROLEY, 
supra note 39, at 242 (conceding that his primary case studies were all prompted by lawsuits by 
public interest organizations against the agencies). 
 214. See id. at 242–43. 
 215. See supra Part I.B; infra Part III.B.2–3. 
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the environment.216 It is difficult to determine how many rules fit into 
this group relative to newsworthy rules. But the fact that the EPA 
promulgates more than three hundred rules per year, coupled with 
the fact that most of the EPA’s rulemaking assignments involve 
highly technical pollution control regulations,217 suggests that a 
significant share of EPA rulemakings might be susceptible to 
information capture. 
1. The First Challenge for Pluralistic Oversight: Basic Imbalances 
in Resources and Information.  The most obvious way that filter 
failure exacerbates preexisting imbalances in interest group 
participation is by making the costs of participation much higher than 
necessary—so high that in many cases, it functions as a barrier to 
entry. When a regulatory participant is not required to filter the 
information it shares with the agency—indeed, when the system 
actually encourages information excess—then other participants may 
find themselves investing a good deal of resources and energy merely 
trying to keep up with the flood of issues and information, much of 
which might be peripheral or even irrelevant. As a strategic matter, 
excessive detail, technical issues, and side-bars may help price out 
these less well-financed adversaries, or at least drive up their costs of 
engaging in the regulatory exercise. 
Pluralistic processes are undermined by a system that becomes 
oblivious to the costs imposed on participants to engage in a 
meaningful way, particularly when there is no chance of fee 
reimbursement at the end of the process. Groups that already 
struggle against organizational and related collective action 
impediments to represent the public interest cannot keep up. In such 
a system, the rich become richer (or at least more dominant) by 
glutting the system with information excess, forcing their opposition 
out of rulemaking proceedings.218 
In regulatory settings characterized by escalating information 
costs, it is generally (but perhaps not always) the public interest 
groups that find themselves on the short end of the participation stick. 
The resources of public nonprofits are typically smaller in comparison 
 
 216. See supra Part I.B. 
 217. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 218. This is precisely Professor Gormley’s intuition in identifying “complexity” as one of the 
two variables that can cause regulatory problems to fall out of direct mechanisms of public 
oversight and engagement. See Gormley, supra note 52, at 597. 
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to their regulated opponents, particularly with respect to the 
resources available to participate throughout the entire rulemaking 
life cycle.219 It is also the case that these public interest groups have a 
stake in almost all of the EPA’s rulemakings; regulated parties, by 
contrast, will find only a few rules directly relevant to their individual 
operations.220 As a result, environmental nonprofits have much less to 
spend and far more to spend it on, as compared to particular 
industries. These cumulative disparities in resources do not mean that 
public interest groups cannot be effective, but it underscores how 
they must pick their battles among rules.221 
There is one last source of possible disparity in participation that 
arises from differing levels of access to key information relevant to 
the rule. Some of this critical information is more readily available 
(due to greater access and specialized knowledge) to some groups 
than to others. Regulated industries, for example, enjoy considerably 
more inside information about how their plants run, how pollution 
control equipment might or might not work once in place, what 
approaches have and have not been considered or tried, and a host of 
other technical issues central to the rulemaking.222 In these 
rulemakings, the cost for a nonprofit to participate is higher relative 
to its industry counterpart because of the added resources necessary 
for them first to access and then to master such technical, inside 
information. Thus, public interest groups not only have fewer 
resources but also may face higher costs to participation per rule than 
their adversaries. 
Resource and information disparities are only the beginning of 
the trouble when it comes to ensuring pluralistic oversight of 
complicated rulemakings. The remainder of this Section highlights 
more subtle but potentially significant information-related factors 
that further increase the gap between the haves and have-nots as they 
participate in highly technical and complex EPA rules. 
 
 219. See generally HREBENAR, supra note 40, at 261–67, 329–30 (describing underfunded 
public interest groups); Stewart, supra note 6, at 1767–70 (describing the same and highlighting 
process-related handicaps that result from imbalance). 
 220. Cf. supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 221. It might be further argued that the stakes for these regulated industries are actually 
higher per capita than for environmental nonprofits. But because this involves 
incommensurables—life versus profit losses—it is more contestable. In any event, because this 
added skewing factor only further tilts the rulemaking toward the regulated industry, it can be 
bracketed as yet another reinforcing factor for purposes of argument. 
 222. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
WAGNER IN FINAL.DOC 3/4/2010  2:04:17 AM 
1380 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:1321 
2. The Second Challenge for Pluralistic Oversight: Information 
Symbiosis between the Agency and Regulated Parties.  The 
administrative process encourages the agency to know its enemies, at 
least if these groups hold in their possession technical facts and details 
that might prove particularly successful in challenging the rule later.223 
Interest groups with extra knowledge or facts relevant to a rule are 
likely to enjoy special participatory advantages in the process and 
may even find themselves working side-by-side with the agency as it 
develops its proposed rule. 
In most complex rulemakings, the agency appears to be quite 
dependant on knowledgeable stakeholders to educate it about critical 
issues peculiarly within their grasp. Such communications can be 
quite a bonus for these select groups, too, providing them with the 
opportunity to shape or even frame the agency’s regulatory project in 
the course of their tutorials and informal discussions. Despite the 
dangers of this pre-proposal intimacy, the agency as a legal matter 
appreciates that if it does not engage in this type of due diligence and 
reach out to the most knowledgeable stakeholders, they are likely to 
torpedo its final rule using specialized information to support their 
contention that the rule will pose undue costs, operational difficulties, 
or a range of other hardships. Conveniently, the law also places no 
restrictions on preproposed rule communications with interest 
groups. Conferences, meetings, telephone conversations, shared 
drafts of a proposed rule, and the like are not limited, and need not 
even be recorded in the rule’s administrative record if the agency 
prefers to keep them under wraps.224 
Under these circumstances, even agency staffers skeptical of 
industry claims may actively seek out industry’s help in developing 
 
 223. As Professor Croley notes, “agencies depend upon information to do whatever they 
aim to do. Those with the most information, with the most credible and verifiable information, 
will have a greater opportunity to influence administrative decisionmakers.” CROLEY, supra 
note 39, at 135. He suggests, however, that this neutral test of providing valuable information 
means that administrative processes produce a leveling effect on participation. Id. at 136. But 
this logical inference neglects the information costs and the possibility that they can be so high 
as to actually screen participation or viable engagement. 
 224. Interested parties engaged in these communications, however, will include them in the 
administrative record when it suits their purpose. In some cases, interest groups even request 
EPA background documents through the Freedom of Information Act and include them in 
their comments to make sure they are part of the record. See, e.g., Pedersen, supra note 160, at 
68–70 (observing that “this tactic [to use FOIA to access agency documents and then to 
communicate them back to the agency to ensure that they make their way into the 
administrative record] has worked fairly well for those who use it, even though the statute 
probably wasn’t intended for that purpose”). 
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the proposed rule to reduce the risk of successful challenges down the 
road. As one agency staffer put it, “[w]e help them; they help us.”225 
These relationships do not necessarily form because staff members 
hope to be employed later by industry, because they enjoy meals and 
conferences in luxurious locations, or even because they are directed 
by an appointed agency official to “play nice” with favored interest 
groups, as traditional capture predicts. Under the analysis here, 
working relationships, primarily with regulated parties, form at the 
pre-proposal stage in large part because of the agency’s desire to 
produce a rule that withstands judicial review.226 For environmentally 
minded staff eager to get the final rule in place so as to create some 
binding requirement on the polluting activities of industry, such pre-
NPRM collaborations are legal necessities. 
The incentives for industry to engage in rule development before 
publication of the proposed rule are substantial as well. Given the 
high level of deference that typically occurs during judicial review, 
regulated parties will perceive major advantages to getting in at the 
ground floor, before the proposed rule is published.227 By contrast, 
public interest groups are likely to face fewer incentives to invest 
their scarce resources heavily in pre-NPRM communications because 
they will face various difficulties getting credit for gains won at this 
early, informal stage.  That is, one cannot trace cause and effect as 
easily at this stage, nor would the agency necessarily engage openly 
with groups that did advertise the gains won during pre-NPRM 
communications. To the extent that administrative processes 
encourage agencies to work closely with industries in the 
development of the proposed rule, then, they may create significant 
imbalances in interest group representation at this critical stage of the 
rulemaking process.  
There is little scholarly attention to these incentives for extensive 
pre-NPRM interest group communications, but what has been written 
 
 225. Coglianese, supra note 47, at 9. 
 226. Specifically, one attorney interviewed in the Field and Robb report observed: 
The reason that the Agency is generally receptive to well-reasoned technical 
comments, explains Rogers, is that if you point out specific problems with a 
regulatory program, then those drafting the rules will generally try to solve those 
problems. They will do so not only because they want to appear to be reasonable and 
responsive to public comments, but also because their willingness to refine a 
regulatory program—to address identified flaws in the program—should help that 
program withstand judicial review. 
Field & Robb, supra note 31, at 50. 
 227. See supra Part II.B.1. 
WAGNER IN FINAL.DOC 3/4/2010  2:04:17 AM 
1382 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:1321 
presents a persuasive case that early contacts with interest groups, 
particularly those with specialized knowledge, are likely to be both 
extensive and influential.228 The scant systemic evidence currently 
available confirms these predictions. In a preliminary study 
examining interest group participation in EPA rules governing 
hazardous air pollutant standards, industry had on average more than 
seven hundred times more docketed communications (meetings, 
letters, and telephone calls) with the EPA during the pre-NPRM 
stage than public interest groups, and more than fifty times more 
recorded contacts with the EPA than state regulators.229 These 
striking disparities in participation on air toxic standards are 
reinforced by Professor Coglianese’s study of significant hazardous 
waste rules promulgated by the EPA from 1988 to 1991.230 Based on 
more than forty interviews with the EPA and stakeholders involved 
in EPA rules, Coglianese concludes that “[i]n the rule development 
phase, industry groups tend to dominate because of the information 
they can provide to the agency staff as they write a 
rule. . . . Corporations and trade associations get involved in the 
development of nearly every significant EPA rule.”231 
What develops from the administrative process during the 
development of the actual rule, then, is a form of information 
symbiosis between the agencies and the most knowledgeable and 
resourceful groups. The agency appreciates that the only way to get 
its rule through the process is to work closely with its fiercest allies 
early in the rulemaking. Indeed, the EPA’s own training materials 
openly encourage these early contacts with its adversaries. 
“Negotiation and consultation with outside parties are an important 
 
 228. See, e.g., CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 
WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY passim (2003) (noting the possibility for important 
participatory opportunities in the development of the proposed rule); Scott R. Furlong & 
Cornelius M. Kerwin, Interest Group Participation in Rulemaking: A Decade of Change, 15 J. 
PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 353, 369 (2005) (same); West, supra note 183, at 70–72 (same). 
 229. See Wagner et al., supra note 37, at 22–23 (reporting that based on pre-NPRM contacts 
that the EPA did docket, there were—on average, per rulemaking—153 communications 
(including meetings, telephone conversations, and letters) with industry; 0.7 communications 
with public interest groups; and 9 communications with state and local regulators). 
 230. Coglianese, supra note 47, at 47–52. 
 231. Id. at 51–52. Professor Coglianese’s dissertation is brimming with illustrative 
quotations. Among them is a quote from an EPA official who praised litigious trade groups for 
their diligence in assisting the EPA, even after suing the agency for the same rule that the 
official helped developed: The trade association “cooperate[d] with the agency, bend[ing] over 
backwards to help us in any way that we wanted. All we had to do was ask and they would do 
that. It was literally a pleasure working with those people.” Id. at 132. 
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part of the rulemaking process at EPA . . . . [This contact] brings 
outside information and perspectives to the Agency’s 
decisions[,] . . . builds support for the Agency’s decisions[,] and 
increases the overall efficiency of EPA’s decision making process.”232 
Professor Coglianese quotes an EPA official who further underscores 
the importance of close relations with industry during the 
development of the proposed rule: 
We try to bring them in as early as possible on what we are required 
to do and request their help very early on and usually this is 
appreciated because that way they have input as opposed to EPA 
unilaterally going out and looking at various textbooks and writing 
rules that are ridiculous because we don’t fully understand what the 
hell we are regulating. So it works out better by working very closely 
with the people that we are going to regulate and we do this in 
various ways. We meet with them, we have industry-agency 
workgroups that will meet together.233 
This enthusiasm for early and frequent stakeholder input is not 
lost on regulatory participants. Industry in particular appreciates that 
its best shot at having a significant influence is during the rule’s 
formative stages. Legal counsel for industry participants advise them 
to “[g]et involved during the preproposal phase of an Agency 
rulemaking. That is when the regulation writers want reliable 
technical information . . . and are thus most receptive to comments 
from interested persons.”234 Indeed, there are several accounts of 
industry not only commenting but also actually drafting the proposed 
rule as part of these pre-NPRM discussions.235 
 
 232. Id. at 32–33 (alterations in original) (citing EPA, FACT SHEET 12 (1992)). 
 233. Id. at 26. 
 234. Field & Robb, supra note 31, at 9; see also supra note 226. 
 235. See Field & Robb, supra note 31, at 52 (crediting one attorney with pointing out the 
advantages of providing draft language for the proposed rule and concluding that “whatever the 
Agency does not take out [of your draft rule] reflects your thinking and has your perspective”). 
As an official in a corporate office explained with respect to involvement with the EPA on a 
rule: 
I led an effort—which took about 9 months—to develop using our internal design and 
operating practices for our [operations], to develop an actual regulation and a 
preamble and it wound up being a 300-page document with lots of technical data to 
submit to the agency before they even really started their regulatory process, as a way 
to influence their thinking on what it ought to look like. And we carefully tied it to 
the statutory mandate and documented all of the design standards and operating 
procedures that we used—why they were important, where they were used, what the 
benefits were—and put that in front of the agency well in advance of their process to 
influence how they went about it. It had a tremendous impact. 
Coglianese, supra note 47, at 32 (alteration in original). 
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3. The Third Challenge for Pluralistic Oversight: Imbalances in 
Participation in Expensive Public Processes.  In an idealized version 
of administrative rulemaking, the agency single-handedly prepares a 
proposal that provides a thoughtful, holistic approach to the 
problem.236 The proposed rule is simple, clear, and accessible, so that 
all affected parties can engage in the core issues. In keeping with the 
APA’s aspirations, the proposal is then subjected to vigorous and 
diverse comments, leading to a final rule that is a bit more complex, 
intricate, and technical, but that generally does not deviate in material 
ways from the agency’s initial proposal. Although interest groups in 
this ideal process might differ in the resources and information 
available to them, their disparities do not significantly advantage 
some groups over others, particularly because they all come to the 
proposal without extensive prior involvement. 
But if the pre-NPRM process discussed in the previous Section is 
even partly accurate, then in practice the prospect of balanced 
engagement by a diverse group of stakeholders is unlikely. Much like 
a contract between elite parties, a number of proposed rules and 
perambulatory explanations may be extraordinarily detailed and even 
unfocussed or meandering—well beyond what might be expected to 
truly attract public notice and comment.237 Because pre-NPRM 
discussions allow select parties to fill the proposal with multiple 
caveats, anticipatory exemptions, and other details that can expand 
the volume and technicality and reduce the coherence of the 
proposal, the proposed rule may be anything but accessible and 
concise at this stage. Indeed, because the agency is not required to 
filter or limit any of its discussion or even the text of its proposed 
rule, the agency is likely to err on the side of overreacting and 
overexplaining. With the threat of judicial review looming, the agency 
operates defensively, working overtime to anticipate all major issues 
 
 236. Cf. WESLEY A. MAGAT, ALAN J. KRUPNICK & WINSTON HARRINGTON, RULES IN THE 
MAKING: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY AGENCY BEHAVIOR 31–38 (1986) 
(providing a flow chart and elaboration on this ideal (and possibly historic) approach to 
rulemaking). 
 237. As Professor Watts observes: 
[A] notice of a final rule could be thought of as speaking to interested parties and to 
the courts in that it aims to justify the validity of that particular rule in terms sufficient 
to stave off or to withstand judicial challenge and perhaps also to win a broader 
public relations battle. 
Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE 
L.J. 2, 25 (2009). For further discussion of many rules’ excessive length and detail, see supra Part 
II.B.1. 
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in its proposed rule in an effort to stave off litigation and devastating 
material comments, without worrying about the barriers that its less-
expert readers might encounter in understanding and evaluating the 
proposed rule. 
In this prolix state, affected groups require greater resources to 
offer meaningful comments on the proposed rule, especially if they 
were not privy to much of the specialized information that went into 
the proposal.238 There have been no efforts to measure the resources 
needed to understand an average EPA proposed rule, but the 
literature offers a number of anecdotes suggesting that the barriers 
can be quite high.239 Indeed, a random sample of any of the EPA’s 
technology-based standards should convince a skeptical reader of the 
near-unintelligibility of these rules, even without reading the more 
dense preambles the agency prepares to defend its rule.240 Reinforcing 
these general claims about a very high and likely excessive level of 
detail and technicality in many EPA rulemakings are some 
preliminary measures that reveal relatively long rules241 and debates 
 
 238. Indeed, buried deep under technical assumptions and impenetrable draft rules could 
lurk significant concessions that occurred during pre-NPRM discussions. Other long passages 
may be a defensive maneuver by the agency first to anticipate detailed criticisms and then to 
respond to them. But an interest group that is not engaged in pre-NPRM discussions may find 
these cumulative passages quite time-consuming to decipher and understand, and often may 
decide after this investment that it is unable to assess the passages’ significance for how public 
health might be affected. Certain adjustments or decisions—monitoring requirements that must 
be conducted annually rather than weekly, techniques for measuring emissions that involve 
larger margins of error than more expensive measurement techniques, pollution control 
equipment that does not function well at high temperatures—may impact pollution levels going 
into the air. But given the main source of litigation concern, these issues will be framed and 
addressed primarily to the agency’s most fearsome opponent—industry. 
 239. See, e.g., JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO 
AND WHY THEY DO IT 283 (1991) (citing as an example a huge record compiled for an OSHA 
standard that took the agency four years to process and that included 105,000 pages of 
testimony “in addition to uncounted pages of documents”); Carol M. Rose, Rethinking 
Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 1 
(asking in despair: “How can we make sense of environmental law? Our legislators churn out 
great undigestible masses of statutes about the environment, which in turn are interpreted by 
mounds of regulations, all densely packed with bizarre terms and opaque acronyms.”); 
Coglianese, supra note 47, at 34–35 n.39 (quoting an EPA staff member discussing how one rule, 
for example, involved 481 commenters, required “800 hours from one contractor alone in one 
week” to begin to assemble and process the comments, and demanded sixteen hundred hours of 
EPA staff time in one week alone to process the comments before the final rule was 
promulgated). 
 240. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. pt. 63 (2009) (technology-based standards for hazardous air 
pollutants). 
 241. See Wagner et al., supra note 37, at 18 (finding an average of thirty-nine pages per final 
rule, with some rules reaching above two hundred pages). 
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over dozens of significant issues for each rule in at least one set of 
pollution control standards.242 Thus, although the EPA’s rules are 
likely to vary in their complexity, the fact that they are generally quite 
complicated and technical seems uncontestable. 
More revealing of actual barriers to participation in public health 
rules are early empirical studies that document significant imbalances 
between regulated parties and public interest groups during the 
comment process. Although these studies do not provide any 
diagnosis for this imbalance, they are at least consistent with the 
consequences expected to flow from information capture. For 
example, in the previously mentioned study on hazardous air 
pollutant rules, industry comments (by industry players as well as 
industrial associations) accounted for more than 76 percent of all 
comments received by the EPA, with extensive industry involvement 
in 100 percent of the rulemakings.243 By contrast, public interest 
representatives, including state and local regulators as well as 
nonprofits, participated in less than half of the rulemakings, with 
comments across all rules averaging 5 percent of total comments.244 In 
his study of RCRA rules, Professor Coglianese found a similar 
imbalance, with businesses participating in 96 percent and national 
environmental groups participating in 44 percent of rules.245 He also 
found that “[n]early 60 percent of all the participants in RCRA 
rulemakings . . . came from industry; only 4 percent from the 
environmental community.”246 These EPA-focused studies are 
complemented by Professors Jason Webb Yackee and Susan Webb 
Yackee’s study of forty low-salience rules from four different 
agencies.247 They found that business interests submitted 57 percent of 
comments, whereas nongovernmental organizations submitted 22 
percent of comments, 6 percent of which came from public interest 
groups.248 The study concludes that business interests dominate the 
 
 242. See id. at 20 tbl.6 (finding an average of twenty-seven issues, and a maximum of 121 
issues, raised per proposed rule in a study of the EPA’s HAPs rulemakings). 
 243. Id. at 17. 
 244. Id. 
 245. See Coglianese, supra note 47, at 50 tbl.2-2. 
 246. Id. at 48; see also id. at 48 tbl.2-1 (noting that 17.3 percent of participants came from 
state and local governments and 10.5 percent came from the federal government; the total 
number of participants was 1607). 
 247. See Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards Business? Assessing 
Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128 (2006). 
 248. Id. at 133. 
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comment process in these low-salience rulemakings, but the authors 
do not provide measures of the rules’ technicality. Hence, it is not 
possible to determine how their results intersect with the information 
capture hypothesis.  
At the same time that the costs required of interest groups rise, 
the currency of greatest value to public interest groups—positive 
credit for success that is then advertised in the media and donor 
circles—drops as the issues become more mired in details and 
technicalities. In the air toxic regulation study previously mentioned, 
media attention on the substance of EPA rulemakings was extremely 
limited, with less than 15 percent of the rules covered at least once in 
more than one hundred major newspapers.249 In this setting, the ratio 
of costs to benefits of public interest participation may fall more 
sharply relative to industry because costs increase and benefits drop 
once information loading reaches the point of diminishing returns. 
These dropping benefits to engagement might also explain why public 
interest groups, to the extent that they do engage, appear to reserve 
their fire power for deadline suits and litigation at the very end of a 
rulemaking, when the possibility for positive media attention is the 
highest.250 
Equally important in assessing the strength of pluralistic 
oversight is an assessment of the actual influence of commenters. One 
can at least hold out some hope that parties that dominate the 
information flow may not necessarily enjoy similar levels of influence 
in affecting the actual substance of the final rule. But based on several 
snippets of evidence, it appears that voluminous filings of technical 
comments do translate relatively directly into influence over the final 
rule. First, if each detailed and well-supported comment raises a 
litigation risk, then the agency can be expected to make changes that 
are roughly proportional to the total number of comments, rather 
than favoring the comments of an underrepresented constituency.251 
In his case study of OSHA, for example, Professor Schmidt found 
that litigation-backed comments were the most influential precisely 
because they posed immediate risks to the fate of the rule.252 Second, 
and in this same vein, industry comments are likely to be more 
factually and technically oriented given industry’s specialized 
 
 249. See Wagner et al., supra note 37, at 30. 
 250. See Coglianese, supra note 47, at 28; Wagner et al., supra note 37, at 27–30. 
 251. See supra notes 148–58 and accompanying text. 
 252. See Schmidt, supra note 173, at 80, 82, 86–87. 
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knowledge and attentiveness to compliance-related details. These 
technical facts constitute an agency’s soft spot in litigation, and 
agencies are purported to be particularly amenable to making 
changes in their final rules based on comments that are technical in 
nature.253 Finally, the preliminary empirical evidence that bears on 
commenter influence reveals that industry continues to dominate the 
changes made between publication of the proposed and final rule. 
Both the Yackee and Yackee study and the preliminary study on 
hazardous air pollutants traced influence by statistically linking 
comments with changes in the final rule.254 The studies found that the 
number of comments was the best predictor of influence; industry 
dominated the comment process as well as the changes the agency 
made in the final rule. In the hazardous air pollutant study, for 
example, agencies made an average of more than ten changes 
weakening a rule, presumably in response to industry demands, as 
compared with an average of two changes that strengthened a rule.255 
4. Reasons for Comfort? Possible Sources of Counterpressure 
Against Pluralistic Losses.  Even if the pressures for information 
capture are in fact strong and unrelenting, there are other 
institutional mechanisms that would seem, in theory, to help agencies 
resist the pressure. Such counterpressure could occur, for example, 
through the courts’ imposition of vigorous information filters on 
participants or by offsetting interest group imbalances with some 
form of political or staff pushback. This Section considers these 
additional institutional interventions. Ultimately, however, none 
 
 253. See, e.g., Field & Robb, supra note 31, at 10 (noting that industry counsel agree that 
“[t]he arguments that stand the greatest chance of being listened to by the Agency are those 
that address technical aspects of a proposed rule rather than the legal basis of that rule”); see 
also id. at 50. Moreover, if industry has already had extensive discussions with the agency to 
convince it to consider its material changes during the pre-NPRM, its formal comments are 
likely to be aimed primarily at chipping away at the rule on smaller details rather than radically 
reconfiguring the proposal. By contrast, the public interest groups’ primary concerns and 
comments may take on some basic framing decisions fundamental to the development of the 
rule. To the extent that these groups’ changes tend in this more “material” direction, they are 
more likely to receive a chilly reception from the agency because they technically require the 
agency to promulgate a supplemental or second proposed rule, which involves an additional 
notice-and-comment process. In terms of the time involved, it may be quicker to reject these 
groups’ significant comments and risk being sued than to accept their changes and trigger notice 
and comment all over again. 
 254. See Yackee & Yackee, supra note 247, at 135; Wagner et al., supra note 37, at 7–8. 
 255. Wagner et al., supra note 37, at 20 tbl.6. 
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appear capable of counteracting information capture, at least not in a 
significant way. 
a. Courts as Filters.  The courts create many of the significant 
incentives for information capture through their interpretation of the 
APA, but in the narrow context of individual cases, they are actually 
quite adept at forcing powerful information filters on participants.256 
Through page and brief limitations, litigation helps focus and narrow 
the issues in dispute.257 Adversarial disagreements also tend to limit 
and sharpen the issues and cull out peripheral or weak arguments. 
Finally, there are generally far fewer information-related imbalances 
at the appellate stage because factual disagreements are generally 
limited to the finite administrative record.258 Thus, though appellate 
cases still can be unwieldy, the judicial process provides incentives for 
parties to process the information before they communicate it.259 
The effectiveness of the courts as information filters, however, is 
only as good as the cases that come to them, and this proves to be a 
significant limitation in several respects. First, courts will not preside 
over all cases in which information capture has taken hold, but only 
those challenges that are brought to them for adjudication. In some 
cases, public interest groups may select captured rulemakings 
specifically to highlight for the court the imbalance in the agency’s 
analysis. The existing empirical evidence suggests, however, that a 
number of EPA rules may not be subjected to judicial scrutiny. 
Professor Coglianese’s statistics indicate that of the EPA’s significant 
hazardous waste regulations promulgated over a three-year period, 
only about a quarter of the rules were actually briefed in court.260 
More than half were not challenged, and about half of the remaining 
cases settled before oral argument.261 Interestingly, some of these 
cases may have settled precisely because the parties did not want to 
invest the time or energy (or litigation risk) in processing their claims 
for the courts. Professor Coglianese found in his study that “[o]ne 
 
 256. Cf. Smith, supra note 21, at 1125 (observing how formal forums can involve more 
extensive filtering for the participants). 
 257. See supra note 26. 
 258. See, e.g., Edison Elec. Inst. v. OSHA, 849 F.2d 611, 617–18 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 259. But see WILSON, supra note 239, at 284 (observing that court access is expensive). 
 260. See supra note 197. 
 261. See supra note 197. 
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reason groups select or settle issues is that the court imposes page 
limits on briefs and a time limit on oral argument.”262 
Adding to the courts’ limitations is the fact that settlements that 
occur on the courthouse steps may make information capture worse, 
rather than better. As discussed earlier, the litigants in these judicial 
settlements (which may be disproportionately the same parties that 
dominated earlier phases of the rulemaking)263 are able to take one 
last bite out of the rulemaking through confidential settlement 
negotiations.264 Even more troubling, in some cases, these post-rule 
settlement negotiations may undo some of the pluralistic gains made 
earlier in the process. Professor Coglianese, for example, observed 
that 
[i]n the wood preserving rule, the 267 individuals and groups filing 
comments on the rule narrowed down to three groups in court. 
Greenpeace and the Environmental Defense Fund were extremely 
active in the rulemaking, but did not enter the litigation. As a result, 
positions these environmental groups successfully advanced in the 
rulemaking were later directly undercut in the litigation process.265 
A second and related limitation to the courts’ filtering 
effectiveness is their dependence on litigants to raise the issues in 
need of vetting. Specifically, if industry is the primary litigant, then 
only industry’s complaints will be aired in court; the possibility that 
the rule is not protective enough will not be presented to the court for 
resolution. The resulting narrowing of the issues raised in litigation 
will likely mirror the imbalance in interest group representation 
occurring at earlier phases of the rulemaking. As noted previously, 
public interest groups appear to file comments on about half of EPA 
rulemakings (whereas industry files comments on nearly all of 
them).266 As a result, environmental groups are only able to file suit 
 
 262. Coglianese, supra note 47, at 114. 
 263. See infra note 269 and accompanying text. 
 264. Also as discussed, the resulting settlements can lead to significant changes that affect, 
for example, how the agency will interpret or enforce the rule; but these changes may not be 
subject to notice and comment and may not even be shared openly with the public. See supra 
notes 195–96 and accompanying text; cf. Field & Robb, supra note 31, at 52–53 (stressing the 
advantages of negotiating with the agency rather than litigating against it, and how such 
negotiations further allow other issues to be addressed, even if they were not part of the original 
legal challenge); Schmidt, supra note 173, at 79 (discussing OSHA’s settlement with one party, 
which involved altering its enforcement guidance). 
 265. Coglianese, supra note 47, at 107. 
 266. See supra text accompanying notes 243–46. 
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for half of all rulemakings because they have not exhausted their 
remedies on the other half. Additionally, evidence reveals that the 
delay common to litigation is highly attractive to industry, but 
constitutes a negative feature for environmental groups because it 
delays pollution regulation.267 Thus, even when they have a claim and 
can file suit, the very different payoffs may make environmental 
groups less inclined to file suit against the substance of EPA rules.268 
The available evidence on challenges to the EPA supports these 
concerns: industry players challenge more EPA rules than 
environmental groups.269 
 
 267. For example, Professors Owen and Braeutigam suggest in their “[s]trategies for 
[e]stablished [f]irms and [i]ndustries” to game the APA: 
The delay which can be purchased by litigation offers an opportunity to undertake 
other measures to reduce or eliminate the costs of an eventual adverse decision. 
These measures include strategic innovation, legislative proposals, and lobbying 
activity. If the administrative process goes on long enough, it is even possible to ask 
for a new hearing on the grounds that new and more accurate information may be 
available. The agency usually cannot resist the effort to delay through exhaustion of 
process because this would be grounds for reversal on appeal to the courts. 
OWEN & BRAEUTIGAM, supra note 59, at 4–5; see also Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. 
McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 
729, 737–38 (observing that “[b]ecause judicial review ‘delay[s] the implementation of OSHA 
standards by an average of two years,’ a company or trade association could save its industry 
$320,000 by filing an appeal, assuming an eight percent annual interest rate. . . . [Thus a trade] 
association could afford legal fees of up to $640 an hour and still save its members money 
compared to the costs of immediate compliance with the OSHA standard” (second alteration in 
original) (footnote omitted)). 
  By contrast, environmental groups often see delay as a window during which health is 
not sufficiently protected. See, e.g., HREBENAR, supra note 40, at 262 (observing that “[t]ime 
delays often benefit the corporate interests while creating a disadvantage for consumer groups” 
and linking this not only to regulatory consequences but to the costs of engaging in the process). 
Though the EPA’s standards may be a disappointment, further delaying their implementation 
could be worse. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 6, at 1772 (“Increased procedural formalities [like 
judicial review] may work to the disadvantage of public interest groups by exhausting their 
limited resources and providing organized interests a basis for delaying agency enforcement 
actions.”); cf. MASHAW, supra note 114, at 174 (noting that the timing of review and associated 
compliance costs affect a party’s stake in challenging a rule in court). 
 268. For the same reasons, environmental groups will be more inclined to sue the EPA for 
missing the statutory deadlines set for issuing the rule. 
 269. See, e.g., Lettie McSpadden Wenner, The Reagan Era in Environmental Regulation, in 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PUBLIC POLICY 41, 48 (Miriam K. Mills ed., 1990) (reporting 
based on an empirical study of appellate litigation from 1970 to 1985 that “[i]ndustry exceeded 
environmental groups’ complaints against government actions at the appellate level as early as 
1976, and this was reversed only once, in 1983, when industry’s inputs fell off,” and positing that 
scarce resources of the environmental groups may help explain why these groups were not more 
vigorous in challenging the Reagan EPA in court); Yackee & Yackee, supra note 247, at 133. 
Professor Coglianese’s study, which considers hazardous waste rules closest to those likely to be 
subject to filter failure, reports that among the thirteen of twenty-eight significant rules 
challenged in court, 101 total petitions were filed; “91 percent of these 65 groups were 
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b. Offsetting Imbalance in Interest Group Participation with 
Civic-Minded Government Employees.  One correction that could be 
quite effective in counteracting imbalances in participation (though it 
would not stem rising information costs) is the civic commitment of 
agency staff. Agency staffers are not automatons that respond 
unthinkingly to gluts of information that threaten to undermine their 
regulatory mission. Committed EPA staff is likely to be an extremely 
important force in pushing back against unilateral pressure from one 
group, particularly industry. In his excellent study, Professor Croley 
notes—with ample evidence—the important role of agency leadership 
and staff in keeping public beneficiaries in mind.270 
In practice, however, this professional ballast might not be 
sufficient to eradicate, or even significantly reduce, the information 
capture phenomenon. First, given the incentives created by the 
structure of administrative law itself, particularly those created 
through judicial review, civic-minded staff will face an uphill legal 
battle to surmount all of the one-sided pressures described in this 
Article. Preliminary evidence of changes made to final rules based on 
skewed industry participation further increases concerns that the 
agency may be capitulating to a number of industry demands—
though the importance of these numerous concessions remains to be 
seen.271 Even assuming that the legal obstacles are not overpowering, 
however, this model of administrative law presents a very different 
mechanism for accountability than the process outlined in the law 
books. For example, if agency staff are the primary means for 
promoting the public interest (and pluralistic mechanisms of oversight 
are effectively abandoned), the hiring of staff must be done in a 
transparent and explicit way that consistently favors those with views 
like those working in public interest groups. Administrative law will 
also have to come to terms with the notion of reduced accountability 
and transparency when decisionmaking authority is delegated 
wholesale to a trustworthy professional workforce. None of this is to 
 
corporations or trade associations, while only 8 percent were environmental organizations.” 
Coglianese, supra note 47, at 70. 
 270. CROLEY, supra note 39, at 159 (positing that “[i]t is plausible that agency regulators are 
motivated to do so as a result of their own commitments to the common good, which might after 
all account for why they became regulators in the first place”); id. at 282 (concluding from his 
case studies how the APA processes helped agencies inoculate rules from interest group 
pressures and allowed “public-interested administrators . . . to pursue regulatory goals they 
believed advanced social welfare in the face of substantial opposition”). 
 271. See supra notes 251–55 and accompanying text. 
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suggest that the agency may not help buffer against information 
capture, but it does suggest that this more informal role played by 
agency staff needs more systematic confirmation and may need 
additional process checks before information capture’s potential 
significance can be dismissed. 
c. Offsetting Pluralistic Imbalance with Civic-Minded White 
House Interventions.  A number of legislative and executive 
innovations, such as cost-benefit analysis, would seem, in the abstract, 
to counteract filter failure head-on by forcing agencies to analyze the 
implications of their rules and share these analyses with the public.272 
Such requirements endeavor to provide onlookers with even more 
accessible and digestible snapshots of the costs and benefits of 
regulation, as well as the implications of regulation for irreversible 
environmental commitments and for vulnerable groups, like small 
businesses.273 
These analytical requirements are quite appealing from an 
information-processing perspective, but they have not lived up to 
their potential in practice and seem to suffer from filter failure as 
well.274 Retrospective studies of the National Environmental Policy 
 
 272. Some of the more significant information-generation requirements imposed on the 
agencies that can apply during informal rulemaking include: the National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–70f (2006), which assesses environmental impacts; the 
Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–21 (2006), which requires clearance procedures 
for federal forms, recordkeeping, and amendments pertaining to electronic information; the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–12 (2006), which requires comprehensive reviews of 
regulatory activities and consideration of the impacts of rules on small businesses; and 
Executive Order 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006), 
which requires a regulatory impact assessment (otherwise known as a cost-benefit analysis) of 
influential rules and that these rules be cleared through the Office of Management and Budget. 
Individual statutes may impose still more information-intensive demands, such as allowing 
parties the right of cross-examination. See generally 1 PIERCE, supra note 9, §§ 7.7, 7.11. 
 273. Winston Harrington, Lisa Heinzerling & Richard D. Morgenstern, Controversies 
Surrounding Regulatory Impact Analysis, in REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, 
supra note 82, at 10, 12–13 (touting these advantages of the RIA process). At the same time, 
these salience-raising analyses provide a door through which White House offices can enter to 
review the agency’s preferred course of action. In theory, this form of political oversight offers 
the opportunity for push-back on information capture. 
 274. Some and perhaps most of this failure may be attributed to how these provisions are 
designed. For example, virtually all of the information and analysis requirements are imposed 
on agencies without protecting them from candid disclosures or litigation-generating admissions 
against interest. These added analyses are also often prepared near the end of the process, when 
the decision is close to final. Harrington et al., supra note 82, at 224–25. As a result, the reports 
serve in practice only to increase the agency’s vulnerability to lawsuits and unwelcome political 
pressure if the agency slips and includes, in writing, some admissions against interest. Not 
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Act (NEPA) and the regulatory impact assessment (RIA) process 
consistently find that the agency’s analyses tend to be very lengthy 
(reaching into the hundreds or thousands of pages), highly technical, 
and so laden with assumptions that the summary tables provide an 
unreliable overview of the contents of the larger document.275 For 
example, in its comprehensive study of the agency’s compliance with 
NEPA, the Council on Environmental Quality concluded that rather 
than providing a candid assessment of the project, the agencies 
generally turned the environmental impact statement into a 
“litigation-proof” document that did not adequately raise or consider 
alternatives or engage with the underlying facts in a rigorous way.276 
Even if these centralized analyses cannot completely counteract 
filter failure, they still might provide valuable mechanisms for the 
White House or other high-level political officials to gain purchase on 
regulatory issues and intervene more directly in ways that offset 
participatory imbalances arising from information capture.277 Much 
like the model for civic-minded staff within the agency, this political 
ballast—occurring through the White House and the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB)—would in theory push back against 
one-sided pressure to keep these rules on a level playing field. Most 
would prefer this political counterpressure to take place in the light 
rather than outside public oversight, as is currently the case.278 But the 
 
surprisingly, agency general counsel and other high level officials appear to play a very heavy 
hand in drafting the document, just as they do for proposed and final rules, and sometimes limit 
the analysis, potentially substantially. Id. at 221–22 (recounting how the agency may consider 
only one option instead of comparing it to a possibly more efficient alternative). The ability of 
these analytical documents to penetrate the informational fog appears well out of reach, at least 
currently. 
 275. Id. at 226 (observing, based on case studies, that “RIAs have become huge, dense 
documents that are almost impenetrable to all but those with training in the relevant technical 
fields . . . . [and that] [e]ven to the well-trained eye, RIAs are often opaque”). 
 276. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: A 
STUDY OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, at iii (1997). 
 277. See, e.g., John D. Graham, Saving Law Through Administrative Law and Economics, 
157 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 473–74 (2008) (describing White House deliberations over features of 
EPA rules that were not clear from the RIAs, but related to the costs and benefits of the 
regulation). 
 278. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A 
Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 78, 86 (2006) (noting 
that “97% of EPA respondents stated that White House involvement was either not 
visible . . . or only somewhat visible to the public” and that a majority of EPA respondents 
believe that the White House is more susceptible to faction capture than the EPA); see also 
Sally Katzen, Correspondence, A Reality Check on an Empirical Study: Comments on “Inside 
the Administrative State,” 105 MICH. L. REV. 1497, 1502–03 (2007) (conceding the lack of 
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fact that it occurs at all may be chalked up as a victory over the 
skewed results that might otherwise arise from information capture. 
Current evidence of OMB’s involvement in EPA rulemakings 
suggests that rather than taking the side of environmental groups, 
OMB far more often sides with industry. One of the primary 
justifications for stronger White House and OMB involvement is to 
counteract the perceived ideological bent of mission-oriented 
bureaucrats.279 Former OMB appointees openly concede that they 
regard balancing out the “laser”-like focus of the environment-
minded EPA as one of their more important roles.280 More recent 
studies of OMB in particular confirm its generally anti-environmental 
bent.281 Thus, if information capture tends to cause a skew toward 
business, existing studies provide no basis for thinking that White 
House and OMB review helps protect against it.282 
 
transparency but arguing that the results of White House involvement provided greater political 
accountability, a point discussed later). 
 279. See, e.g., Bagley & Revesz, supra note 40, at 1261–62 (discussing how OMB review is an 
antiregulatory force that descended from the Reagan-era assumption that agencies will 
overregulate due to capture by groups like prohealth and prosafety constituencies). 
 280. Katzen, supra note 278, at 1505 (observing how the EPA “focus[es] like a laser” on 
protecting the environment, whereas the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) 
takes “a broader view and consider[s] how, for example, an environmental proposal will affect 
energy resources, tax revenues, health policy, etc.”). 
 281. In their study of top EPA officials’ views of OIRA during the Bush I and Clinton 
administrations, Professors Bressman and Vandenbergh report that the strong majority (70 
percent) reported that the “White House readily sought changes that would reduce burdens on 
regulated entities, and veered from those that would increase such burdens.” Bressman & 
Vandenbergh, supra note 278, at 87. Professor Croley made similar, although not quite as 
strong, observations about OIRA’s tilt during the White House review process: 56 percent of 
the meetings OIRA conducted to discuss rulemakings were exclusively with industry, as 
compared with 10 percent held exclusively with public interest groups. Steven Croley, White 
House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 853, 
871 (2003). Finally, in a study by the Government Accountability Office, about two-thirds of the 
rules that OIRA “significantly affected” and for which comments were available involved 
reinforcing the views of industry. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NO. GAO-03-929, 
RULEMAKING: OMB’S ROLE IN REVIEWS OF AGENCIES’ DRAFT RULES AND THE 
TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE REVIEWS 11 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/ new.items/ 
d03929.pdf. 
 282. To the extent that these centralized review processes could ultimately make matters 
worse with regard to information filtering, the good news is that they only apply to some of the 
most significant rules, which are likely to be the most salient. But the glass is more likely half 
empty. Significant rules seem to be those most likely to escape the most entrenched forms of 
information capture. See supra notes 213–15 and accompanying text. That these salient rules 
actually escape information capture only to be placed, because of their significance, into a more 
highly politicized setting—where they are at real risk of old-fashioned political capture—
presents a bleak picture of administrative process. 
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5. Summary.  In the process just described, as costs mount at 
each successive stage of a rulemaking, the participants drop out. The 
resulting information capture causes adversarial and pluralistic 
processes to break down due to the substantial demands on the time 
and energy of interest groups that must keep up with the growing 
issues and record. Once information costs are factored into the 
evaluation of administrative processes, then, these processes may not 
be neutral after all.283 In the end, the result looks much the same as 
the type of agency capture that initially motivated these oversight 
processes in the beginning. 
B. Other Adverse Consequences 
1. Constrained Decisionmaking that Leads to Satisficing Rather 
than Comprehensive Regulatory Decisions.  Professor James Q. 
Wilson writes that “government management tends to be driven by 
the constraints on the organization, not the tasks of the 
organization.”284 The possibility that the agency may spend more time 
with the constraint of organizing, processing, and responding to 
information than actually synthesizing it into a coherent regulatory 
policy seems more than a hypothetical worry. The mounds of highly 
 
 283. This is the fundamental point at which this Article departs from Professor Croley’s 
analysis. See CROLEY, supra note 39, at 74–75 (arguing that regulatory agencies may avoid bias 
from information capture because many sources of information are available). Once 
information costs are considered, the processes are not neutral. Information costs do provide a 
way for more powerful interests to outcompete less powerful interest groups. Indeed, these 
advantages occur because of administrative processes and rules, not in spite of them. More 
specifically, Professor Croley seems to assume that access in most cases will be both a necessary 
and a sufficient condition for participation. This Article argues that it may be a necessary 
condition, but it is not sufficient in most cases. For example, he argues that 
[b]ecause the procedures through which agencies identify and evaluate regulatory 
alternatives provide opportunities for a wide variety of interests to supply 
administrators with facts and arguments, and similarly to question the facts and 
arguments provided by competing interest or generated by agencies themselves, 
regulatory decisionmaking procedures provide significant protection against 
informational capture. 
Id. at 75. But if the information involved is extremely voluminous and technical, then access is 
not “free” in practice and information begins to impede the extent to which parties can 
participate. This Article’s analysis also takes issue with Professor Croley’s argument that 
administrative processes provide agencies with the discretion to consider information 
comprehensively. See, e.g., id. (“[A]gencies are equipped [through administrative procedures] to 
assess information about regulatory ends and means, and in particular to do so with 
informational independence from those interests with the biggest stake in regulatory 
outcomes.”). Instead, this Article argues that administrative processes tend to tether the agency 
to the informational priorities of the dominant stakeholders. 
 284. WILSON, supra note 239, at 115. 
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technical information streaming in, coupled with a judicially enforced 
requirement that the agency must “consider” all of it, puts a strain on 
the agency’s ability to make coherent decisions. The most obvious 
effect of this strain is to divert some of the agency’s limited attention 
away from producing coherent regulatory policies and toward 
information management.285 Indeed, processing this incoming 
information can become so central to the agency’s daily work that 
organizing and processing information could even surpass the 
energies dedicated to the agency’s mission of producing creative, 
effective public-benefitting regulations. 
Agencies, wisely, have tried to delegate much of the burden of 
information management to contractors, but separating information 
management from decisionmaking is not always easy in these 
settings.286 For example, contractors are often assigned the job of 
summarizing public comments and preparing the agency’s 
comprehensive response to them.287 They are also heavily involved in 
the technical analysis that precedes development of the proposed 
rule.288 Both of these responsibilities place the contractors in key roles 
of regulation development. As a result of contractors’ intimate 
involvement, there is growing concern that contractors, rather than 
the EPA, may be left making key policy decisions simply by virtue of 
fulfilling their contracts. Professor Paul Verkuil, for example, worries 
that because of this extensive contractor involvement in rulemakings, 
“[r]ationality review by the agency may be fast becoming a 
misnomer.”289 An increasingly heavy reliance on contractors to 
process large amounts of the information relevant to a regulation may 
also lead the EPA to “look ‘less for technical geniuses’ [in hiring staff] 
and more for generalists who can oversee and communicate with 
 
 285. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 19, at 242 (“[Many] systems were not designed to conserve 
the critical scarce resource—the attention of managers—and they tended to ignore the fact that 
the information most important to top managers comes mainly from external sources and not 
from the internal records that were immediately accessible for mechanized processing.”). 
 286. See, e.g., Paul R. Verkuil, The Wait Is Over: Chevron as the Stealth Vermont Yankee II, 
75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 921, 928 (2007) (“Agency officials, overwhelmed by a workload 
produced in part by perceived views of hard-look review requirements, are increasingly 
delegating the rationality assignment to private contractors and signing off on the results.”). 
 287. Id. 
 288. See, e.g., MAGAT ET AL., supra note 236, at 31–38 (describing the role of contractor 
analyses and reports in the rulemaking process). 
 289. Verkuil, supra note 286, at 929. 
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technical consultants. This has affected morale, as EPA technical staff 
at times resent not being able to use their expertise.”290 
Filter failure and the resulting risk of information capture in 
administrative process not only divert agency attention away from the 
central task of policymaking but also risk allowing the participants to 
control the regulatory agenda. Incremental muddling through in 
response to interest group input—or satisficing—will replace 
comprehensive problem solving.291 This is exacerbated by the fact that 
under the current structure of notice and comment, “private parties 
can be relied upon to tell the agency what it is doing wrong [in 
specific rulemakings], but not how it might improve.”292 In such a 
system, the agency is given little or no credit for imaginative problem 
solving. 
In fact, a rule seems more likely to survive judicial review if the 
agency is particularly vigilant about responding to the priorities and 
issues its adversaries raise, even if it means forgoing the development 
of its own conception of a more holistic regulation. This judicially 
imposed demand puts the agency at the mercy of its adversaries and 
cedes to them some measure of control over the regulatory blueprint. 
One group of commentators concludes that, based on these process-
based incentives, “it seems best to regard the regulatory agency as an 
endogenous force whose behavior can be strategically manipulated by 
the firms it regulates.”293 
The most significant problem with satisficing as a way to develop 
regulatory policy, however, is the possibility that the groups that 
constrain the agency in these ways will not represent a cross section of 
the affected interests but instead will be badly skewed or even one-
sided.294 In her study of the effects of judicial review on the EPA, 
Professor O’Leary concludes that “[m]atters suitable for litigation are 
 
 290. O’Leary, supra note 156, at 565. 
 291. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 239, at 283 (expressing concern and quoting others with 
the concern that the threat of judicial review will cause agencies to resist change or take risks on 
policies, “especially those that embody novel ideas or approaches”). 
 292. Rubin, supra note 119, at 103; see also id. at 114 (arguing that “policy formation 
concerns a much less strict conception of notice, grounded in considerations of optimal 
information flow, not fairness to individuals”). 
 293. OWEN & BRAEUTIGAM, supra note 59, at 9. 
 294. Judge Garland suggests this worry in passing, but with respect only to economic 
regulation. With respect to economic regulation, his concern is apparently that incumbents will 
engage the agency and that future beneficiaries will not be represented in judicial review or 
interest representation. See Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 505, 591 (1985). 
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the ‘squeaky wheels that get the grease,’ while other important 
environmental problems fall by the wayside.”295 Squeaky wheels drive 
the formulation and solutions to the regulatory problem at hand, thus 
narrowing the conception and analysis as well as limiting the range of 
best policy responses.296 And the agency’s legally based preoccupation 
with these squeaky wheels may be badly out of line with the public 
interest, the aggregate views of all affected parties, and the original 
goal of the statute. As a result, a “system predicated on building 
consensus and refracting interests may prove painfully incapable of 
policymaking that transcends particularistic demands.”297 
If administrative incentives do cause the agency to aim for a 
proposal that withstands the criticisms of litigious interest groups 
rather than one that provides comprehensive and responsible 
regulation, then the ideal of agencies has been significantly 
compromised.298 The solution lies not in providing more process and 
judicial review, but elsewhere. 
2. Strategic Uses of Information Capture that Pervert Open 
Government Processes.  Information capture represents the dark side 
of a transparent, equal, and open system of government: it enables 
participants to legally undercut one another and manipulate the 
agency with elaborate information-based strategies.299 Principles for 
open government can even exacerbate basic inequities among interest 
groups with regard to the resources available to participate, at least in 
some settings. As Professor Mashaw intuits, “if interest group theory 
 
 295. O’Leary, supra note 156, at 562. 
 296. Professor Stewart worried—even in the early years of the interest representation 
model—that “[j]udicialization of agency procedures and the expansion of participation rights 
may . . . aggravate the tendency for the agency to assume a passive role, focusing on the unique 
character of each controversy in order to reach an ad hoc accommodation of the particular 
constellation of interests presented.” Stewart, supra note 6, at 1773 (footnote omitted). The 
possibility of these ad hoc, unprincipled decisions arising from interest representation seemed to 
be Professor Stewart’s largest concern as well, though he gestured to the added possibility that 
ad hoc analysis also might not take into account all affected interests. Id. at 1789. 
 297. BOSSO, supra note 200, at 255. 
 298. Professor Schiller recounts how in the New Deal, agencies were supposed to serve “as a 
counterweight to the incredible power wielded by large corporations. . . . The administrative 
state equalized the playing field by placing the government on the side of the people rather than 
having it simply act as a neutral ‘umpire’ in a dispute between two unequal parties.” Schiller, 
supra note 29, at 429; see also MELNICK, supra note 149, at 76–80, 129–35, 157–62, 261–69 
(discussing cases in which courts emphasized that the agency role was to protect public health 
and the environment). 
 299. Cf. CROLEY, supra note 39, at 305 (touting how APA processes stave off rent-seekers 
and keep regulatory outcomes more public benefitting). 
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works even somewhat similarly to what the public choice fraternity 
believes, transparency is a double-edged sword.”300 
Indeed, the abuse of transparency and open government are well 
known by regulatory insiders. More than thirty years ago, Professors 
Bruce Owen and Ronald Braeutigam underscored how stakeholders’ 
“ability to control the flow of information to the regulatory agency is 
a crucial element in affecting decisions.”301 Based on this power, they 
observe how these stakeholders can make available “carefully 
selected facts,” withhold others, and if delay is useful, “flood the 
agency with more information than it can absorb.”302 When the agency 
seeks a particularly damaging piece of information that cannot be 
withheld legally, the interest group’s “best tactic is to bury it in a 
mountain of irrelevant material” or provide it but simultaneously 
“deny its reliability and to commence a study to acquire more reliable 
data.”303 
Published advice by legal counsel to industry betray similar, 
albeit less candid strategies to use information strategically during the 
rulemaking process. One interviewee in Professor Coglianese’s 
study—a corporate counsel—provided a succinct summary of these 
methods: “We will try to build a record that’s persuasive . . . to sort of 
overwhelm the agency and create for them the impression that the 
world out there wants them to do something else.”304 Another group 
of industry attorneys observed that the EPA’s aversion to litigation 
was often exploited: “many people may file suit [against the EPA] 
just to ‘get a seat at the negotiating table.’”305 
Good government reforms can also be used as Trojan horses to 
surreptitiously introduce new strategic tools for controlling regulatory 
processes through information capture. For example, the tobacco 
 
 300. MASHAW, supra note 114, at 190. 
 301. OWEN & BRAEUTIGAM, supra note 59, at 4. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. These techniques can also be deployed in more adversarial settings to overcome the 
opposition’s efforts. For example, “[i]f another party has supplied damaging information, it is 
important to supply contrary information in as technical a form as possible so that a hearing is 
necessary to settle the issues of ‘fact.’” Id. The techniques even advise regulated parties to 
deploy decentralized information systems so that officials can be selected who can testify 
truthfully on what they know, but be carefully protected from other conflicting or damaging 
sources of information. Id. 
 304. Coglianese, supra note 47, at 35–36. 
 305. Field & Robb, supra note 31, at 53. 
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lobby was the architect of both the Data Access306 and the Data 
Quality Acts,307 which Congress passed as appropriation riders about 
a decade ago.308 Both acts were purportedly passed to improve the 
scientific integrity of regulatory decisions. Yet, as their sponsorship 
might suggest, these provisions were motivated by more than 
tobacco’s selfless effort to get government running on the right 
scientific track. The Data Access Act, for example, allows any party 
to access the data from any federally funded study that forms the 
basis for regulation; but private research that informs regulatory 
requirements (most of which is produced by regulated parties) is 
unaffected and remains out of public reach.309 A companion 
appropriations rider passed one year later, the Data Quality Act, 
allows any interested party to file an unlimited number of complaints 
(and appeals) of unlimited size against an agency alleging that some 
piece of information used at some point in the regulatory process was 
unreliable.310 The provision includes no sanctions or costs for abusive 
filings. In the case of the Data Quality Act, however, the agencies got 
the last laugh. The courts and Congress declined to provide judicial 
review of the complaint process,311 and at the same time, industry use 
of the Act was put under the spotlight because of concerns about 
abuse.312 As a result, and much to the disappointment of its 
proponents, the Data Quality Act falls short of providing a judicially 
enforced mechanism for launching additional, information-based 
challenges to agency rulemakings. 
 
 306. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, 
Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-495 (1998). 
 307. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763, 
2763A-153 to -154 (2000). 
 308. See, e.g., Memorandum from Jim Tozzi to Matthew Winokur (Oct. 12, 1998) (on file 
with the Duke Law Journal) (discussing the origin and effects of the Data Access Act); Chris 
Mooney, Interrogations: Thanks to a Little-Known Piece of Legislation, Scientists at the EPA and 
Other Agencies Find Their Work Questioned Not Only by Industry, but by Their Own 
Government, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 28, 2005, at C1 (describing the origins of the Data Quality 
Act). 
 309. See, e.g., Wendy Wagner & David Michaels, Equal Treatment for Regulatory Science: 
Extending the Controls Governing the Quality of Public Research to Private Research, 30 AM. 
J.L. & MED. 119, 138 (2004) (noting these inequitable features). 
 310. See id. at 138–39 (describing the effect of the Data Quality Act on the regulatory 
process). 
 311. See, e.g., Salt Inst. v. Thompson, 345 F. Supp. 2d 589, 593 (E.D. Va. 2004) (“Neither the 
Act itself nor its very limited legislative history provide a mechanism for judicial review of 
information quality or any avenue for judicial relief.”). 
 312. See, e.g., Mooney, supra note 308. 
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In settings in which information capture is likely to take hold, 
rules providing for transparency and open government should be 
vigorously examined for signs of mischief.313 Information capture is 
also a reminder that a commitment to open government is not an end 
in itself, but merely an “institutional design tool” used to effectuate 
good government.314 The effectiveness of transparency and open 
government thus should not be taken for granted without examining 
the opportunities for abuse. 
3. An Information Avalanche.  One of the fundamental 
characteristics of information capture, at least in theory, is that the 
information excesses and accompanying imbalances in participation 
will worsen over time and resist easy fixes. Professor Peter Schuck 
writes eloquently about a related phenomenon, which he calls legal 
complexity.315 In these complex legal landscapes, he writes,  
it is no longer enough to know one’s location and destination; one 
cannot survive without a great deal of local knowledge about when 
the buses run, whether cabs will venture into certain 
neighborhoods, . . . and where it is safe to walk. . . . Experienced 
guides equipped with maps and special know-how are 
essential . . . .316 
As this dense landscape becomes more complex and labyrinthine, it 
may even begin to outstrip the ability of these experts to navigate the 
terrain. At some point, the issues, volume, specialized knowledge, and 
other features may simply take on a shape of their own, resisting 
mastery by any of the parties. 
Some EPA rules and regulatory programs appear destined to be 
on a path toward potentially hopeless complexity. In an article now 
more than a decade old, Professor Eric Orts writes about the problem 
of juridification, when laws and requirements proliferate and become 
increasingly complex until the entire regulatory structure “breaks 
down under its own weight.”317 Others have echoed these concerns. 
 
 313. Cf. CROLEY, supra note 39, at 293 (concluding that the best antidote for a rigorous 
regulatory system is “increased transparency and participation”). 
 314. Cf. MASHAW, supra note 114, at 191 (“‘Transparency’ thus becomes a strategic 
institutional design tool, not an end in itself.”); Jasanoff, supra note 28, at 22 (noting the limits 
of transparency in promoting rigorous regulatory science). 
 315. Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE 
L.J. 1, 22 (1992). 
 316. Id. at 20. 
 317. Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1241 (1995). 
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Professor Thomas McGarity, in his classic article on ossification, 
noticed an upward trajectory in the complexity and technical detail in 
Federal Register preambles.318 In his study of pesticide policy, 
spanning from the 1940s through the 1980s, Professor Bosso similarly 
observes that the “[o]ne dynamic [that] stands out . . . [is that] 
objective conditions have evolved to higher orders of complexity, but 
the fundamental relationships paradoxically remain pretty much the 
same.”319 
All of these observations raise the rather obvious question of 
how to put the brakes on a system that is likely to grow only more 
informationally overloaded and complex over time, in ways that 
might even lose sight of regulation’s original motivating purpose. It is 
difficult to imagine that agencies will be able to resist this pull toward 
increasing complexity on their own, particularly in light of the 
mandatory open-door policies that they have maintained for so long. 
Instead, process changes coming from outside the agencies are 
needed. Several possible reforms are discussed in the next Part. 
IV.  REFORM 
The problem of filter failure runs deep in administrative law, and 
redressing it may involve a long process of experimentation. The 
reforms presented here are simply efforts to begin a discussion about 
reform possibilities. Although some of the reforms seem unduly 
specific and prescriptive, they are offered primarily in the hope of 
generating new ways to think about administrative process rather 
than attempting to cut specific paths through the forest.320 At the same 
time, although some of the proposals are unconventional, none of 
them require radical changes to the existing administrative system.321 
 
 318. See McGarity, supra note 146, at 1387. For a visual representation of the growth of 
environmental regulations from 1972 to 2008, see http://www.law.drake.edu/ facStaff/docs/T_40_ 
compared.JPG (last visited Feb. 15, 2010) (provided by Prof. Jerry Anderson, Drake Law 
School). 
 319. BOSSO, supra note 200, at 235. 
 320. Information capture may also be more amenable to reform than more systemic 
problems such as scarce resources, White House overrides, and organizational and structural 
problems that are more deeply engrained within agency structure. See supra note 201 and 
accompanying text. Indeed, if some of the perverse legal approaches to information can be 
reversed, then it will leave a clearer picture of the intractable regulatory and administrative 
problems that remain and provide some hope that they can be whittled away gradually. 
 321. In identifying possible reforms, particular care should be taken to ensure that the fixes 
proposed for these technical and complex rules will not have adverse side effects on other 
sectors of regulation in which regulatory problems may be quite different. See, e.g., Gormley, 
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The reforms track the adverse consequences discussed in Part III and 
are presented in roughly the same order. See Figure 3. 
The bulk of the reforms suggested here attempt to fix the 
breakdown in the pluralistic process that results when information 
capture afflicts administrative rulemaking. The adversarial back-and-
forth between interest groups, when it works, helps filter information 
naturally by eliminating some of the peripheral or poorly supported 
arguments and sharpening the discussion of issues most critical to 
decisionmaking. It thus not only revives the possibility for more 
balanced decisions within the agency but also helps make the debates 
and contests more accessible to a broader audience, including the 
media, thereby improving the operation of the political process.322 
Although an adversarial approach to regulatory deliberations is 
inefficient and creates a range of problems,323 it is, and likely will 
remain, a primary mechanism for ensuring administrative 
accountability.324 Therefore, the most straightforward approach for 
 
supra note 52 (describing four types of politics (boardroom, hearing room, street-level, and 
operating room) that arise depending on the relative salience and complexity of the subject 
matter). In fact, some of the sharpest criticisms of Professor Sunstein and then-Judge Breyer’s 
work take issue with their tendency to overgeneralize about the regulatory state from their 
more narrow examples of problematic rulemaking and to ignore the dominant role of industry 
in their analysis. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING 
THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING passim (2005) (systematically 
arguing against the use of cost-benefit analysis as urged by Professor Sunstein and others); 
David A. Dana, Setting Environmental Priorities: The Promise of a Bureaucratic Solution, 74 
B.U. L. REV. 365, 376–81 (1994) (reviewing BREYER, supra note 209) (questioning Judge 
Breyer’s neglect of interest group politics in his analysis and suggesting that this is a serious 
omission); Eric J. Gouvin, A Square Peg in a Vicious Circle: Stephen Breyer’s Optimistic 
Prescription for the Regulatory Mess, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 473, 482–83 (1995) (reviewing 
BREYER, supra note 209) (criticizing Judge Breyer’s analysis for totally ignoring public choice 
theory); Lisa Heinzerling, Justice Breyer’s Hard Look, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 767, 767 (1995) 
(arguing “that the set of agency decisions that are ‘in fact highly irrational’ is, for Breyer, small 
but not empty” (quoting Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 
ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 395 (1986))); Stephen F. Williams, Risk Regulation and Its Hazards, 93 
MICH. L. REV. 1498, 1503–06 (1995) (reviewing BREYER, supra note 209) (criticizing Judge 
Breyer for neglecting to account for interest group politics in his analysis). 
 322. See generally Nathanson, supra note 42 (explaining that policy arguments must be both 
socially and scientifically credible). 
 323. See generally KAGAN, supra note 150 (studying the problems that the adversarial 
process introduces into American law); Stewart, supra note 6, at 1670, 1686 (describing the 
rulemaking process as muddled by competition between governmental authority and private 
autonomy and by inadequate consideration of important interests). 
 324. Implicit in this effort to reinforce pluralistic processes (though as will be discussed, that 
is not the sole ingredient to reform) is the argument that adversarialism should not be dismissed 
across the board and is sometimes beneficial (at least in settings in which there are no 
alternatives for sharpening the deliberations). Cf. KAGAN, supra note 150, at 226 (conceding the 
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reform is to revitalize the pluralistic process in these complex 
rulemakings. 
Figure 3.  Matching Reforms Tied to the Adverse Consequences of 
Information Capture 
 
A second type of reform circumvents adversarial processes 
altogether and instead proposes a litigation-free space in which 
regulators are expected to innovate and devise effective regulatory 
solutions free of constraints imposed by interest group pressures. One 
of the disadvantages of rigorous adversarial processes, even when 
they work, is that the participants’ agenda can control the regulators’ 
 
benefits of adversarial legalism with respect to its potential to “give all interests a voice,” but 
arguing that, when used without limits, it “can make the government disproportionately 
responsive to those who do wield” the mechanisms of adversarial legalism). In situations in 
which information costs are likely to rise very high and the parties are equally matched, 
adversarialism may be one of the best mechanisms available to control information costs, 
particularly if these costs have grown higher than can be realistically addressed through other 
means. 
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framework for thinking about the problem. This reform would create 
an opportunity for the agency to initiate the regulatory project 
without the constraints imposed by interest groups. Indeed, under this 
reform, the agency would not only have the opportunity but would 
also be required to consider regulatory alternatives free from 
stakeholder and legal distractions. 
A third reform proposes a triage strategy that divides and 
conquers dominant participants who have captured the process by 
using competition-based strategies to pit them against one another. 
Specifically, some first movers among the regulated sector can enjoy 
advantages in the market and regulatory process by identifying gaps 
in regulatory coverage that, when filled, give them a competitive edge 
over laggards. This competition-based approach is particularly useful 
for redressing the more deeply embedded information capture 
problems of the past because it provides incentives for heavily 
invested parties to penetrate enormous rulemaking records. The net 
result, however, is that the public benefits because these parties’ 
efforts will ultimately highlight areas of slippage and thus ensure that 
regulations do not drift too far from their statutory and public 
missions. 
A. Reforms to Reinvigorate Pluralistic Engagement in Rulemakings 
Although existing administrative procedures impose no filter on 
the information used to support the rulemaking process, there 
appears to be an assumption that some filtering will nevertheless take 
place through pluralistic oversight. The problem with this assumption 
is that in some, and perhaps many, settings, the information-related 
costs associated with participation are so high that an entire sector of 
affected interests may not be able to participate. When this happens, 
the adversarial process breaks down, leading to information capture. 
There are several ways to reinvigorate more balanced and 
diverse interest group engagement in complicated rulemakings. This 
Section discusses each in turn. 
1. A Participation-Based Standard for Judicial Review.  Given 
that the courts inadvertently create many of the incentives for 
regulatory participants to engage in information capture, correcting 
the standards for judicial review should be a top priority. The courts’ 
current approach to judicial review is to evaluate the agency’s rule 
based on the information filed by interest groups in protest to the rule 
and to determine, as a substantive matter, whether the agency’s 
WAGNER IN FINAL.DOC 3/4/2010  2:04:17 AM 
2010] FILTER FAILURE 1407 
response was arbitrary.325 Agencies risk being reversed if their final 
rule is considered inadequate in light of a significant comment raised 
on the proposal. 
The proposal here shifts the courts’ focus from substance to 
process.326 The proposed reform links the standard for review to the 
rigor of interest group engagement in a rulemaking. Rulemakings 
dominated by one set of interests from start to finish would trigger a 
skeptical review. On the other hand, if the underlying interest group 
representation was healthy, vigorous, and diverse, the court would 
create a strong presumption in favor of the result the agency reached. 
The logic behind the approach is that a robust, pluralistic process 
is likely to discipline the agency’s outcomes and results. By contrast, 
when it is evident that the development of the rules did not involve 
diverse participation from affected interest groups, the courts are 
needed to ensure that the deals incorporated into the rule do not 
stray too far from the statutory goals. Indeed, for rules that are 
developed without strong political oversight and adversarial vetting, 
the courts may be the last hope in providing some accountability. 
The standard for review, then, would depend on the robustness 
of interest group participation in the rulemaking. See Figure 4. If a 
diverse and balanced group of affected parties is involved throughout 
the rulemaking, then the agency’s rule would be afforded 
considerable deference from the court—a “[s]oft [g]lance” or 
something similar.327 On the other hand, if one party dominates all 
phases of the rulemaking and then sues the agency for failing to make 
certain accommodations based on its comments, the court would have 
 
 325. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006). 
 326. Professor Rubin’s idea of breaking the ties between rulemaking and stakeholder 
comments helped generate some of this Article’s recommendations. See Rubin, supra note 119, 
at 157 (arguing that rulemaking should be dictated by “instrumental rationality, rather 
than . . . public participation”). Specifically, Professor Rubin proposes a significant shift in the 
basis for judicial review that parallels, or at least seems quite complementary to this proposal 
because it tries to break the link between stakeholder pressure and regulatory analysis. See id. at 
157–63. As discussed in note 375, infra, however, there are some significant differences that lead 
the proposals in slightly different directions with respect to redressing information capture. 
 327. Thomas O. McGarity, Professor Sunstein’s Fuzzy Math, 90 GEO. L.J. 2341, 2371 (2002); 
see also id. at 2372 (agreeing with Professor Sunstein on the idea of a more deferential standard 
of review in which “courts should play an exceedingly deferential role” and “should give 
agencies the benefit of every reasonable doubt” (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of 
Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2255, 2259 (2002))). In an earlier article, Professor McGarity provided 
greater elaboration on how this more deferential test might work. Under his formulation, judges 
would adopt the posture of a “pass-fail” professor reviewing a research paper about a complex 
problem on a topic outside her field of expertise. McGarity, supra note 146, at 1452–54. 
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a strong presumption against the challenger. In this case, the court 
would afford the agency still more deference, along the lines of the 
clear error standard used in the appeal of fact from jury trials. By 
contrast, if a challenger was unable to engage in the rulemaking 
process because it lacked sufficient resources or specialized 
knowledge, but its members took a great interest in the consequences 
of the rule, then the court (almost like it treats parties proceeding pro 
se) would adopt a presumption in favor of the challenger’s petition 
and afford the rule a hard look. Effectively, the courts’ review—
ranging from hard look to considerable deference—would be 
calibrated to the robustness of the pluralistic process. 
Figure 4.  A Flow Chart of the Participation-Based Standard for 
Judicial Review 
 
At present, there appears to be little connection between the 
robustness of the pluralistic process and the level of scrutiny afforded 
to an agency’s rule. Instead, the rigor of the agency’s process is 
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evaluated only with regard to whether the agency complied with a 
short checklist of APA requirements, like providing a publicly 
accessible record, providing ample opportunity for notice and 
comment, and so on. The apparent assumption underlying the courts’ 
process-based review is “if you build it [an open and transparent 
administrative system], they will come.” If, as it now seems, many 
affected interests might not come when information capture has taken 
hold of the rulemaking process,328 the courts’ obligation to dig deeper 
into the record to evaluate the rigor of the pluralistic process seems 
inescapable. 
This participation-based standard for judicial review thus seeks 
to use the courts to help level inherent participatory imbalances, 
rather than allowing them to aggravate these imbalances, however 
unwittingly. If the agency is not attentive to vigorous engagement by 
the full range of affected parties, for example, it would risk a hard 
look review of its rule if one of the underrepresented groups decides 
to file a challenge. Indeed, because of this risk, the agency would have 
litigation-based incentives to take the comments of underrepresented 
parties quite seriously, despite their small number. Even more 
importantly, they would have strong incentives to reach out and 
engage groups that are likely to be underrepresented in the 
rulemaking process. The retention of hard look review thus reserves 
an important role for courts when important affected interests are 
absent and when the likelihood for democratic lapses, whether 
inadvertent or deliberate, are high. 
Calibrating the judicial review standard to the level of pluralistic 
participation in the rulemaking process may even provide dominant 
stakeholders with some incentives to engage their adversaries in the 
substance of a rulemaking. If dominant stakeholders wish to threaten 
the agency with a credible risk of reversal by the courts (that is, a soft 
glance review standard rather than clear error), they would need their 
adversaries to be present at least during the notice-and-comment 
period. Incentives for balanced involvement in the rulemaking 
process might at least partly counteract the incentives these same 
stakeholders currently have, via information capture, to overwhelm 
adversaries with voluminous information about specialized issues and 
 
 328. This in fact seemed clear at least to political scientists more than two decades ago. See 
Gormley, supra note 52. 
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contestations that weigh down the rulemaking and make it less 
accessible.329 
The recommended adjustment to judicial review—tying judicial 
deference to the robustness of the pluralistic process—might even 
make judicial review more predictable. A number of commentators 
have suggested that the uncertainty associated with judicial review 
causes some of the most serious problems in agency behavior.330 This 
uncertainty can cause agencies to act defensively, bloating the record 
and rule well out of proportion to what is necessary. Even more 
importantly, stakeholders can take advantage of the situation by using 
the threat of judicial review as a strategic tool, even when their claims 
are weak.331 To the extent that the test suggested here can be 
implemented in a more consistent and predictable way than the 
current approach to judicial review, it will reduce at least some of this 
uncertainty.332 
 
 329. Cf. Elliott, supra note 176, at 1495–96 (“If the notice-and-comment procedure is to 
function to promote genuine dialogue, as opposed to merely giving parties a chance to put their 
objections and the agency’s answers on the record for judicial review, it will have to be re-
engineered to promote the substance of dialogue through the process of representation.”). 
 330. See, e.g., MASHAW, supra note 114, at 165 (concluding that the most commentators 
“seem to argue that the real impediment created by judicial review is uncertainty”); see also 
supra notes 150–54 and accompanying text. 
 331. See supra notes 299–305 and accompanying text. 
 332. Given that judicial review can be employed not only to alter the rule but also to delay 
the proceedings and forestall compliance costs or other unwanted outcomes, the proposal will 
not protect against all information-related abuses. An additional adjustment to this pluralistic-
based review standard would attempt to reduce even more of the benefit (and incentive) for 
using litigation in part as a way to delay rulemaking. The most obvious approach would be to 
keep the final rule in place pending ultimate reversal by the courts, or even better, to delay the 
ability of a stakeholder to bring a case until it is ripe and imposes specific losses on a party. 
Professor Mashaw persuasively argues for the complete elimination of preenforcement review, 
not only to redress some of this strategic abuse, but also to reduce some of the uncertainties 
faced by the courts in resolving preenforcement challenges. See MASHAW, supra note 114, at 
177–80 (suggesting that altering the timing of judicial review may help reverse the strong 
incentives that some parties have to challenge rules excessively). If the parties must wait for a 
tangible harm to the challenger, then in adjudicating the claim, the court will be presented with 
real facts rather than abstracted argument and hypothetical worries. See id. As Professor 
Mashaw concedes, however, there are risks associated with legally requiring parties to comply 
with a contested standard, only to determine through a legal challenge filed years later that the 
standards were in fact set arbitrarily high. See id. Ultimately, additional research on past cases 
and settlements may reveal that the risks of eliminating preenforcement review are quite 
inflated and that the harm in most cases of delaying litigation will be trivial or at least not very 
significant. Alternatively, higher sanctions could be imposed on a party for petitioning for 
judicial review when a court later finds the claims to be largely nonmeritorious. This more timid 
proposal might be the best way to begin, as it presents the fewest risks of unintended side 
effects. 
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This calibrated approach to judicial review is not a panacea, 
however. A number of impediments must be addressed if the reform 
is to be successful. First, the courts would need a way to determine, 
with some consistency, when this imbalance has occurred. This 
involves first identifying who the potential affected groups are and 
fitting them into categories of affected interests. Conveniently, for 
most environmental rulemakings, categorizing participants according 
to the interests they represent should not be difficult.333 Second, the 
test requires determining when the ratio between a dominant group 
and other affected parties constitutes an unacceptable imbalance. For 
a variety of reasons, this point of imbalance must be more dramatic 
than simply the point at which the number of commenters from 
industry are slightly greater or fewer than the number of commenters 
from public interest groups.334 Instead, imbalance would need to be a 
point at which, for example, the ratio of one set of affected parties 
relative to the other set is four to one, ten to one, or even twenty-five 
to one. Under current docket rules, the comment process may 
provide the appropriate place to assess this balance or imbalance. If 
docketing were required for all communications, including those 
occurring during the pre-NPRM stage, then all contacts could be 
added from the rulemaking docket to determine the extent to which 
participation is balanced or imbalanced. 
Even with relatively clear rules for determining imbalance and 
the corresponding standard for review, there will be inevitable 
variations in how courts employ the applicable soft glance or hard 
look tests. These variations, however, are likely to be more modest 
and less worrisome than the current roulette-like variations in the 
courts’ opinions, which range from hard look to super deference, 
depending on the panel.335 If the recommended reform were 
 
 333. For example, empirical studies of stakeholder participation in EPA rulemakings by 
Professor Coglianese, supra note 47, and Professors Yackee & Yackee, supra note 247, did not 
suggest any difficulty with categorizing stakeholders into affected groups. 
 334. Such a point of imbalance would mean that the use of “soft glance” is the exception 
rather than the rule because rarely would rules receive this kind of balanced vetting. 
 335. See supra notes 150–54 and accompanying text. At the Supreme Court level, it is 
possible that clearer tests may not overcome the lack of structure and consistency in applying 
the various deference tests. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge & Connor N. Raso, Chevron as a 
Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Test of What Motivates Judges in Agency Deference Cases 
(Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper, Jul. 28, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1440392 (finding motive-based explanations for the Supreme Court’s varying 
approaches to judicial review of agency decisions). It seems plausible, however, that the use of 
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implemented, this variation would at least be within categories of a 
single standard of review, rather than the full range of possible 
standards. 
There are other possible problems with practical implementation 
of this proposal. First, although a party’s dramatic 
underrepresentation creates the risk of hard look review, a party that 
is not present at all in notice and comment (that is, its presence is 
zero) would lose the opportunity to sue because it lacks standing.336 
As an unintended side effect, then, the proposal might make the 
agency and dominant stakeholders more, not less, eager to use 
information capture as a means of cutting underrepresented groups 
out of the rulemaking process. The solution here might be to broaden 
standing to include, in extreme cases, those parties who did not file 
comments but who have a compelling reason to enlist the courts in 
review and can justify their inactivity during the notice-and-comment 
period. 
Second, a collection of stakeholders, particularly public interest 
groups, may actually game the revised approach by holding back on 
their comments during notice and comment in the hope of using the 
hard look threat against the agency later, during litigation (or 
settlement negotiations). Although this does not seem likely for a 
host of reasons,337 the suggested rules do open the door to this new 
 
clear guidelines in the appellate courts could improve the state of judicial review at this critical 
level of agency review. 
 336. See supra notes 163–67 and accompanying text. This may not be unusual. The 
Coglianese study found that environmental groups provided comments on only 44 percent of 
the EPA rules governing hazardous waste handling and disposal during the period under study; 
industry, by contrast, provided comments on 96 percent of the rules. See Coglianese, supra note 
47, at 50 tbl.2-2. State and local regulators may have been involved in the 56 percent of 
rulemakings that lacked public interest representations, thus picking up the slack for their 
absence. It is possible, however, that for at least a significant set of rules—say 30 percent or so—
there was no public interest representation at all, either by the nonprofits or by government 
regulators who sometimes (though not always) step in the shoes of the public interest. 
 337. If some of the current figures are correct, then industry, if it used this strategy, would 
be able to file very few comments—perhaps no more than one comment among themselves—to 
be considered underrepresented relative to environmental groups. See Coglianese, supra note 
47, at 48 (observing in his study that the relative ratio of industry to public interest commenters 
was about fifteen to one, whereas the ratio of industry to state or local regulators was about 
three to one). The public interest groups, by contrast, would have to come to terms with the 
delay that resulted from their legal challenge. This might not be problematic, however, for rules 
for which delay is actually environmentally beneficial (when standards are being loosened, 
rather than strengthened). It also may not be terribly problematic if the public interest group is 
petitioning for suit with the intention of settling the case swiftly, and thus plans to use the threat 
only to gain more concessions from the agency through post-rule negotiations. 
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type of strategic action. The solution here may be to add a more 
rigorously enforced good faith requirement to the petition process. 
The petitioners would need to explain why they were not able to 
participate more vigorously during the rulemaking process and 
convince the court that they were proceeding in good faith in the 
challenge that followed. 
Third, some stakeholders might be tempted to further redirect 
their energies from formally participating in the process during notice 
and comment to informally communicating with the agency, 
particularly during the pre-NPRM stage of the rulemaking. The 
corrective in this case could be to require a complete accounting of all 
interest group participation occurring throughout the entire life cycle 
of the rule’s development and to have the courts consider those 
docketed communications when assessing imbalance.338 Additionally, 
the courts could overrule current precedent that requires the 
proposed rule to be reopened for comment if the agency makes 
material changes in a final rule.339 Instead, material changes (provided 
they result from comments) would be allowed as long as the changes 
do not substantially handicap one or more affected parties in 
significant and inequitable ways. 
If this revised approach to judicial review still seems sensible 
once the kinks are worked out, it could be implemented interstitially 
by the courts or, ideally, passed into law as an amendment to the 
APA. A congressional amendment would provide the clearest and 
most democratic way to usher in the new approach to judicial review. 
This may be politically unrealistic, however.340 The courts could also 
make many of these recommended changes through their 
interpretative authority; indeed, in most cases, this Article’s proposals 
simply scale back previous judicial inventions.341 Incremental 
experimentation by the courts may, in fact, be desirable to give the 
approach a test run before it becomes codified as law. 
 
 338. See supra notes 334–35 and accompanying text. 
 339. See supra notes 179–83 and accompanying text. 
 340. Such a revision to the APA may not be amenable to industry because it would curb 
some of their gains from defects in the system over the last four decades. This could fracture 
congressional support for what would otherwise seem a bipartisan, process-neutral amendment. 
 341. Cf. Pierce, supra note 155, at 910–20 (arguing that the Supreme Court should abolish 
three administrative law doctrines: limits on ex parte communication between agencies and 
interested parties during informal rulemaking; bans on bias and prejudgment of issues by agency 
officials; and requirements that (a) a final rule be the logical outgrowth of the rulemaking 
process, and (b) the agency disclose all data and studies relied upon in forming the final rule). 
WAGNER IN FINAL.DOC 3/4/2010  2:04:17 AM 
1414 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:1321 
2. Appointed Advocates or Adjudicators to Replace the Lack of 
Balanced Engagement.  Reformed judicial review may help encourage 
more pluralistic engagement in rulemakings, but it will not be 
sufficient to ensure that missing interests are represented in all 
rulemakings vulnerable to information capture. A more 
comprehensive, but also more costly, method to redress pluralistic 
imbalance would deploy government intermediaries—agency-
selected ombudsmen, advocates, advisory groups or even 
administrative law judges (ALJs)—to stand in for significantly 
affected interests that might otherwise be underrepresented in 
rulemakings. The concept of formal, government-provided advocates 
in these types of settings is not new.342 In fact, the proposal has some 
of the flavor of the Small Business Reform Act, which institutes a 
rather elaborate network to ensure that the interests of small 
businesses are adequately considered.343 
There are different ways that this type of government 
intermediary might ensure that missing interests are represented. 
Agency ombudsmen or advocates acting on behalf of missing 
interests could scrutinize all rulemakings to ensure, for example, that 
the agency is considering not just the economic costs of standards but 
also the public health benefits, particularly with regard to vulnerable 
populations.344 If these interests are not adequately considered in the 
 
 342. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 6, at 1711 (discussing, with some reservations, the possible 
use of a specialized, high-level government advocate to represent diffuse interests); see also id. 
at 1761 n.439 (providing a relatively extensive bibliography of proposals in the early 1970s for 
the creation of advocate agencies to represent the interests of poor or other underrepresented 
groups in consumer protection and related proceedings). 
 343. The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 
110 Stat. 857, was based in part on a concern that information excesses precluded smaller 
businesses from keeping up with bigger competitors in the provision of regulation. See id. 
§§ 202–03, 110 Stat. at 857–58 (finding that small businesses were disproportionately burdened 
by current regulatory procedures and declaring the intention of simplifying the regulatory 
process and making it more cooperative and accessible to small businesses). The Act, among 
other things, provides small businesses with an agency ombudsman and related advocates to 
help protect their interests. See, e.g., Thomas O. Sargentich, The Small Business Regulatory 
Enforcement Fairness Act, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 123, 131 (1997) (describing these qualities of the 
Act). 
 344. The need for adequate representation in public health and environmental regulation is 
at least as pressing for communities located in areas with heavy pollutant loads as it is for small 
businesses, for example. Currently these groups—without or even with legal assistance—
confront a wall of complexity and strategic evasion that makes it next to impossible for them to 
press their claims or even determine the source of excess pollution in their communities. See, 
e.g., Cappiello & Olsen, supra note 85 (commencing a five-part series on industrial pollution in 
low-income Houston neighborhoods). 
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proposed rule stage, the advocate would be required to file comments 
and build a record for review that could be used by other regulatory 
participants in the course of judicial review. Because the effectiveness 
of this representation may be difficult to measure and oversee, 
however, the use of government advocates may be an incomplete 
remedy. 
Alternatively, rulemakings that are highly technical and suffer 
from imbalanced engagement during notice and comment could 
trigger an advisory review process in which an expert committee is 
assembled to review the rule to ensure that issues relevant to missing 
affected interests (for example, diffuse public benefits such as health 
protection) have been adequately considered in developing the rule.345 
As in current law, the agency would not be required to adopt the 
suggestions of advisory groups, but a record would be created that 
could be used as the basis for judicial review. The agency may even be 
required to respond to critical advisory group opinions or risk the 
chance of increased judicial scrutiny. The resulting record thus would 
not only provide an added hook for judicial review challenges 
brought by an underrepresented group but also should make the 
underlying issues more accessible to the broader political process.346 
A hybrid rulemaking, which employs some requirements of 
formal rulemakings in an informal rulemaking process, could provide 
an even more rigorous mechanism for ensuring that the most 
important affected interests are represented, albeit with a higher price 
tag. There are many permutations, but the basic idea is for an ALJ to 
preside over a hybrid rulemaking, either conducted on paper or 
through a formal hearing, with the agency representing the proposed 
 
 345. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(2)(B)–(C) (2006) (establishing that the Clean Air Scientific 
Advisory Committee (CASAC) should review the EPA’s ambient air quality standards at five-
year intervals). A similar type of scientific review is required for the EPA’s registration of 
pesticides. 7 U.S.C. § 136w(d)–(e) (2006) (requiring the Scientific Advisory Panel established 
under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) to review the scientific 
basis for major regulatory proposals concerning pesticides and to adopt peer-review procedures 
for scientific studies carried out pursuant to FIFRA). 
 346. The EPA’s recent decision to reject CASAC’s advice on a more stringent revised 
standard for fine particulates serves as a case in point. See, e.g., Erik Stokstad, EPA Draws Fire 
over Air-Review Revisions, 314 SCIENCE 1672, 1672–73 (2006) (noting that criticism of the 
EPA’s revision of its review policies largely stemmed from the EPA’s rejection of CASAC’s 
advice to tighten air quality standards for soot); Jane Kay, EPA Ignores Advice for Annual 
Limits on Tiny Soot, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 22, 2006, at A3, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=c/a/2006/09/22/MNGJBLABRM1.DTL (detailing the disappointment among 
environmental and health groups when the EPA ignored a recommendation agreed to by 
twenty of the twenty-two members of CASAC). 
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rule and an advocate, either private or government-appointed, 
commenting on weaknesses of the proposed rule from the standpoint 
of underrepresented affected interests. Such a hybrid rulemaking 
would provide even more formal assurance that all interests affected 
by the rulemaking have received adequate consideration. Due to the 
added time and cost, the hybrid process would need to be reserved 
for rules that involve substantial effects on important affected 
interests wholly unrepresented during the notice-and-comment 
process.347 The advantage of this more formal process is that the ALJ 
would issue binding decisions rather than act merely as a government 
advocate or advisor. 
3. Reinvigorating Representation of Underrepresented Groups 
Like the Diffuse Public Interest.  A less radical approach to increasing 
balanced engagement in at-risk rulemakings is to subsidize 
participation on specific rulemakings in which certain sets of interests, 
such as those representing the diffuse public, will be otherwise 
underrepresented.348 Alternatively, rewards could be offered to 
indirectly increase incentives for this same type of public-benefitting 
representation.349 For example, a monetary prize and positive 
publicity could be awarded to the author of the most meaningful 
public-benefitting set of comments on a complex rule, particularly if 
the party approaches the issues from the perspective of improving 
public health or environmental protection. Much like architectural 
prizes, there could even be law school or graduate student 
competitions not only for commenting on a rule but also for 
proposing compelling policy innovations.350 An interest group would 
 
 347. This could be required for rules with significant implications for unrepresented affected 
parties, a finding that is made along with other determinations of significance already required 
under Executive Order 12,866. 
 348. If public interest groups are subsidized, however, it is critically important that the 
subsidies require them to engage in the low-salience, highly technical rules vulnerable to 
information capture rather than other more publicly visible controversies in which they are 
likely to have a presence with or without public subsidies. 
 349. For more general discussions of the desirability of bolstering participation of the diffuse 
public, see, for example, Gerald E. Frug, Administrative Democracy, in HANDBOOK OF 
REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 519, 529–31 (David H. Rosenbloom & Richard D. 
Schwartz eds., 1994); Steven Kelman, Adversary and Cooperationist Institutions for Conflict 
Resolution in Public Policymaking, 11 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 178, 200–03 (1992); Robert 
B. Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay, 94 YALE L.J. 
1617, 1635–40 (1985). 
 350. Cf. EPA, P3: People, Prosperity and the Planet Student Design Competition for 
Sustainability, http://www.epa.gov/ncer/p3/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2010). 
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then be permitted to challenge the rulemaking on behalf of the 
winning submitter if the agency ignores those comments, and would 
be entitled to reasonable attorney fees if the group substantially 
prevailed in the litigation. Through these mechanisms, interest groups 
and like-minded experts might find that the prospect of remuneration 
provides an incentive to engage in complex rulemakings that 
overcomes the disincentives of participation created by the 
information capture phenomenon. 
A more indirect approach to increasing the benefits of 
participation for public interest groups is to raise the public visibility 
of more obscure and complex environmental rulemakings. A 
rulemaking that becomes newsworthy because of its public interest 
implications also becomes one that interest groups will find 
marketable, donor-friendly, and worthy of investment. On the other 
hand, if nonprofit resources are scarce and finite, raising the salience 
of one rule may simply lead the groups to withdraw their engagement 
from another less-newsworthy rule. 
If increasing the salience of a rule does increase the resources 
available for public interest engagement, the agency under this 
proposal would be required to provide an estimate of the rule’s public 
health benefits and an assessment of what alternate versions of the 
rule might accomplish in public health terms. For example, the agency 
would be required to estimate the health and environmental benefits 
that would result from the promulgation of a particular pollution 
control standard and to estimate these same benefits associated with 
other, alternative versions of the standard. Public health assessments 
in these cases, by their nature, cannot be very detailed—the 
uncertainties make this futile—but the results of a basic assessment 
might help identify an informative range of possible health and 
environmental consequences, at least qualitatively. Resources 
currently devoted to regulatory impact assessments, which tend to 
highlight the costs of regulation at the expense of assessing and 
raising the visibility of public health benefits, could be used to fund 
these public health–oriented analyses.351 The regulatory impact 
assessment may be a valuable innovation, but as implemented it 
misses the core analytical problem with much public health and 
 
 351. Cf. Harrington et al., supra note 273 passim (providing case studies of high-profile 
RIAs at the EPA that raise a number of challenging questions about the value of the RIA 
process, at least as currently practiced, and open the door to considering the reallocation of 
these analytical resources to more productive endeavors). 
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environmental regulation—the obscure, unspecified public benefits—
and exacerbates this blind spot by focusing almost exclusively on the 
costs to regulated parties. 
More attention may also need to be given to the choice of 
legislative standards and regulatory tools with respect to their 
potential for increasing the salience of EPA rules.352 For example, 
performance standards, like ambient air standards or related types of 
innovations, seem more likely to engage balanced constituencies in 
discussions about how they are set as compared with technology-
based standards353 and standards governing industrial activities and 
operations (like many of the rules governing hazardous waste 
operations in RCRA).354 Technology-based standards may be at 
higher risk of falling prey to information capture because they involve 
complex processes and because the health implications associated 
with them are more difficult to evaluate.355 On the other hand, these 
 
 352. As a legislative matter, information capture may also provide a barometer to help 
identify when certain added requirements on regulatory agencies are likely to improve or 
instead exacerbate information capture. Evidence that a new process requirement might inflate 
information costs or make a process susceptible to information capture could create a 
presumption against the new process that must be overcome by the proponent. See, e.g., 
Sargentich, supra note 343, at 137 (arguing that this problem afflicts the Small Business Reform 
Act); supra notes 308–12 and accompanying text. Alternatively, there could be mandatory look-
back studies, perhaps every three years, prepared by the Congressional Research Service to 
evaluate how various processes affect information management in the agencies and also to 
determine whether they are used by a balanced constellation of groups or instead used primarily 
by dominant or rich stakeholders. 
 353. I have been a longtime proponent of these standards. See Wagner, supra note 83. 
 354. See, e.g., National Ambient Air Quality Standards of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
7409(b)(1) (2006). For a slightly more extended discussion of why these standards are likely to 
invite a more balanced group of affected parties, see Lynn Blais & Wendy Wagner, Emerging 
Science, Adaptive Regulation, and the Problem of Rulemaking Ruts, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1701, 1733 
(2008). These performance standards are generally premised on health outcomes or related 
measures, so the salience accompanies the exercise and is harder to shake out, even with 
voluminous records and very complicated and technical issues. Indeed, commentators who are 
particularly enamored with performance standards as a preferred means of regulation seem to 
intuitively appreciate that they work better because they are direct and goal-oriented, cutting 
through the many steps and assumptions that underlie many other types of regulatory standards. 
See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman & Nirit Sandman, Fighting Childhood Obesity Through 
Performance-Based Regulation of the Food Industry, 56 DUKE L.J. 1403, 1411–13 (2007) 
(touting the virtues of performance standards, based on these general attributes, as compared to 
command-and-control standards). 
 355. Market-based programs may also suffer from information capture if there are a number 
of hidden details that determine how well the market will work or how well it will address the 
health issues on the table. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, Forcing Democracy, 14 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 300, 318, 320–25 (1995) (concluding, based on detailed investigation of the 
congressional debates, that the title IV market “created by the 1990 Amendments owes much of 
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standards have important virtues (expediency, for example) that may 
significantly outweigh their vulnerability to information capture and 
that therefore must be taken into account.356 
4. Information Filters on Participants.  A final reform to 
reinvigorate more balanced engagement by all affected interests 
would encourage or even mandate flat restrictions on the information 
that participants can load into the rulemaking process.357 Establishing 
simple filters on the amount and type of these communications will 
not solve all problems—there will still be a temptation to fill 
comments with highly specialized and undigested information. 
Nonetheless, establishing these filters would be a good start. At the 
very least, the filters would force all participants to begin to control 
information excess at the margin. 
The first set of recommended reforms advocate limits on the size 
of the communications that participants can share with the agency, 
including minimum standards to ensure the reliability of technical 
assertions. These restrictions could be quite simple—for example, 
imposing page and volume limits on the filings, much like the limits 
placed by appellate courts on appellants.358 Courts could also play a 
 
its content to the influence of special interest groups” but that many of these deals were 
invisible and hidden under the seemingly accessible market-based approach). 
 356. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 83, at 92–107 (recounting some of these virtues). 
 357. The possibility of infringements on the First Amendment right to free speech arising 
from page and related restrictions on formal communications in the administrative process seem 
unlikely, but are nevertheless conceivable. Cf. Burriola v. Nev. Dept. of Corr., No. 3:07-CV-102 
JCM (VPC), 2008 WL 510231, at *6 (D. Nev. Feb. 22, 2008) (discussing, without issuing a 
holding on, a prisoner’s contention that page limits allegedly imposed by the prison on his 
correspondence abridged his First Amendment rights and concluding ultimately that “there is 
no evidence, nor does plaintiff contend, that his speech was chilled or he suffered ‘actual harm’ 
as a result of the denial of this general correspondence due to page limits”). If size restrictions 
placed on formal administrative communications are reasonable and are likely to advance the 
goals of administrative process, then the general sense seems to be that they are safe from a 
successful First Amendment challenge. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Intersection of Free 
Speech and the Legal Profession: Constraints on Lawyers’ First Amendment Rights, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 569, 569 (1999) (observing that “[r]ules of evidence and procedure, bans on 
revealing grand jury testimony, page limits in briefs, and sanctions for frivolous pleadings, to 
name a few, are examples of speech limitations that are widely accepted as functional necessities 
in the administration of justice, much like rules of order in a town meeting” and concluding 
ultimately that restrictions imposed to streamline the administration of justice are typically 
given wider berth under the First Amendment). 
 358. See, e.g., U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, FIFTH CIRCUIT, CHECKLIST FOR PREPARATION OF 
BRIEFS AND RECORD EXCERPTS (2008), available at http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/ clerk/docs/ 
brchecklist.pdf (specifying very specific and strict limits on the form and size of briefs filed in 
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supporting role by scrutinizing comments to ensure that the issues 
raised to the agency were clear and accessible and not obscured by 
dozens of detailed sub-issues. Participants could also be required to 
verify the reliability of the data presented and provide supporting 
analysis for critical assertions of fact. Although these suggestions are 
simple, they might be quite effective in capping the amount of 
information that a party can introduce into the regulatory system.359 
Evidence suggests that investing energy and time in collating, 
digesting, and communicating issues in a succinct way can 
dramatically improve the quality of a communication, while also 
increasing the likelihood that the recipient (here, the agency) will 
receive the intended message.360 As one trade association explained to 
Professor Coglianese in his study: 
EPA started its proposals and our comments took up a space on my 
bookshelf this thick [respondent holds hands about one-and-a-half 
feet apart]. So to me the fact that we whittled it down to 100 pages 
[to meet the appellate court’s page limit] is pretty remarkable. There 
were a lot more issues that we conceded later were not—you know 
we were just whining—we didn’t have a good recommendation for 
an alternative approach for EPA to take. So a lot of issues fell off 
over the years.361 
Even if encouraging or requiring limits on communications does not 
yield significant benefits in every case, establishing these limits would 
signal that information flowing into the agencies should be restricted 
and, at the very least, would initiate a conversation about how to 
 
the Fifth Circuit). For a short discussion of the fate of possible First Amendment challenges to 
such restrictions, see supra note 357. 
 359. This proposal also shifts primary information filtering responsibility onto participants, 
who generally are best able to do this processing at the lowest cost. But see Alan Raul & Julie 
Zampa Dwyer, “Regulatory Daubert”: A Proposal to Enhance Judicial Review of Agency 
Science by Incorporating Daubert Principles into Administrative Law, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 7, 8 (2003) (effectively recommending that the agency be held responsible for filtering 
the reliability of communications coming from affected parties). 
 360. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 21, at 1150 (observing that information theory suggests that 
“[t]he more impersonal contexts will require greater formality, so that the typical audience 
member will not incur large processing costs”). 
 361. Coglianese, supra note 47, at 112. Another attorney conceded that the appellate brief 
was unsuccessful in part because the brief writers had failed to do an adequate job of controlling 
information excess: the brief “was so filled with so many issues of such a technical nature that I 
think we got lost in explaining basically how simple this one [issue] was.” Id. at 111 (alteration in 
original). 
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encourage participants to be more concise and clear in the 
information they submit to the agency. 
A second, related information filter involves limiting the number 
of contacts between agency staff and stakeholders throughout the 
rulemaking cycle. This is probably best accomplished by requiring the 
agency to log all ex parte communications into the rulemaking docket 
and ensuring that detailed records of each communication are 
available upon request.362 Unlike the current process, which places no 
limits or recording requirements on ex parte communications 
occurring before the publication of the proposed rule, a requirement 
of greater transparency for communications has the potential to 
improve accountability and may even cause participants engaging in 
pre-NPRM contacts to use them sparingly. 
Finally, the agency itself should be encouraged to filter the 
communications incorporated into proposed and final rules to ensure 
that the rules are accessible to a diverse, albeit sophisticated, group of 
affected parties.363 As discussed earlier, the APA’s concise general 
statement requirement has effectively been ignored and, if anything, 
rewritten by the courts to demand a defensive, “encyclopedic” 
statement from the agency.364 The judicial demands that cause the 
agency to behave in this way should be significantly altered (as 
discussed in the following Section),365 but the courts should also give 
some meaning to the concise general statement, if for no other reason 
than to signal the value of its underlying aspiration. Doing so would 
involve encouraging the courts to remand rules that are too obtuse 
and disjointed and that assume too high a level of technical 
information for the average elite reader. The court has this authority 
under the APA’s concise general statement clause.366 Although the 
interpretation of such an aesthetic-based test could vary across 
 
 362. This might not be practical without a modification of the current rules discussed later, 
however. Because a flat restriction on the number of communications can be circumvented 
through trade associations, subsidiaries, and the like, the best approach may simply involve 
requiring a complete record of all communications. 
 363. The proposal here does not suggest that the general public should be able to pick up 
the Federal Register and understand the EPA’s perambulatory explanation of a proposed rule. It 
is intended to suggest, however, that an environmental lawyer or even a law student should be 
able to read a preamble and understand most of it, at least after spending a few hours with it. 
 364. See supra notes 131–37 and accompanying text. 
 365. See infra Part IV.B. 
 366. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006). 
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judicial panels,367 any damage resulting from this variability would be 
limited. After all, the court would be remanding the rule only for a 
clearer explanation, a demand that might annoy and embarrass the 
agency but should take no more than a month or two to satisfy.368 
B. Bypassing Adversarial Constraints: Policy in the Raw 
Even if the previously recommended reforms are implemented, 
agencies are still likely to focus most of their attention on comments 
that present a credible risk of judicial review and, as a result, may 
have less time to develop creative and more comprehensive solutions 
to regulation. As discussed in Part III, the courts, by requiring the 
agency to be responsive to all criticisms, effectively place the agency 
in a reactive role. Rather than focusing its energies on developing 
public-oriented regulatory policy, the agency finds instead that it must 
devote most of its analysis to preparing rules that can withstand fierce 
attack from an aggressive group of affected interests and respond to 
the flood of information loaded into the system by these same 
groups.369 
Unlike the reforms presented in the previous Section, the 
proposal presented in this Section attempts to address the problems 
created by information capture not by reinforcing adversarial 
processes, but by circumventing them, at least at an early stage of 
policy development.370 Specifically, this policy-in-the-raw reform 
requires the agency to be largely, if not completely, insulated from 
stakeholders and political input during the embryonic stage of the 
development of its regulatory proposal. Although affected parties 
 
 367. Such a test would require, for example, that the basic thrust and requirements of the 
rule be discernable from the preamble and that important passages (like the significant changes 
from the proposed rule) be comprehensible to those who otherwise lack specialized knowledge. 
 368. The biggest problem with this reform is that it suggests that the courts only require a 
succinct statement at the final rule stage, a point at which such a demand may be the least 
helpful to stakeholders. To remand a rule for lacking a “concise general statement” at the 
proposed rule stage, however, would necessitate an entirely new notice-and-comment period, 
which could pose a hardship on the pace of rulemaking and invite more strategic use of the 
requirement by those interest groups that benefit from delay. 
 369. See supra notes 153–58 and accompanying text. 
 370. Cf. Stewart, supra note 6, at 1807 (“The only conceivable way out of the labyrinth 
would seem to be a new and comprehensive theory of government and law that would 
successfully reconcile our traditional ideals of formal justice, individual autonomy, and 
responsible mechanisms for collective choice, with the contemporary realities of decentralized, 
uncoordinated, discretionary exercises of governmental authority and substantial disparities in 
the cohesiveness and political power of private interests. Such a conception may well be 
unattainable, and in any event will not be achieved in the foreseeable future.”). 
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would become important later in refining and even rejecting the 
proposals developed during this period, they would become involved 
only after the agency has had the opportunity to frame and consider 
regulatory solutions free from their input and pressure.371 
Although the details are best left for a later discussion, the 
policy-in-the-raw proposal in broad strokes involves a two-step rule-
development process. At the raw stage, a small team of highly 
regarded policy wonks from inside the agency would develop a pre-
proposal. This team would start with the statutory mandate and 
sketch out a goal statement based on that text alone.372 It would then 
work—essentially in complete isolation—to develop a pre-proposal 
that best accomplishes that goal.373 Unlike the current approach to 
rulemaking, this policy-in-the-raw stage would be led by an agency 
team that is completely unconnected with and ideally not even aware 
of stakeholder pressures, litigation concerns, or other legal risks 
associated with the rulemaking.374 Its deliberations would be shielded 
from all stakeholder input, including friendly guidance from staff in 
the general counsel’s office or from politically appointed officials. The 
team would also be free to approach the proposal in whatever way it 
sees fit. There would be no requirement that it use analytical tools 
like cost-benefit analysis, formal alternatives analyses, or other forms 
of impact assessment, although the team would be free to develop or 
use these analytic tools if it felt that doing so would be helpful and 
consistent with the statute’s goal. 
The pre-proposal developed by this team would be subject to 
peer review or, as appropriate, input from a Federal Advisory 
 
 371. Cf. Rubin, supra note 119, at 157–63 (advocating for insulating the agency from 
stakeholder pressure by the standard of review—an instrumental rationality standard—rather 
than actually isolating the agency staff, as proposed here). 
 372. This is similar to the “goal statement” urged by Professor Rubin, although it is more 
preliminary and is not vetted through interested parties. See id. at 163 (“A new APA should 
require that a document published at the time the agency decides to proceed with rulemaking 
explicitly state this goal before any effort has been made to determine the means by which the 
goal should be implemented.”). 
 373. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Scientific and Political Integrity in Environmental Policy, 86 
TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1644–46 (2008) (advocating “limit[ed] contacts between political appointees 
and nonmanagement career technical staff during the technical stages of regulatory 
development” to improve the integrity of science used for policy). 
 374. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, 54 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 70–73 (1991) (discussing how the EPA initiates a rulemaking and 
describing the composition of the initial “workgroup” that drafts the first proposal, which can 
include agency lawyers who may invoke legal considerations at an early stage of proposal 
development). 
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Committee Act (FACA) advisory group comprised of a mix of policy 
analysts and other specialists (but not stakeholders). The team would 
have the option of using the comments, suggestions, and questions 
raised during this review process to modify the pre-proposal, but it 
would be under no obligation to do so. Any modifications would be 
wholly at the agency team’s discretion, and there would be no risk of 
judicial reprimand if the team chose to disregard suggestions made 
during this review. 
The final pre-proposal, along with the comments of peer 
reviewers or the FACA committee, would be published on the 
Internet and available in hard copy. The preliminary proposal would 
be expected to be detailed and comprehensive, yet also accessible to 
regulatory experts who lack specialized knowledge about the issues 
addressed by the rule. The agency team members responsible for 
preparing the pre-proposal would operate much like academics—
producing innovative yet effective proposals and enjoying 
reputational rewards based on the quality of their work. Particularly 
good teams or team members might find their visibility among 
policymakers and academics to be enhanced when they produce 
particularly inspired proposals. Ideally, the teams would attract high-
caliber candidates both because the unconstrained nature of the work 
would be inviting and because there would be opportunities for 
individual accolades for work well done. To maintain these 
reputational benefits, the team would be encouraged to develop pre-
proposals that are detailed, thoughtful and well supported. Poor 
analysis, half-baked innovations, or proposals with little support could 
lead to embarrassment within the policy analysis community. 
Establishing an initial raw stage for regulatory policy 
development would counteract information capture in a number of 
subtle but important ways. First, the proposals developed as part of 
this process would likely be much more accessible to a wide group of 
affected parties than existing proposals. Unlike the existing 
policymaking process, which is rife with incentives to inflate 
information costs (from the perspective of some stakeholders, the 
more esoteric the rule the better), proposals developed in the raw 
would be designed to engage a broad audience. After all, reputational 
advantages will not accrue to team members if very few individuals 
understand the rule. Pre-proposals developed in the raw therefore 
will be written to give interested parties an appreciation of the nature 
of the rulemaking project, its likely direction, and how it might fit 
with other rules. Moreover, because the implications of the rule will 
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be easier to understand, public interest groups will be better able to 
highlight the value of their engagement for donors and members. A 
more accessible and coherent proposal also provides a benchmark or 
point of reference against which future (potentially more complex 
and detail-oriented) proposals can be compared and evaluated. This 
is a particularly valuable benefit in light of the fact that the complex 
proposed and final rules discussed earlier seem inaccessible in part 
because there is no clear point of entry for developing an 
understanding of the relevant issues. 
Second, policy in the raw allows an agency team to innovate in 
ways that are decoupled from the participatory and litigation 
processes. This creates the opportunity for more candid and creative 
analysis. Similar to the proposal advanced by Professor Rubin for an 
“instrumental rationality” approach to rulemaking, the agency would 
focus on the policy puzzle at hand during the raw stage of 
policymaking, rather than on simply anticipating and reacting to what 
the stakeholders might say about its proposal.375 
Finally, the raw period of policy development provides the 
agency with a litigation-free zone for conducting meaningful 
alternatives assessments on competing proposals. Currently, agency 
lawyers and political advisors appear to exert a heavy hand in the 
agency self-assessments required under Executive Order or by 
statute. These advisors rightfully worry that an agency’s honest 
evaluation of its proposal against alternatives may actually put its 
preferred policies at risk by exposing important advantages of 
 
 375. As mentioned in note 372, supra, Professor Rubin also proposes a policymaking 
process that strives to decouple the process from stakeholders by basing judicial review on 
“whether the rule that the agency has promulgated is likely to achieve its stated goal.” See 
Rubin, supra note 119, at 163. Professor Rubin sees this instrumental rationality goal 
operationalized, at least in part, through cost-benefit analysis. Id. at 159–61. Unlike Professor 
Rubin’s approach, however, the judicial review approach proposed here is more deferential to 
the agency on the substance of its rule, and the pre-proposal is insulated from stakeholders 
entirely and is also largely free of any threat of judicial review other than ensuring that the raw 
proposal is completed. Although both approaches seem eager to provide the agency with more 
incentives to develop comprehensive, intelligent, and innovative policies, this proposal is 
concerned exclusively with the problem of information capture. By contrast, because 
information capture is not among the evils that Professor Rubin considers, see id. at 162–63, his 
proposals are largely insensitive to the danger—and some facets of his proposal may risk 
exacerbating these problems, at least for the subset of rules susceptible to information capture. 
See, e.g., id. at 164–65 (recommending early involvement of stakeholders and harder look by 
courts, which together could perpetuate information capture in at-risk rules); see also id. at 164 
(“There is evidence . . . that the influence of special interests on government decision makers is 
less disproportionate than is often assumed, and the multiplicity of voices may ultimately 
counterbalance each other.” (footnote omitted)). 
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competing approaches that might otherwise have gone unnoticed by 
opponents.376 Conducting analyses in an environment free from these 
political and litigation pressures at the very early stages of a 
rulemaking should result in a more meaningful assessment of 
alternatives.377 
The crux of this proposal is to establish an early, unconstrained 
period of policy development during which the agency can develop 
one or more basic proposals for addressing the regulatory problem at 
hand. How this pre-proposal then fits into the existing rulemaking 
process warrants further discussion. One approach would be to use 
the pre-proposal as the principle background document upon which 
the proposed rule is based. A team of EPA staff (including 
representatives from the program office and the general counsel’s 
office) would ground the proposal in light of various interest group 
inputs and legal constraints. This team could alter or even reject the 
pre-proposal in its entirety in the development of the proposed rule. 
To afford the pre-proposal some stature and significance, however, 
there should be a presumption that the pre-proposal would form the 
basis for the proposed rule. The agency would need to explain in the 
preamble of its proposed and final rules why it chose to deviate in 
significant ways from the pre-proposal. These explanations, in turn, 
would be subject to judicial review. 
It bears mention that this policy-in-the-raw recommendation 
parallels negotiated rulemaking but takes essentially the opposite 
tack. In negotiated rulemaking, the agency identifies the major 
interested parties and meets with them to negotiate a proposed rule.378 
Here, rather than looking to the stakeholders to assist in developing a 
regulatory proposal, the policy-in-the-raw approach eschews the use 
of stakeholders during the initial stages of policy development unless 
specific information is needed. The hope is that policies developed in 
the raw will be more complete and targeted than proposals that are 
developed based on the idiosyncratic concerns of selected interest 
 
 376. Wendy Wagner, The Clean Air Interstate Rule RIA: Advocacy Dressed Up as Policy 
Analysis, in REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 82, at 56, 59–60 
(detailing these litigation-based incentives in the RIA process). 
 377. See, e.g., Harrington et al., supra note 82, at 224–25 (proposing that RIAs be done 
somewhat earlier in the process to ensure that they provide a meaningful analysis of 
alternatives). 
 378. See 5 U.S.C. § 561 (2006) (establishing a framework for the conduct of negotiated 
rulemaking). 
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groups.379 The resulting proposal should also be much clearer and 
more accessible with respect to the logic and assumptions underlying 
the rule.380 Likewise, the contribution the rule makes to the protection 
of health and the environment should be more explicit and easy to 
understand. 
C. Competition-Based Regulation 
Thus far, this Article’s reforms have addressed the substantive 
implications of information capture: the lack of balanced oversight 
and engagement in complex rules and the inability of the agency to 
think comprehensively or creatively about the regulatory task at 
hand. This final set of reform proposals attempts to address the more 
deeply embedded ways that information capture may take hold of the 
process itself. Noble goals of greater administrative transparency can 
actually be surreptitiously used to facilitate information capture.381 
Moreover, as information continues to be loaded into the system, the 
system may become so bloated and overwhelmed that it is difficult to 
reverse the information avalanche.382 The reforms in this Section 
attempt to target these problems—namely, the potential for abuse of 
open government provisions and the information avalanche that can 
result. 
Rather than engage the missing interests more adversarially or 
impose filters on participants’ regulatory communications, this final 
reform attempts to scramble the incentives of the most engaged and 
powerful interest groups and pit these otherwise like-minded interests 
against one another. Specifically, the proposal takes a divide-and-
conquer approach to rectifying more entrenched forms of information 
 
 379. Judge Wald, for example, expresses concern about the consensual nature of negotiated 
rulemaking and the after-the-fact nature of the agency's explanation for a proposed regulation: 
“The consensus could also be pure political logrolling . . . rather than rational decisionmaking.” 
Patricia M. Wald, Negotiation of Environmental Disputes: A New Role for the Courts?, 10 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 22 (1985). 
 380. Concerns have been raised about the public accessibility of negotiated rulemakings. 
See, e.g., William Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the Public 
Interest—EPA’s Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL. L. 55, 79 (1987) (expressing concern over the 
EPA’s preamble being an “after-the-fact rationale attempting to justify decisions made by the 
negotiating committee for reasons we can never know”); id. at 88–89 (discussing the adverse 
impact on public participation resulting specifically from the negotiation of scientific 
information and methodology); Derek R. McDonald, Note, Judicial Review of Negotiated 
Rulemaking, 12 REV. LITIG. 467, 477–78 (1993) (discussing the concern that the public is not 
adequately included in negotiated rulemakings). 
 381. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 382. See supra Part III.B.3. 
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capture. By creating an adversarial climate within the most vigorous 
and unified coalition, the reform essentially creates fresh incentives 
for talented and resourceful advocates to whittle down the record to a 
manageable size and to use transparency and open government not to 
overwhelm regulatory participants but to better isolate problems with 
competitors’ positions. 
Competition-based regulation, like pluralism, thus relies on a 
somewhat unconventional adversarial process to address the 
problems of information capture.383 But unlike the reforms for 
reinvigorating pluralistic engagement in proposed rulemakings 
presented previously, ensuring a diverse mix of affected parties is not 
important to this reform. Rather, this proposal focuses instead on 
dividing and conquering those parties that have successfully used 
information capture in the past by creating competition among 
them.384 
Competition-based regulation is easiest to understand in the 
context of product licensing. In current product licensing, the EPA 
determines which products are not “unreasonably unsafe” (or the 
equivalent) through complex and generally unopposed processes that 
often involve only the manufacturers of the product at issue. Because 
these manufacturers may dominate the procedures, the EPA’s 
deliberations may not benefit from pluralistic oversight. As a result, 
there is a risk that the agency’s decisions will diverge from both 
 
 383. Information specialists may have other organization-based or process-based 
suggestions for how past information excesses can be brought under control in the future. If a 
rule remains highly complex and opaque, even after implementation, then information audits 
may be used to clarify or sort the issues according to their significance and to reduce 
unnecessary ambiguities or technical details in the future. These systems may also help organize 
the constant influx of administrative materials by, for example, sorting documents and inputs 
according to their materiality, reliability, and relevance with different electronic signatures for 
high-, medium-, and low-quality filings based on these factors (material, reliable, relevant). 
Regardless of how this is accomplished, the point here is simply that these types of 
informational economics should be brought to bear with some force on the administrative state. 
As Professor Simon observes: “When we find the right way to summarize and characterize that 
information—when we find the pattern hidden in it—its vast bulk compresses into succinct laws, 
each one enormously informative.” SIMON, supra note 19, at 227. Although it is beyond the 
scope of this Article to identify how these types of informational management schemes might be 
implemented, it appears that the capacity to accomplish this type of informational downsizing 
and filtering, even for existing rules, exists and could prove helpful. 
 384. See Wendy E. Wagner, Using Competition-Based Regulation to Bridge the Toxics Data 
Gap, 83 IND. L.J. 629 passim (2008) (providing a fuller version of this proposal); see also DAVID 
DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 153–61 (2003) (introducing 
the idea of a competitive-based private claim available to first-movers to recoup costs associated 
with environmental innovation). 
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statutory goals and what rigorous factfinding might otherwise reveal 
due to information capture. 
The EPA does not have the resources to review these past 
decisions, and even if it did, it seems unlikely that reviews would 
involve participation from a diverse set of interest groups. The 
alternative here attempts to devise ways to encourage the regulated 
parties themselves to challenge licensing decisions that are too 
lenient. Specifically, the manufacturer of a green product could file a 
petition alleging that a competitor’s product, which occupies the same 
market niche, is much more hazardous in a variety of ways and 
therefore should be regulated more stringently. The types of 
regulatory requirements that might be imposed on this inferior 
competitor could range from labeling requirements (that highlight the 
risks associated with using the product relative to superior products) 
to actually banning the inferior product if its risks are unreasonable in 
light of the alternatives. The process would be initiated by a petition 
filed by the green company and would involve an adjudicatory 
hearing in which the manufacturers would battle each other on the 
facts. The EPA would make a final decision on the merits and issue 
regulations accordingly.385 
A similar process might be established for reviewing pollution 
control standards. A green company could petition the EPA to set 
more stringent limits for discharges from a category of industry 
because of the ready availability of green methods and technologies 
that significantly reduce pollution below permitted levels. 
One of this approach’s key attributes is that it provides incentives 
for adversaries to dredge up useful information regarding optimal 
environmental solutions that might otherwise be lost in the mounds of 
undigested regulatory filings. By relying on manufacturers to root out 
information on inferior competitors, and providing a forum for 
establishing more stringent regulation of those competitors, the 
proposal unleashes energy that those outside the competitive process, 
including regulators, will have difficulty duplicating.386 An added 
 
 385. EPA regulators would adjudicate these competitive claims through adversarial hearings 
in formal rulemaking fashion. If a product is certified as superior, the certification could be 
useful not only to consumers but also to insurers and investors, and might even ward off tort 
litigation by indicating that the manufacturer produced at least a “reasonable alternative 
design.” See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (1998). 
 386. Undoubtedly, manufacturers will sometimes overstate the risks of competitor products, 
but adversarial adjudications help protect against this overstatement by providing competitors 
with a full opportunity to rebut or disprove allegations of risk. 
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benefit of this approach is that market forces will help triage the 
regulatory process. Competitive energy will focus on the worst 
products and processes (for example, those for which green 
alternatives have the greatest competitive edge). The striking 
similarity of this proposal with recent proposals for competition-
based reform of the patent system—in which non-patent holders 
could file petitions to cancel a patent as invalid—attests to 
policymakers’ increasing recognition of the valuable role market 
forces can serve in supporting regulatory decisions and processes.387 
The petition process could also be open to any party willing to 
bring a case against an inferior product, not just the manufacturers or 
other regulated parties who stand to benefit financially. Thus, if 
industry proves reluctant to engage in the process but there are 
established differences between products, public interest advocates 
could press the charge in their stead.388 In these settings, in which the 
petitioner is not the company standing to profit monetarily from the 
claim, the petitioner could also be awarded attorney fees for 
substantially prevailing, as well as a possible bonus fee to be paid at 
the discretion of the superior company as an expected but not 
mandated thank you.389 
 
 387. See Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 321 (2007) (providing that 
anyone “who is not the patent owner may file with the Office a petition for cancellation seeking 
to institute a post-grant review proceeding to cancel as unpatentable any claim of a patent”); see 
also COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECON., NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 96–97 (Stephen A. Merrill, 
Richard Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004) (“The committee recommends that Congress 
seriously consider legislation creating an Open Review procedure, enabling third parties to 
challenge the validity of issued patents on any grounds in an administrative proceeding within 
the USPTO.”). 
 388. See Wagner, supra note 384, at 643–44 (discussing an example based on asphalt 
sealant). 
 389. Although the competitive-based approach to regulation targets existing products and 
regulations, it might also be available to work prospectively in cases in which regulated 
participants are well established and new regulations—perhaps climate change or 
nanotechnology—are coming along the pike. In these settings, if the agency has several 
alternative proposals that emerge from its rulemaking process, there could be a brief six-month 
or one-year window during which competitors could advocate for the most ambitious proposal 
to establish a market edge. Some of this adversarialism may emerge (or be squelched) in 
comment periods; but by attaching a clear reward to the claim or position, it may draw 
competitors out of the closet and turn them against one another. 
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CONCLUSION 
A commitment to open government and equal access is 
appropriately central to the administrative process, and these 
objectives remain the continuing focus of legislators, administrators, 
and the courts. The assumption that these goals alone will ensure 
accountable government, however, has generally been taken for 
granted; and over time, it has become increasingly evident that 
significant design flaws are emerging in the system that threaten to 
undermine these objectives. Chief among these design flaws is 
administrative law’s obliviousness to the impact that excessive 
information can have on the effective functioning of the system. 
There are no provisions in administrative law for regulating the flow 
of information entering or leaving the system or for ensuring that 
regulatory participants can keep up with the rising tide of issues, 
details, and technicalities. Indeed, a number of doctrinal refinements 
intended originally to ensure that executive branch decisions are 
made in the sunlight inadvertently create incentives to overwhelm the 
administrative system with information. Rather than illuminating the 
process, these reams of comments and reports replete with 
inaccessible techno-jargon create a dark cloud that obscures the 
decisionmaking process and ultimately undermines pluralistic 
oversight, productive judicial review, and opportunities for intelligent 
agency decisionmaking. 
A number of public-benefitting rules emerging from the 
regulatory state may be influenced heavily by only one set of 
interests—typically regulated parties—with little to no 
counterpressure to ensure that the public interest is represented or 
protected. The result is information capture: embedded participatory 
imbalances that emerge from the administrative legal system’s infinite 
tolerance of and even tendency to encourage information excess. 
Information capture allows strategic parties to effect considerable 
control over the agency’s priorities and the substance of regulatory 
decisionmaking. Even more insidious, under the right circumstances 
this information capture occurs even if the dominant participants are 
not trying to manipulate the system. 
Information may have been a scarce commodity in the 1940s 
when the foundation for the administrative state was being laid, but 
this is no longer the case. Existing administrative processes suffer 
from too much rather than too little information. Other areas of law 
have developed rules that explicitly discourage parties from playing 
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strategic games with information and encourage communications 
between participants to be productive and efficient. It is past time for 
the administrative system to take note and change its ways. 
